Persona:
Moral, María J.

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Moral
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María J.
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2019 - 201912020 - 20231
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Autor: González, Xulia ×

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Mostrando 1 - 2 de 2
  • Miniatura
    Publicación
    Effects of antitrust prosecution on retail fuel prices
    (Elsevier, 2019-10-18) González, Xulia; Moral, María J.
    In February 2015, Spain’s Competition Authority imposed € 32.4 million in fines on five of the country’s largest oil operators as sanctions for price collusion. This paper examines the effect of that antitrust action on retail fuel prices. Our analysis uses a novel data set with detailed information on more than 8000 gas stations throughout Spain. Prices were collected every day from 18 August 2014 to 15 June 2015 (almost 2 million price observations). First we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for wholesale costs and brand affiliation. Then we use a model of gas stations and time fixed effects while adopting a difference-in-differences approach to assessing the fines’ effect on retail fuel prices. Our results indicate that, after publication of the fine, sanctioned firms raise prices slightly, and the additional revenues far exceeded the amount of the fine. We also find substantial heterogeneity, depending on the size of the fine, in the magnitude of this price response. Hence the fine’s burden might well have been borne mainly by consumers, whose welfare was thereby reduced. Our study should be of interest to antitrust authorities as we show that sanctions may not be effective enough in deter price fixing practices, especially when sanctions are weak and the profits from colluding are sufficiently high.
  • Miniatura
    Publicación
    Competition and Competitors: Evidence from the Retail Fuel Market
    (Sage Journals, 2023) González, Xulia; Moral, María J.; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8142-2285
    Policy makers and antitrust authorities are concerned about the lack of competition in the fuel retail market and its impact on consumer prices. The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate the role of the intensity of competition and competitors’ brand affiliation on retail fuel prices. To this end, we use a panel data set with detailed daily on nearly 8,500 gas stations and 2 million price observations; we estimate a reduced-form fuel price equation that accounts for supply (input costs and local competition) and demand shifters (income, traffic intensity, and location) as well as for brand and time fixed effects. We use an instrumental variable estimation strategy, to account for the endogeneity of the intensity of competition. Our results show that premium brands and low-cost brands affect the prices of rival firms in an opposite way. On the one hand, premium brands soften competition in the local markets where they operate and thereby allow their rivals to set higher prices. Besides, price setting by premium-brand stations react differently depending on whether the nearest rival sells the same brand (a friendly competitor) or some other brand. By contrast, low-cost brands contribute to reducing prices through their own prices (direct effect), thereby encouraging competitors to lower their prices (indirect effect). Our results suggest that regulation limiting the entry of premium operators whilst promoting the entry of low cost gas stations will enhance competition at the retail level.