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Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices

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dc.contributor.authorGonzález, Xulia
dc.contributor.authorMoral, María J.
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-18T16:55:09Z
dc.date.available2024-10-18T16:55:09Z
dc.date.issued2019-10-18
dc.descriptionThe registered version of this article, first published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, is available online at the publisher's website: Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102537
dc.descriptionLa versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en International Journal of Industrial Organization, está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102537
dc.description.abstractIn February 2015, Spain’s Competition Authority imposed € 32.4 million in fines on five of the country’s largest oil operators as sanctions for price collusion. This paper examines the effect of that antitrust action on retail fuel prices. Our analysis uses a novel data set with detailed information on more than 8000 gas stations throughout Spain. Prices were collected every day from 18 August 2014 to 15 June 2015 (almost 2 million price observations). First we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for wholesale costs and brand affiliation. Then we use a model of gas stations and time fixed effects while adopting a difference-in-differences approach to assessing the fines’ effect on retail fuel prices. Our results indicate that, after publication of the fine, sanctioned firms raise prices slightly, and the additional revenues far exceeded the amount of the fine. We also find substantial heterogeneity, depending on the size of the fine, in the magnitude of this price response. Hence the fine’s burden might well have been borne mainly by consumers, whose welfare was thereby reduced. Our study should be of interest to antitrust authorities as we show that sanctions may not be effective enough in deter price fixing practices, especially when sanctions are weak and the profits from colluding are sufficiently high.en
dc.description.versionversión final
dc.identifier.citation"González, X. y M.J. Moral, 2019, ""Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices"", International Journal of Industrial Organization 67, 102537.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.102537
dc.identifier.issn1873-7986
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/24084
dc.journal.titleInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
dc.journal.volume67
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.centerFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
dc.relation.departmentEconomía Aplicada
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es
dc.subject53 Ciencias Económicas
dc.subject.keywordsfuel pricesen
dc.subject.keywordsretail fuel marketen
dc.subject.keywordsantitrust prosecutionen
dc.subject.keywordsbrand affiliationen
dc.titleEffects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel pricesen
dc.typeartículoes
dc.typejournal articleen
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery6c3ad27b-bbd9-44ce-a1e4-0854f96ceb26
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