Keeling, Sophie Alexandria2025-02-072025-02-072024Sophie Keeling, 2024. Responding to second-order reasons, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume 109, Issue 3 Pages: 755-1067, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.130691933-1592https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13069https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14468/25849The registered version of this article, first published in “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume 109, 2024", is available online at the publisher's website: Wiley, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13069 La versión registrada de este artículo, publicado por primera vez en “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Volume 109, 2024", está disponible en línea en el sitio web del editor: Wiley, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13069A rich literature has discussed what it is to respond to a reason, e.g., to believe or act on the basis of some consideration or another. In comparison, what it would be to respond to a second-order reason has been underexplored. Yet formulating an account of this is vital for maintaining the existence of second-order reasons in both the practical and epistemic domains. And indeed, there are reasons to doubt this is possible. For example, responding to second-order reasons is meant to be different from simply coming to believe or act for a more richly described first-order reason but it's not clear what this would look like. This paper introduces an account of the second-order basing relation which meets these concerns. It therefore both develops our picture of second-order reasons and helps to defend their existence.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess72 Filosofíaartículo