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Competition and Competitors: Evidence from the Retail Fuel Market

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dc.contributor.authorGonzález, Xulia
dc.contributor.authorMoral, María J.
dc.contributor.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8142-2285
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-18T09:19:32Z
dc.date.available2024-07-18T09:19:32Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.descriptionThis is the Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Sage Journal in "Energy Journal" on Nov 2023, available online: https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.44.6.xgon Este es el manuscrito aceptado de un artículo publicado por Sage Journalen "Energy Journal" en Nov 2023, disponible en línea: https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.44.6.xgon
dc.description.abstractPolicy makers and antitrust authorities are concerned about the lack of competition in the fuel retail market and its impact on consumer prices. The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the role of the intensity of competition and competitors’ brand affiliation on retail fuel prices. To this end, we use a panel data set with detailed daily on nearly 8,500 gas stations and 2 million price observations; we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for supply (input costs and local competition) and demand shifters (income, traffic intensity, and location) as well as for brand and time fixed effects. We use an instrumental variable estimation strategy, to account for the endogeneity of the intensity of competition. Our results show that premium brands and low-cost brands affect the prices of rival firms in an opposite way. On the one hand, premium brands soften competition in the local markets where they operate and thereby allow their rivals to set higher prices. Besides, price setting by premium-brand stations react differently depending on whether the nearest rival sells the same brand (a friendly competitor) or some other brand. By contrast, low-cost brands contribute to reducing prices through their own prices (direct effect), thereby encouraging competitors to lower their prices (indirect effect). Our results suggest that regulation limiting the entry of premium operators whilst promoting the entry of low cost gas stations will enhance competition at the retail level.en
dc.description.versionversión final
dc.identifier.citationGonzález, X. y Moral, MJ. (2023), “Competition and Competitors: Evidence from the Retail Fuel Market”, The Energy Journal, 44 (6). https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.44.6.xgon
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.44.6.xgon
dc.identifier.issn1944-9089, 0195-6574
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/23009
dc.journal.issue6
dc.journal.titleEnergy Journal
dc.journal.volume44
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final187
dc.page.initial163
dc.publisherSage Journals
dc.relation.centerFacultades y escuelas::Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
dc.relation.departmentEconomía de la Empresa y Contabilidad
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es
dc.subject53 Ciencias Económicas
dc.subject.keywordsfuel pricesen
dc.subject.keywordslocal market competitionen
dc.subject.keywordssntitrust regulationen
dc.subject.keywordsSpainen
dc.titleCompetition and Competitors: Evidence from the Retail Fuel Marketen
dc.typeartículoes
dc.typejournal articleen
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6c3ad27b-bbd9-44ce-a1e4-0854f96ceb26
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6c3ad27b-bbd9-44ce-a1e4-0854f96ceb26
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