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Kolling, Mario

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0000-0001-8561-6952
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Kolling
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  • Publicación
    The Multiannual financial framework 2021–2027 and Next Generation EU - A turning point of EU multi-level governance?
    (Taylor & Francis, 2023-07-29) Hernández Moreno, Jorge; Kolling, Mario
    The agreements on Next Generation EU (NGEU) and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 (MFF 2021–2027) are extraordinary milestones for the EU integration process. Not only do both regulations have important redistributive effects within a defined timeframe, but both regulations shape the hierarchy of objectives and instruments of EU budgetary policies. This is particularly true for cohesion policy, which has been characterised as the model of EU multilevel governance (MLG). Drawing on historical institutionalism and Peter Hall’s classification of policy change, this text examines the dynamics of change in MLG. In particular, this research looks at the timing and scope of changes in EU cohesion policy since the 1980s. We ask whether or not the adoption of NGEU and the MFF 2021–2027 is likely to represent a critical juncture for the MLG and to what extent both regulations modify objectives and instruments of cohesion policy.
  • Publicación
    The Determinants of Taxation Innovation Policy in Spain’s Common Regime Autonomous Communities (1986–2018)
    (Oxford University Press, 2023-07-05) Toubeau, Simon; Zak Godoy, Deborah; Kolling, Mario::virtual::3300::600; Kolling, Mario; Kolling, Mario; Kolling, Mario
    This article studies the determinants of tax innovation in Spain’s Common Regime Autonomous Communities (ACs) over the period 1986–2018, across the different types of taxes included in their “own taxes.” Our central finding is that the introduction of taxes is motivated by politics: ACs governments introduce taxes when governed by left-wing parties or by a coalition government that included a regionalist party. Second, we find that parties in government follow a strategic calculus when introducing new taxes: an approaching election and a previously introduced tax decrease the chances of tax innovation. Third, we find that AC government also respond to functional pressures and introduce new taxes to shore-up their revenues when faced with a budget deficit. Two important negative results to come out of this analysis are that taxation innovation is not sensitive to geographical diffusion or to the availability of alternative source of revenue in the system of territorial financing.