Marsili, Neri2025-02-112025-02-112024-04-25Marsili, N. (2024). Fictions that don’t tell the truth. Philosophical Studies, 181(5), 1025-1046. https://doi.org/10.1007/S11098-024-02098-70031-8116 | eISSN 1573-0883https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02098-7https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/25894The registered version of this article, first published in “Philosophical Studies, 181(5), 1025-1046", is available online at the publisher's website: Springer, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02098-7La versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en “Philosophical Studies, 181(5), 1025-1046", está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Springer, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02098-7Can fictions lie? According to a classic conception, works of fiction can never contain lies, since their content is not presented as true, nor is it meant to deceive us. But this classic view can be challenged. Sometimes fictions appear to make claims about the actual world, and these claims can be designed to convey falsehoods, historical misconceptions, and even pernicious stereotypes. Should we conclude that some fictional statements are lies? This article introduces two views that support a positive answer, and two that support a negative one. After examining various ways in which fictions can deceive, it concludes in favour of the view that fictional statements can mislead, but never lie.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess72 FilosofíaartículoFictionLyingUnreliable narrationDeceptionAssertionImplicature