Publicación: La cláusula de comisión de apertura del préstamo hipotecario en cuestión con el Auto de Tribunal Supremo de 10 de septiembre 2021
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2022
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Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacional
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info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess
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Thomson Reuters Aranzadi
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La concesión de un crédito responsable implica para la prestamista la realización de ciertas actividades o servicios que permitan averiguar la solvencia del potencial cliente que se concitan en el concepto legal de comisión de apertura. Como cualquier cláusula no negociada individualmente está sometida a la protección que quiere brindar la Directiva 93/13 al usuario del crédito medio, atento y perspicaz; protección que se traduce en que la exigencia de su transparencia no se reduzca sólo al carácter comprensible de ésta en un plano formal y gramatical sino que debe entenderse de manera “extensiva”; esto es, que en el momento de la celebración del contrato, el consumidor tenga el nivel de información óptimo que le permita apreciar la carga económica y jurídica que pesará sobre él por efecto de esa cláusula comisión de apertura cuando forme su consentimiento. Pese a que los criterios para ponderar la transparencia extensiva de la comisión de apertura habían sido fijados obiter dita por el Tribunal Supremo desde la Sentencia 44/2019, atendiendo a que su naturaleza es la de ser un elemento esencial del contrato, el TS en su reciente Auto de 10 septiembre 2021, pide su confirmación al Tribunal de Justicia y con ello, la de su doctrina sobre la necesidad del juicio de abusividad cuando la cláusula sea declarada, conforme a dichos criterios, intransparente. Quiere dejar claro que la declaración del Tribunal de Luxemburgo, relativa a que la comisión de apertura al no ser un elemento esencial del contrato, cae en el juicio automático de abusividad donde se puede exigir a la prestamista la demostración de los servicios efectivamente prestados so pena de considerarla nula, parte de un planteamiento distorsionador del órgano jurisdiccional remitente, y ha llevado a posturas disidentes con su doctrina a ciertos órganos jurisdiccionales. La tendencia al juicio de abusividad directa que comienza con las cláusulas suelo y multidivisa, encuentra apoyo para otras cláusulas esenciales del contrato en la doctrina e incluso en órganos jurisdiccionales que han respetado la doctrina del TS y se entiende que será la regla general cuando se aplique a los contratos de préstamo el nuevo párrafo del art. 83 TRLGDCU. La última palabra la tiene hoy el TJUE. Sin embargo, creemos que en el enjuiciamiento de abusividad de una comisión de apertura intransparente pueden atenderse otros criterios que los que el TS ha hecho llegar en su Auto al TJUE, pues éstos responden al concepto normativo de la comisión de apertura y blindarían la posición del prestamista en la mayoría de los casos. La demostración de las acciones o servicios propios de dicha comisión, que es llegar al verdadero control de precios, con criterios más específicos será lo que favorezca la alta protección que quiere brindar la Directiva 93/13 al prestatario.
The granting of a responsible lending implies for the lender to carry out some activities to check the creditworthiness of the potential client that are subsumed within the legal concept of “arrangement fee”. As any other, an “arrangement fee” which has not been individually negotiated are subject to the protection provided by the Directive to the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. This means that the requirement of transparency cannot be reduced merely to the understandability of the clause from a formal, grammatical point of view. On the contrary, that requirement must be understood in a broad sense, namely that, at the time the contract is signed, the consumer has been provided with enough information to enable him or her to evaluate the consequences deriving from the “arrangement fee” clause. Even though the criteria to assess the transparency of the “arrangement fee” clause were set obiter dicta by the Supreme Court since the judgment 44/2019, considering that its nature is that of being an essential element of the contract, in its recent order of 10 September 2021, the Supreme Court requested the Court of Justice for confirmation of those criteria and of its doctrine on the need for an unfairness judgment when the clause is declared intransparent according to said criteria. The Supreme Court intends to make it clear that the declaration of the Court of Luxembourg in its judgment of 16 July 2020, Caixabank, stating that the “arrangement fee” clause is directly subject to the unfairness test, according to which unless the lender proves the services actually provided, the clause shall be deemed null and void, draws from a distorting approach of the referring court, having such declaration led to some national Courts to positions dissenting with the Supreme Court’s doctrine. The tendency to a direct unfairness judgment resulting from the lack of transparency like that applied to the “floor” and “multi-currency” terms in the case of other essential clauses of the contract finds support in the doctrine and even in jurisdictional bodies that have respected the Supreme Court’s doctrine, and it is understood that it will become the rule when the second paragraph of article 83 of the consolidated text of the General Law for the protection of consumers and users (TRLGDCU) applies to the contract. The CJEU has the last word today. However, we believe that in prosecuting the unfairness of an “arrangement fee” clause, if it is intransparent, the criteria can be taken into account than those that the TS has sent to the CJEU in its Order, since these respond to the normative concept of the opening commission and would shield the position of the lender in most cases. The demonstration of the actions or services of said fee, which is to reach the true price control, with more specific criteria will be what favors the high protection that Directive 93/13 wants to offer to the borrower.
The granting of a responsible lending implies for the lender to carry out some activities to check the creditworthiness of the potential client that are subsumed within the legal concept of “arrangement fee”. As any other, an “arrangement fee” which has not been individually negotiated are subject to the protection provided by the Directive to the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. This means that the requirement of transparency cannot be reduced merely to the understandability of the clause from a formal, grammatical point of view. On the contrary, that requirement must be understood in a broad sense, namely that, at the time the contract is signed, the consumer has been provided with enough information to enable him or her to evaluate the consequences deriving from the “arrangement fee” clause. Even though the criteria to assess the transparency of the “arrangement fee” clause were set obiter dicta by the Supreme Court since the judgment 44/2019, considering that its nature is that of being an essential element of the contract, in its recent order of 10 September 2021, the Supreme Court requested the Court of Justice for confirmation of those criteria and of its doctrine on the need for an unfairness judgment when the clause is declared intransparent according to said criteria. The Supreme Court intends to make it clear that the declaration of the Court of Luxembourg in its judgment of 16 July 2020, Caixabank, stating that the “arrangement fee” clause is directly subject to the unfairness test, according to which unless the lender proves the services actually provided, the clause shall be deemed null and void, draws from a distorting approach of the referring court, having such declaration led to some national Courts to positions dissenting with the Supreme Court’s doctrine. The tendency to a direct unfairness judgment resulting from the lack of transparency like that applied to the “floor” and “multi-currency” terms in the case of other essential clauses of the contract finds support in the doctrine and even in jurisdictional bodies that have respected the Supreme Court’s doctrine, and it is understood that it will become the rule when the second paragraph of article 83 of the consolidated text of the General Law for the protection of consumers and users (TRLGDCU) applies to the contract. The CJEU has the last word today. However, we believe that in prosecuting the unfairness of an “arrangement fee” clause, if it is intransparent, the criteria can be taken into account than those that the TS has sent to the CJEU in its Order, since these respond to the normative concept of the opening commission and would shield the position of the lender in most cases. The demonstration of the actions or services of said fee, which is to reach the true price control, with more specific criteria will be what favors the high protection that Directive 93/13 wants to offer to the borrower.
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