García Alonso, Marta María2024-05-202024-05-202019-05-140191-6599; EISSN: 1873-541Xhttps://doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2019.1616312https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/11987For the philosopher of Rotterdam, religious coercion has two essential sources of illegitimacy: the linking of religious and ecclesiastical belief and the use of politics for religious purposes. Bayle responds to it, with his doctrine of freedom of conscience, on one hand and by means of the essential distinction between voluntary religious affiliation and political obligation, on the other hand. From my perspective, his doctrine of tolerance does not involve an atheist state, nor does it mean the rejection of the presence of religion in the public space or its displacement to the intimate sphere of the conscience. This paper proposes a reading of Baylean tolerance as a political doctrine that allows the articulation between freedom of conscience (individual), minority confessions (private associations), and official religion (established church). Thus, the Baylean theoretical model could be considered a proposal to provide a normative form to the practice of toleration present in the 17th-century Netherlands.enAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0 Internacionalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessartículoPierre Bayletolerancereligious pluralismfreedom of conscienceEnlightenment