Publicación: The forgotten elements in the debate on the limiting of the action for repayment of the cost unduly charged to the consumer: the «limitation objection abuse», the absence of «causa retinendi» and «legal realism» (First part)
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2023
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Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad y Mercantiles de España
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Tres claves son capitales para encajar que la acción de restitución de los gastos indebidamente imputados al usuario en una cláusula nula por abusiva en un contrato de préstamo estándar protegido por la Directiva 93/13, puede ser tan independiente de la acción declarativa de la que deriva, que puede ser prescriptible y acorde con los principios de eficacia y de seguridad materializados en la exigencia por el TJUE del plazo «razonable» para activar con éxito la «facultad de exigir» la prestación indebidamente pagada: 1. La aplicación de la doctrina alemana del «abuso de la prescripción» cuando se ha creado la apariencia de que no debería alegarse por el sujeto beneficiado por la prescripción; porque dicho sujeto no puede abstraerse de la notoriedad y publicidad de las resoluciones en que se declaraba la nulidad por abusiva de la cláusula redactada por él. 2. La inexistencia de la «causa retinendi» del desplazamiento patrimonial del principio del «enriquecimiento injusto negativo»; porque la característica propia de la acción de restitución que es la de reclamar el reembolso de los gastos realizados a terceros y no a la prestamista, no puede albergarse en el sinalagma del artículo 1303 del Código Civil; y 3. El «realismo jurídico» previo paso por la necesaria objetivización del «criterio subjetivo» del "dies a quo" de la prescripción; porque al poner en paralelo a la jurisprudencia con las normas jurídicas en el sistema de fuentes del Derecho, hace juiciosa nuestra opción de considerar como "dies a quo" de la acción de restitución, la fecha de 23 de enero de 2019, que es la de las «sentencias uniformes del Tribunal Supremo».Veremos si nos da la razón el Tribunal de Luxemburgo o si prefiere optar por alguna de estas otras tres opciones planteadas por el Tribunal Supremo y la Sección 15 de la AP de Barcelona en sus respectivos autos planteando cuestión prejudicial: la fecha de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia en los asuntos acumulados C-698/18 y 699/18, o en los asuntos acumulados C-224/19 y C-259/19; la fecha de la declaración de nulidad de la cláusula por abusiva en el caso concreto, o la fecha del pago de los gastos indebidamente imputados.
Three elements are of capital importance in assuming that the legal action for the refunding of formalization, novation or cancellation costs unduly charged to the consumer by an unfair term in a standard loan contract covered by the Directive 93/13 can be as much independent of the invalidity action from which it derives as to be subject to a limitation period, in conformity with the principles of effectiveness and legal certainty embodied in the requirement by the ECJ of «reasonable» time limits for exercising the right to claim the refunding of amounts unduly paid: 1. The application of the German doctrine of «limitation objection abuse» when the appearance has been created that such an objection will. 2. The absence of the «causa retinendi» of the patrimonial displacement of the «negative unjust enrichment» principle; because the object of the action for repayment, which is to claim the reimbursement of payments made to third parties and not to the lender, cannot be housed in the «synalagma» of article 1303 of the Civil Code; and 3. «Legal realism» after passing through the necessary «objectification of the subjective criterion» of the dies a quo of the limitation period; because, by putting in parallel the jurisprudence with the legal rules in the system of sources of law, it makes our option to consider as dies a quo of the action for repayment, the date of January 23, 2019, which is that of the «uniform judgments of the Supreme Court», judicious.We will see if the Court of Luxembourg agrees with us or if it prefers to opt for one of these other three options raised by the SC and Section 15 of the Barcelona AP in their respective orders raising a preliminary question: the date of the judgment of the Court of Justice in joined cases C-698/18 and 699/18, or in joined cases C-224/19 and C-259/19; the date of the declaration of nullity of the clause as abusive in the specific case, or the date of payment of the unduly charged expenses.
Three elements are of capital importance in assuming that the legal action for the refunding of formalization, novation or cancellation costs unduly charged to the consumer by an unfair term in a standard loan contract covered by the Directive 93/13 can be as much independent of the invalidity action from which it derives as to be subject to a limitation period, in conformity with the principles of effectiveness and legal certainty embodied in the requirement by the ECJ of «reasonable» time limits for exercising the right to claim the refunding of amounts unduly paid: 1. The application of the German doctrine of «limitation objection abuse» when the appearance has been created that such an objection will. 2. The absence of the «causa retinendi» of the patrimonial displacement of the «negative unjust enrichment» principle; because the object of the action for repayment, which is to claim the reimbursement of payments made to third parties and not to the lender, cannot be housed in the «synalagma» of article 1303 of the Civil Code; and 3. «Legal realism» after passing through the necessary «objectification of the subjective criterion» of the dies a quo of the limitation period; because, by putting in parallel the jurisprudence with the legal rules in the system of sources of law, it makes our option to consider as dies a quo of the action for repayment, the date of January 23, 2019, which is that of the «uniform judgments of the Supreme Court», judicious.We will see if the Court of Luxembourg agrees with us or if it prefers to opt for one of these other three options raised by the SC and Section 15 of the Barcelona AP in their respective orders raising a preliminary question: the date of the judgment of the Court of Justice in joined cases C-698/18 and 699/18, or in joined cases C-224/19 and C-259/19; the date of the declaration of nullity of the clause as abusive in the specific case, or the date of payment of the unduly charged expenses.
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