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Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro

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Zamora Bonilla
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Jesús Pedro
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Mostrando 1 - 10 de 12
  • Publicación
    Filosofía de las Ciencias Sociales
    (UNED (Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia), 0201-03-07) Álvarez Álvarez, José Francisco; Jiménez Buedo, María; Teira Serrano, David; Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
    Queremos daros aquí la bienvenida a nuestro curso de Filosofía de las Ciencias Sociales ofertado a los alumnos de los Grados de Antropología y Filosofía de la UNED. El texto que aquí os ofrecemos pretende servir como manual para superar la asignatura, pero también como un curso en abierto para todos aquellos interesados en la disciplina. Este curso es abierto en dos sentidos . Por un lado, todo el material del curso (incluyendo este manual) se ofrecerá bajo una licencia Creative Commons en el espacio OCW de la UNED. Por otro lado, este manual permanecerá “abierto” él mismo, pues no se edita aún como libro en papel, sino que se renueva cada año con las aportaciones de nuestros estudiantes.
  • Publicación
    Meaning and testability in the structuralist theory of science
    (2003-02-27) Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
  • Publicación
    El neopositivismo es un humanismo
    (2003-02-27) Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
  • Publicación
    Tiene el Homo Oeconomicus sentido del deber
    (2006-02-27) Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
  • Publicación
    The Politics of Positivism: Disinterested Predictions from interested agents
    (Uskali Maki, 2009-08-06) Teira Serrano, David; Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
  • Publicación
    Contra apocalípticos. Ecologismo, Animalismo, Posthumanismo
    (Shackleton Books, 2021-03-15) Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
  • Publicación
    Rational Golems: Collective Agents as Players in the Reasoning Game
    (Springer, 2021) González de Prado Salas, Javier; Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
    We ordinarily attribute beliefs and other intentional states to collective entities. These attributions can be vindicated from a theoretical perspective that holds that: (i) collective entities can behave as rational agents in our argumentative practices of giving and asking for reasons; and (ii) attributions of beliefs are interpretative tools aiming to make sense of the behaviors and perspectives of agents, and to keep track of their commitments. However, it is not immediately clear that groups have attitudes that play the same role in our argumentative and interpretative practices as the beliefs of individuals. It seems that the belief-like attitudes attributed to collective agents lack some of the distinctive features of the beliefs of individuals. More specifically, collective (but not individual) agents seem to be able to form beliefs against the available evidence at will, moved by rewards or other practical considerations. This has made some authors (Wray, Synthese 129(3): 319–333, 2001; Wray PRO 18: 363–376, 2003; Meijers, ProtoSociology 16: 70–85, 2002; Meijers, PRO 18: 377–388, 2003; Hakli, Cogn Syst Res, 7(2–3): 286–297, 2006) argue that the belief-like attitudes of collectives are actually some form of acceptance (which does not involve the commitment to truth characteristic of belief). On our view, this proposal is misguided. We shall argue that the belief-like attitudes of collectives are actually subject to the norms that govern belief, even if these norms can be broken more blatantly in the case of groups than in the case of individuals. In order to explain why this is so, we appeal to the fact that doxastic deliberation in groups is mediated by the deliberative actions of the relevant members, which may be rationally motivated by practical considerations.
  • Publicación
    The Positive, the Normative and the Ontology of Social Problems
    (Taylor & Francis, 2022-06-15) Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
  • Publicación
    Diseases as social problems
    (Springer Nature, 2024-02-02) Saborido Alejandro, Cristian; Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro; Agencia Estatal de Investigación (España)
    In this paper we articulate a characterization of the concept of disease as a social problem. We argue that, from a social ontology point of view, diseases are problems that are identified and addressed within the framework of concrete social institutions and practices (those that shape medicine). This approach allows us to overcome the classical distinction between naturalist and normativist approaches in the philosophy of medicine, taking into account both the material and the symbolic factors that shape the categories and determine the practices of medicine.
  • Publicación
    Public Choice versus Social Choice as Theories of Collective Action
    (Oxford University Press, 2023-02-23) Zamora Bonilla, Jesús Pedro
    The existence and necessity of collective goods and collective actions is one of the characterizing properties of political reality. From the point of view of economics, the nature of collective goods has been studied especially through what is known as “the theory of public goods,” and the positive and normative properties of collective choice has been analyzed through several formal approaches, among which the two most important are “social choice theory” and “public choice theory.” This chapter offers a panoramic historical survey of these three theories and of their mutual relations.