Persona: Moral, María J.
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Moral
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María J.
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Publicación Scrappage by age: Cash for Clunkers matters!(Elsevier, 2019-06-13) Laborda, Juan; Moral, María J.; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0966-7034This study assesses the effect of tax incentives on scrappage in periods of both economic expansion and crisis. Although such incentives are common during a recession, they may also be useful in renewing the vehicle fleet during other periods in order to reduce pollution and improve road safety. The present analysis is based on panel data covering the period from 2011 to 2017 in Spain, where several schemes were intermittently implemented. Using duration models, we specify the scrappage rate as a function of car age and other factors related to business cycle and transportation sector. On the base of this specification, we control for tax incentives. Our results confirm the relevant impact of car age and scrappage schemes on the scrappage rate and, consequently, on fleet age distribution. Therefore, cash for clunkers schemes may be of interest to policymakers as part of a strategy to reduce pollution and road accidents, regardless of the stage of the business cycle.Publicación Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices(Elsevier, 2019-10-18) González, Xulia; Moral, María J.In February 2015, Spain’s Competition Authority imposed € 32.4 million in fines on five of the country’s largest oil operators as sanctions for price collusion. This paper examines the effect of that antitrust action on retail fuel prices. Our analysis uses a novel data set with detailed information on more than 8000 gas stations throughout Spain. Prices were collected every day from 18 August 2014 to 15 June 2015 (almost 2 million price observations). First we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for wholesale costs and brand affiliation. Then we use a model of gas stations and time fixed effects while adopting a difference-in-differences approach to assessing the fines’ effect on retail fuel prices. Our results indicate that, after publication of the fine, sanctioned firms raise prices slightly, and the additional revenues far exceeded the amount of the fine. We also find substantial heterogeneity, depending on the size of the fine, in the magnitude of this price response. Hence the fine’s burden might well have been borne mainly by consumers, whose welfare was thereby reduced. Our study should be of interest to antitrust authorities as we show that sanctions may not be effective enough in deter price fixing practices, especially when sanctions are weak and the profits from colluding are sufficiently high.Publicación Examining the influence of tourism on beer demand in retail markets(Taylor & Francis, 2023-08-07) López González, Alejandro; Moral, María J.; Taylor & Francis; https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5515-5235; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0966-7034Beer is a widely consumed beverage in Spain, particularly among the large numbers of tourists that visit our coastal regions. By taking into consideration the Spanish consumption statistics provided by the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, it is intended to measure the influence of tourism on beer sales, once having controlled the main factors of demand (prices, income, unemployment) and having avoided the multicollinearity between tourist frequentation and seasonality. It is concluded that tourism has a positive and significant impact on the relevant market of each region and month, as well as on the differences between the income of the local population and the one of tourists.Publicación Fuel taxation, emissions policy, and competitive advantage in the diffusion of European diesel automobiles(Wiley, 2018) Miravete, Eugenio J.; Thurk, Jeff; Moral, María J.Import tarifs have decreased signi cantly over the past 30 years due to a large number of economic integration agreements. We investigate whether national policies can be an efective replacement for tarifs to protect domestic industry. Our focus is the European automobile market where we show fuel taxes and vehicle emissions policy favored diesel vehicles, a technology popular with European consumers but largely ofered only by domestic automakers. We estimate a discrete choice, oligopoly model of horizontally diferentiated products using Spanish automobile registration data where we observe engine type. We show European automakers bene ted from pro-diesel fuel taxes and a lenient NOx emissions policy to earn signi cant pro ts from diesel cars. Had regulators used policies which did not favor diesels, consumers would have shifted consumption towards gasoline-powered imports. We show both policies amounted to signi cant non-tarif trade policies equivalent to an import tarif between two to three times the ofcial rate.Publicación Competition and Competitors: Evidence from the Retail Fuel Market(Sage Journals, 2023) González, Xulia; Moral, María J.; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8142-2285Policy makers and antitrust authorities are concerned about the lack of competition in the fuel retail market and its impact on consumer prices. The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the role of the intensity of competition and competitors’ brand affiliation on retail fuel prices. To this end, we use a panel data set with detailed daily on nearly 8,500 gas stations and 2 million price observations; we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for supply (input costs and local competition) and demand shifters (income, traffic intensity, and location) as well as for brand and time fixed effects. We use an instrumental variable estimation strategy, to account for the endogeneity of the intensity of competition. Our results show that premium brands and low-cost brands affect the prices of rival firms in an opposite way. On the one hand, premium brands soften competition in the local markets where they operate and thereby allow their rivals to set higher prices. Besides, price setting by premium-brand stations react differently depending on whether the nearest rival sells the same brand (a friendly competitor) or some other brand. By contrast, low-cost brands contribute to reducing prices through their own prices (direct effect), thereby encouraging competitors to lower their prices (indirect effect). Our results suggest that regulation limiting the entry of premium operators whilst promoting the entry of low cost gas stations will enhance competition at the retail level.