Persona:
Martín Román, Javier

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Martín Román
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Javier
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2019 - 201912020 - 20241
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Autor: Moral Arce, Ignacio × Tiene archivos: true ×

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Mostrando 1 - 2 de 2
  • Miniatura
    Publicación
    Fiscal rules to the test: The impact of the Spanish expenditure rule
    (Elsevier, 2024) Moral Arce, Ignacio; Herrero Alcalde, Ana; Martín Román, Javier
    Despite the large spread of fiscal rules around the world, there is still not enough evidence of their effectiveness in ensuring fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, there is little evidence of the impact of expenditure rules in countries’ fiscal performance. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the Spanish expenditure rule that has been in force since 2012 in controlling the growth of public expenditure. We use a synthetic control methodology to analyze the impact of the rule on the evolution of current and primary expenditure within Spanish public administrations (2001–2018), avoiding the potential endogeneity problems of traditional econometric approaches. Overall, we find that the expenditure rule has largely improved budget sustainability by limiting both current and primary expenditure. These results are robust to different levels of government.
  • Miniatura
    Publicación
    Cessation of Activity Benefit for Spanish Self-employed Workers: A Heterogeneous Impact Evaluation
    (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2019-05) Moral Arce, Ignacio; Martín Román, Javier; Martín-Román, Ángel L.
    The goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of a public policy implemented through the Spanish Social Security system: the Cessation of Activity Benefit (CAB) for self-employed workers. Making use of the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (MCVL) and by means of a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology, our results show that, when we do not take into account heterogeneity in the treatment, self-employed workers receiving CAB experience non-employment spells between 33 and 38 logarithmic points longer than their not entitled counterparts. We also detect that this difference is not constant but depends on the likelihood of being treated. We believe that the two traditional problems that affect the insurance markets, consequence of the asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard, are behind these results.