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Welfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimicking

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dc.contributor.authorAyala Cañón, Luis
dc.contributor.authorHerrero Alcalde, Ana
dc.contributor.authorMartinez‐Vazquez, Jorge
dc.contributor.funderInstituto de Estudios Fiscales. España
dc.contributor.funderComunidad Autónoma de Madrid. España
dc.date.accessioned2025-11-04T17:08:41Z
dc.date.available2025-11-04T17:08:41Z
dc.date.issued2024-01-10
dc.descriptionThe registered version of this article, first published in Papers in Regional Science, is available online at the publisher's website: Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12605
dc.descriptionLa versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en Papers in Regional Science, está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Elsevier, https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12605
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the determinants of welfare benefit levels within a highly fiscally decentralized context. More specifically, we analyze the role of mimicking as a driver of the institutional design of subnational government policies in the absence of federal co-ordination and financing. Empirically we focus on the welfare benefit programs of Spanish regional governments during the period 1996-2015. Our results strongly support the significant role played by mimicking: regional public agents observe what their peers are doing and act accordingly, and this holds even in a context of low mobility of households.en
dc.description.versionversión final
dc.identifier.citationHerrero-Alcalde, A.; L. Ayala-Cañón; y J. Martinez-Vazquez (2021): “Welfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimicking”, Papers in Regional Science, 100(5), 1178-1209, DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12605 (Working Paper GSU)
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12605
dc.identifier.issn1435-5957
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/30753
dc.journal.issue5
dc.journal.titlePapers in Regional Science
dc.journal.volume100
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final1209
dc.page.initial1178
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.centerFacultad de Derecho
dc.relation.departmentEconomía Aplicada y Gestión Pública
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.es
dc.subject5303 Contabilidad pública
dc.subject5304 Actividad económica
dc.subject.keywordswelfareen
dc.subject.keywordsfiscal federalismen
dc.subject.keywordsyardstick competitionen
dc.subject.keywordsinequalityen
dc.titleWelfare benefits in highly decentralized fiscal systems: Evidence on interregional mimickingen
dc.typeartículoes
dc.typejournal articleen
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication235c25ef-3291-45b1-bdc0-e9ce9f4cb42c
relation.isAuthorOfPublication6bcbefc4-e649-4eea-9c5c-c6497320f6ea
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery235c25ef-3291-45b1-bdc0-e9ce9f4cb42c
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