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Responding to second-order reasons

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dc.contributor.authorKeeling, Sophie Alexandria
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-07T09:34:55Z
dc.date.available2025-02-07T09:34:55Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.descriptionThe registered version of this article, first published in “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume 109, 2024", is available online at the publisher's website: Wiley, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13069 La versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume 109, 2024", está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Wiley, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13069
dc.description.abstractA rich literature has discussed what it is to respond to a reason, e.g., to believe or act on the basis of some consideration or another. In comparison, what it would be to respond to a second-order reason has been underexplored. Yet formulating an account of this is vital for maintaining the existence of second-order reasons in both the practical and epistemic domains. And indeed, there are reasons to doubt this is possible. For example, responding to second-order reasons is meant to be different from simply coming to believe or act for a more richly described first-order reason but it's not clear what this would look like. This paper introduces an account of the second-order basing relation which meets these concerns. It therefore both develops our picture of second-order reasons and helps to defend their existence.en
dc.description.versionversión publicada
dc.identifier.citationSophie Keeling, 2024. Responding to second-order reasons, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume 109, Issue 3 Pages: 755-1067, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13069
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13069
dc.identifier.issn1933-1592
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/25849
dc.journal.issue3
dc.journal.titlePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
dc.journal.volume109
dc.language.isoen
dc.page.final818
dc.page.initial799
dc.publisherWILEY
dc.relation.centerFacultades y escuelas::Facultad de Filosofía
dc.relation.departmentLógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.es
dc.subject72 Filosofía
dc.titleResponding to second-order reasonsen
dc.typeartículoes
dc.typejournal articleen
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication9c2e0602-0a07-4fa0-9cbc-cd58adba64f3
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery9c2e0602-0a07-4fa0-9cbc-cd58adba64f3
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