Keeling, Sophie Alexandria2024-09-262024-09-262023-05-17Keeling, S. Accounting for doxastic agency: Mental action and self-awareness. Synthese 201, 185 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04069-71573-0964https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/23831Uncontroversially, individuals exercise agency in acting; can we say the same about believing? This paper argues that subjects do indeed exercise agency over their beliefs and provides an account by which this is possible. On my picture, self-awareness is fundamental to the nature of doxastic agency. Drawing on work in the philosophy of action, I argue that subjects exercise agency in performing mental actions that form and sustain their beliefs, where they are aware of these actions as part of reasoning and exercising agency over their beliefs.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess55 Historia::5506 Historia por especialidades::5506.22 Historia de la cienciaartículoDoxastic agencySelf-awarenessEpistemic responsibility