Persona: Moral, María J.
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Moral
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María J.
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Publicación Fuel taxation, emissions policy, and competitive advantage in the diffusion of European diesel automobiles(Wiley, 2018) Miravete, Eugenio J.; Thurk, Jeff; Moral, María J.Import tarifs have decreased signi cantly over the past 30 years due to a large number of economic integration agreements. We investigate whether national policies can be an efective replacement for tarifs to protect domestic industry. Our focus is the European automobile market where we show fuel taxes and vehicle emissions policy favored diesel vehicles, a technology popular with European consumers but largely ofered only by domestic automakers. We estimate a discrete choice, oligopoly model of horizontally diferentiated products using Spanish automobile registration data where we observe engine type. We show European automakers bene ted from pro-diesel fuel taxes and a lenient NOx emissions policy to earn signi cant pro ts from diesel cars. Had regulators used policies which did not favor diesels, consumers would have shifted consumption towards gasoline-powered imports. We show both policies amounted to signi cant non-tarif trade policies equivalent to an import tarif between two to three times the ofcial rate.Publicación Competition and Competitors: Evidence from the Retail Fuel Market(Sage Journals, 2023) González, Xulia; Moral, María J.; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8142-2285Policy makers and antitrust authorities are concerned about the lack of competition in the fuel retail market and its impact on consumer prices. The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the role of the intensity of competition and competitors’ brand affiliation on retail fuel prices. To this end, we use a panel data set with detailed daily on nearly 8,500 gas stations and 2 million price observations; we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for supply (input costs and local competition) and demand shifters (income, traffic intensity, and location) as well as for brand and time fixed effects. We use an instrumental variable estimation strategy, to account for the endogeneity of the intensity of competition. Our results show that premium brands and low-cost brands affect the prices of rival firms in an opposite way. On the one hand, premium brands soften competition in the local markets where they operate and thereby allow their rivals to set higher prices. Besides, price setting by premium-brand stations react differently depending on whether the nearest rival sells the same brand (a friendly competitor) or some other brand. By contrast, low-cost brands contribute to reducing prices through their own prices (direct effect), thereby encouraging competitors to lower their prices (indirect effect). Our results suggest that regulation limiting the entry of premium operators whilst promoting the entry of low cost gas stations will enhance competition at the retail level.