Examinando por Autor "Keeling, Sophie Alexandria"

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    Accounting for doxastic agency: Mental action and self- awareness
    (Springer, 2023-05-17) Keeling, Sophie Alexandria
    Uncontroversially, individuals exercise agency in acting; can we say the same about believing? This paper argues that subjects do indeed exercise agency over their beliefs and provides an account by which this is possible. On my picture, self-awareness is fundamental to the nature of doxastic agency. Drawing on work in the philosophy of action, I argue that subjects exercise agency in performing mental actions that form and sustain their beliefs, where they are aware of these actions as part of reasoning and exercising agency over their beliefs.
  • Miniatura
    Publicación
    Doxastic Agent's Awareness
    (WILEY, 2024) Keeling, Sophie Alexandria
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    Publicación
    Responding to second-order reasons
    (WILEY, 2024) Keeling, Sophie Alexandria
    A rich literature has discussed what it is to respond to a reason, e.g., to believe or act on the basis of some consideration or another. In comparison, what it would be to respond to a second-order reason has been underexplored. Yet formulating an account of this is vital for maintaining the existence of second-order reasons in both the practical and epistemic domains. And indeed, there are reasons to doubt this is possible. For example, responding to second-order reasons is meant to be different from simply coming to believe or act for a more richly described first-order reason but it's not clear what this would look like. This paper introduces an account of the second-order basing relation which meets these concerns. It therefore both develops our picture of second-order reasons and helps to defend their existence.