Persona: Teira Serrano, David
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Teira Serrano
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David
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Publicación El oráculo gramatical de Agustín García Calvo(1998-11-01) Teira Serrano, DavidLo que queremos mostrar en este ensayo es que la pretendida razón común ejercitada por García Calvo en sus escritos encubre una concepción metafísica muy particular del lenguaje, de la que dimanan sus análisis gramaticales de la Realidad; una concepción que no se defiende sino que se postula oracularmente: lo que hay es lenguaje. A ello sumaremos una breve consideración de las limitaciones de esos análisis, más allá de que se conceda o no la tesis metafísica de partida.Publicación What evidence for a cholera vaccine? Jaime Ferrán’s submissions to the Prix Bréant(2023-01-01) Uzcanga Lacabe, Clara; Teira Serrano, DavidThis article analyses how the French Academy of Sciences assessed Jaime Ferrán’s cholera vaccine submitted for the Prix Bréant in the 1880s. Ferrán, a Spanish independent physician, discovered the treatment in 1884 and tried it on thousands of patients during the cholera outbreak in Valencia the following year. His evaluation sparked a controversy in Spain and abroad on the vaccine’s efficacy. The Bréant jury did not see any evidence for it in Ferrán’s submission, a decision usually interpreted in terms of French scientific nationalism (or simple chauvinism): an outsider from the scientific periphery could not be awarded the Bréant. Drawing on the archival records of the award, we suggest that Ferrán failed instead to provide data that the Academy could consider unbiased, according to the contemporary standards for data presentation. We will illustrate these standards at work in the assessment of another submission from Spain, by Philipp Hauser, who received the Bréant for the thoroughness of his statistical endeavour.Publicación Rules versus standards: what are the costs of epistemic norms in drug regulation?(2019-01-01) Andreoletti, Mattia; Teira Serrano, DavidOver the last decade, philosophers of science have extensively criticized the epistemic superiority of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) for testing safety and effectiveness of new drugs, defending instead various forms of evidential pluralism. We argue that scientific methods in regulatory decision making cannot be assessed in epistemic terms only: there are costs involved. Drawing on the legal distinction between rules and standards, we show that drug regulation based on evidential pluralism has much higher costs than our current RCT-based system. We analyze these costs and advocate for evaluating any scheme for drug regulatory tests in terms of concrete empirical benchmarks, like the error rates of regulatory decisions.Publicación Frank Knight : le risque comme critique de l ' économie politique(2000-03-17) Pradier, Pierre Charles; Teira Serrano, DavidIn this paper we try to throw some light on the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty attending to a number of previous contributions to philosophy and economics. On the economists' side, we propose to read Knight's distinction on the light of the distribution controversy that took place at the Quarterly Journal of Economics at the end of the XIX century. On the philosophers' side, the pair risk/uncertainty can be analysed in view of Knight's epistemological sources, as opposing a sort of probabilistic positivism to an agnostic variety of positivism. His philosophical commitments can be of use in explaining why Knight closes down the distribution controversy, proposing instead a reconstruction of economics as a rational choice science. En el presente artículo intentamos obtener algunas claves para iluminar la distinción knightiana entre riesgo e incertidumbre a partir de la obra de sus predecesores. Por parte de los economistas, podemos interpretar la distinción a la luz del debate sobre la distribución que tuvo lugar en el Quarterly Journal of Economics a finales del XIX. Por otra parte, atendiendo a sus fuentes filosóficas podemos analizar la distinción entre riesgo e incertidumbre en términos de teoría del conocimiento oponiendo positivismo probabilístico a positivismo agnóstico. El análisis de la epistemología de Knight nos permite explicar por qué cierra por absurdo el debate sobre la distribución, proponiendo a cambio una reconstrucción de la teoría económica como ciencia de la elección racional.Publicación Placebo trials without mechanisms: How far can they go?(2019-07-01) Teira Serrano, DavidIn this paper, I suggest that placebo effects, as we know them today, should be understood as experimental phenomena, low-level regularities whose causal structure is grasped through particular experimental designs with little theoretical guidance. Focusing on placebo interventions with needles for pain reduction -one of the few placebo regularities that seems to arise in meta-analytical studies- I discuss the extent to which it is possible to decompose the different factors at play through more fine-grained randomized clinical trials. My sceptical argument is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that experiments alone are not enough to standardize interventions, and that it is necessary to include theories. On the other hand, I argue that the social interactions that seem to be part of placebo effects are difficult, if not impossible, to blind. Therefore, the measurement biases arising from the participants’ reactivity to the experimental setup cannot be controlled for. Further decomposition of placebo effects requires a theoretical account of the existing experimental regularities that may guide further tests.Publicación Why Experimental Balance is Still a Reason to Randomize(2020-03-01) Martínez, Marco; Teira Serrano, DavidExperimental balance is usually understood as the control for the value of the conditions, other than the one under study, which are liable to affect the result of a test. We will discuss three different approaches to balance. ‘Millean balance’ requires to identify and equalize ex ante the value of these conditions in order to conduct solid causal inferences. ‘Fisherian balance’ measures ex post the influence of uncontrolled conditions through the analysis of variance. In ‘efficiency balance’ the value of the antecedent conditions is decided ex ante according to the efficiency they yield in the estimation of the treatment outcome. Against some old arguments by John Worrall, we will show that in both Fisherian and efficiency balance there are good reasons to randomize the allocation of treatments, in particular when there is no agreement among experimenters as to the antecedent conditions to be controlled for.Publicación A Contractarian Solution to the Experimenter’s Regress(2012-12-25) Teira Serrano, DavidDebiasing procedures are experimental methods aimed at correcting errors arising from the cognitive biases of the experimenter. We will discuss two of these methods, the predesignation rule and randomization, showing to what extent they are open to the experimenter’s regress: there is no meta-rule to prove that, after implementing the procedure, the experimental data are actually free from biases. We claim that, from a contractarian perspective these procedures are nonetheless defensible, since they provide a warrant of the impartiality of the experiment: we only need a proof that the result has not been intentionally manipulated for a prima facie acceptance.Publicación Kites: the rise and fall of a scientific object(2014) Suay Belenguer, Juan Miguel; Teira Serrano, DavidBetween 1753 and 1914, kites were used as scientific objects in different branches of physics. First, as experimental instruments in electrical experiments. Then, still in the 1750s, we find theoretical models of the flight of kites. In the late 19th century, sophisticated technological kites were also used for aerological measurement. Finally, at the turn of the past century, kites served early aeronautical researchers as scale models of wings. In all cases, there was a rise and a fall: kites were reasonably successful in all these roles, but they could not produce interesting enough results to stand the competition of more efficient alternatives.Publicación What was fair in actuarial fairness?(2019-06-06) Heras Martínez, Antonio José; Pradier, Pierre Charles; Teira Serrano, DavidIn actuarial parlance, the price of an insurance policy is considered fair if customers bearing the same risks are charged the same price. The estimate of this fair amount hinges on the expected value obtained weighting the different claims by their probability. We claim that, historically, this concept of actuarial fairness originates in an Aristotelian principle of justice in exchange (equality in risk). We will examine how this principle was formalized in the 16th century and shaped in life insurance during the next two hundred years, in two different interpretations. The Domatian account of actuarial fairness relies on subjective uncertainty: an agreement on risk is fair if both parties are equally ignorant about the chances of an uncertain event. The objectivist version grounds any agreement on an objective risk estimate drawn from a mortality table. We will show how the objectivist approach collapsed in the market for life annuities during the 18th century, leaving open the question of why we still speak of actuarial fairness as if it were an objective expected value.Publicación Blinding and the non-interference assumption in medical and social trials(2012-12-25) Teira Serrano, DavidIn this paper, I am going to present and defend the following claims. First, if the participants are not indifferent regarding treatments, we need to implement a blinding device in every trial in order to ground the Non Interference Assumption. But we cannot take its efficacy for granted: we need to test that the blinding actually controlled for the expectations of the participants and no malign unmasking spoiled the NIA. Precisely because this test is necessary, we can only blind the participants up to a certain point: we cannot deceive them. There is evidence showing that if they suspect they are being deceived, they will deviate from the trial protocol, flawing the outcome.