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2021
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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Springer

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We ordinarily attribute beliefs and other intentional states to collective entities. These attributions can be vindicated from a theoretical perspective that holds that: (i) collective entities can behave as rational agents in our argumentative practices of giving and asking for reasons; and (ii) attributions of beliefs are interpretative tools aiming to make sense of the behaviors and perspectives of agents, and to keep track of their commitments. However, it is not immediately clear that groups have attitudes that play the same role in our argumentative and interpretative practices as the beliefs of individuals. It seems that the belief-like attitudes attributed to collective agents lack some of the distinctive features of the beliefs of individuals. More specifically, collective (but not individual) agents seem to be able to form beliefs against the available evidence at will, moved by rewards or other practical considerations. This has made some authors (Wray, Synthese 129(3): 319–333, 2001; Wray PRO 18: 363–376, 2003; Meijers, ProtoSociology 16: 70–85, 2002; Meijers, PRO 18: 377–388, 2003; Hakli, Cogn Syst Res, 7(2–3): 286–297, 2006) argue that the belief-like attitudes of collectives are actually some form of acceptance (which does not involve the commitment to truth characteristic of belief). On our view, this proposal is misguided. We shall argue that the belief-like attitudes of collectives are actually subject to the norms that govern belief, even if these norms can be broken more blatantly in the case of groups than in the case of individuals. In order to explain why this is so, we appeal to the fact that doxastic deliberation in groups is mediated by the deliberative actions of the relevant members, which may be rationally motivated by practical considerations.
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collective belief, deliberation, judgment aggregation, acceptance, transparency
Citación
González de Prado, J., Zamora-Bonilla, J. (2021). Rational Golems: Collective Agents as Players in the Reasoning Game. In: Koreň, L., Schmid, H.B., Stovall, P., Townsend, L. (eds) Groups, Norms and Practices. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-49590-9_2
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Facultad de Filosofía
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Lógica, Historia y Filosofía de la Ciencia
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