09false100true score desc 2gaptrue5mapcontentxmltrue50object_type_i,object_type_i_lookup,coverage_period_mt,geographic_area_mt,geographic_coordinates_mt,author_role_mt,contributor_role_mt,org_id_mt,org_role_mt,supervisor_mt,supervisor_id_mi,supervisor_id_mi_lookup,fields_of_research_mi,fields_of_research_mi_lookup,display_type_i,display_type_i_lookup,seo_code_mi,seo_code_mi_lookup,copyright_i,license_i,license_i_lookup,oa_compliance_t,oa_notes_t,grant_id_t,funding_body_t,description_of_resource_t,software_required_t,project_description_t,keywords_mt,project_name_t,project_id_t,isdatasetof_mt,isdatasetof_mt_lookup,notes_t,date_dt,xsd_display_option_mi,xsd_display_option_mi_lookup,file_downloads_i,created_date_dt,updated_date_dt,research_program_mt,title_t,depositor_i,isderivationof_mt,assigned_user_id_mt,assigned_group_id_mi,assigned_group_id_mi_lookup,isdatacomponentof_mt,isannotationof_mt,author_id_mi,author_id_mi_lookup,alternative_title_mt,pid_t,publisher_t,author_mt,contributor_mt,contributor_id_mi,contributor_id_mi_lookup,refereed_i,series_t,journal_name_t,newspaper_t,conference_name_t,book_title_t,identifier_mt,edition_t,subject_mi,subject_mi_lookup,place_of_publication_t,start_page_t,end_page_t,chapter_number_t,issue_number_t,volume_number_t,conference_dates_t,conference_location_t,patent_number_t,country_of_issue_t,description_t,date_available_dt,language_mt,phonetic_title_t,language_of_title_mt,translated_title_t,phonetic_journal_name_t,translated_journal_name_t,phonetic_book_title_t,translated_book_title_t,phonetic_newspaper_t,file_attachment_name_mt,translated_newspaper_t,phonetic_conference_name_t,translated_conference_name_t,issn_mt,isbn_mt,isi_loc_t,prn_t,output_availability_t,na_explanation_t,sensitivity_explanation_t,file_attachment_content_mt,org_unit_name_t,org_name_t,report_number_t,sequence_i,genre_t,genre_type_t,formatted_title_t,formatted_abstract_t,parent_publication_t,convener_t,ismemberof_mt,ismemberof_mt_lookup,link_mt,link_description_mt,rights_t,views_i,scopus_id_t,thomson_citation_count_i,gs_citation_count_i,gs_cited_by_link_t,scopus_citation_count_i,status_i,status_i_lookup,first_author_in_document_derived_t,first_author_in_fez_derived_t,ands_collection_type_t,start_date_dt,end_date_dt,access_conditions_t,extent_t,contact_details_email_mt,contact_details_physical_mt,loc_subject_heading_mt,depositor_affiliation_i,surrounding_features_mt,condition_mt,style_mt,period_mt,category_mt,subcategory_mt,structural_systems_mt,adt_id_t,subtype_t,language_of_parent_title_t,proceedings_title_t,file_description_mt,herdc_code_i,herdc_code_i_lookup,herdc_status_i,herdc_status_i_lookup,institutional_status_i,institutional_status_i_lookup,herdc_notes_t,follow_up_flags_i,follow_up_flags_i_lookup,follow_up_flags_imu_i,follow_up_flags_imu_i_lookup,scopus_doc_type_t,scopus_doc_type_t_lookup,wok_doc_type_t,wok_doc_type_t_lookup,conference_id_i,total_chapters_t,publisher_id_i,translated_proceedings_title_t,native_script_title_t,roman_script_title_t,native_script_book_title_t,roman_script_book_title_t,native_script_journal_name_t,roman_script_journal_name_t,native_script_conference_name_t,roman_script_conference_name_t,total_pages_t,native_script_proceedings_title_t,roman_script_proceedings_title_t,language_of_book_title_mt,language_of_journal_name_mt,language_of_proceedings_title_mt,doi_t,author_count_t,collection_year_dt,location_mt,building_materials_mt,architectural_features_mt,interior_features_mt,sherpa_colour_t,ain_detail_t,rj_2010_rank_t,rj_2010_title_t,rj_2012_rank_t,rj_2012_title_t,rc_2010_rank_t,rc_2010_title_t,herdc_code_description_t,score,citation_t1true60 (opening to european constitutionalism AND ismemberof_mt:bibliuned\:Setopenaire AND status_i:(2)) 6display_type_idisplay_type_i_lookup_exactkeywords_mftdate_year_tauthor_id_miauthor_id_mi_lookup_exactauthor_mftjournal_name_t_ftsubject_misubject_mi_lookup_exactgenre_type_t_ftismemberof_mftismemberof_mt_lookup_exactsubtype_t_ftscopus_doc_type_t_ftscopus_doc_type_t_lookup_exact(_authlister_t:(1)) AND (status_i:(2)) 34232014-01-01T00:00:00Z312023-12-02T09:28:28Z2023-12-02T09:28:28ZConstitutional limits to European integration in the New Member States after the biggest enlargementbibliuned:DptoDCONST-FDER-Articulos-Jsarrion-010We live in the Europe Union (EU) in a context of relations between legal systems of different levels. Therefore the positions of EU New Member States Constitutional or Supreme Courts are analysed in the paper with the use of the multilevel constitutionalism theoretical approach and focus on changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, that opened a new constitutional horizon in the EU integration process. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) defined relations between EU law and national law thanks to the primacy principle of EU law. Nevertheless the EU law’s formal authority does not depend exclusively on ECJ position. It is conditioned largely by characteristics of each national legal system and national supreme or constitutional court case law. In fact, in most of EU Member States, certain constitutional reserves or constitutional limits to the primacy of EU law in the constitutional and supreme court case law with regard to (constitutional) fundamental rights and principles, can be found. The paper analyses the origin and development of those limits in the case law doctrine of Constitutional Courts in two old and three new EU Member States and concludes with the identification of the consequences and perspectives of EU integration with regard to the coherent protection of fundamental (constitutional) rights and principles across the EU.0812<a class="citation_author_name" title="Navegar por nombre de Autor de Sarrión Esteve, Joaquín" href="/fez/list/author/Sarrión Esteve, Joaquín/">Sarrión Esteve, Joaquín</a> . (<span class="citation_date">2014</span>) <a class="citation_title" title="Click para ver : Constitutional limits to European integration in the New Member States after the biggest enlargement" href="/fez/view/bibliuned:DptoDCONST-FDER-Articulos-Jsarrion-010">Constitutional limits to European integration in the New Member States after the biggest enlargement</a>. RecordArtículo de revistaPublishedDerechoThe registered version of this article, first published in Poznan University of Economics Review, is available online at the publisher's website: https://doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2014.3.832Economics and Business ReviewSarrión Esteve, JoaquínPoznan University of Economics Reviewbibliuned:DptoDCONST-FDER-Articulos-Jsarrion-010http://e-spacio.uned.es/fez/view/bibliuned:DptoDCONST-FDER-Articulos-Jsarrion-01038188314engSarrion_Esteve_Joaquin_ConstitutionalLimits.pdfpresmd_Sarrion_Esteve_Joaquin_ConstitutionalLimits.xml2392-1641bibliuned:DptoDCONST-FDER-Articulosbibliuned:Setarticulobibliuned:SetopenaireDepartamento de Derecho Constitucional (UNED). ArtículosSet de artículoSet de openairehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0Licencia Creative CommonsSarrión EsteveAcceso abiertohttps://doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2014.3.8321.07468834232014-01-01T00:00:00Z4672014-07-03T23:19:27ZLa reforma constitucional mexicana del 9 de agosto de 2012, entre racionalización débil de la forma de gobierno presidencial y tímida apertura a la democracia participativa = The mexican constitutional reform of august 9, 2012. between the form of presidential govern¬ment and timid opening weak rationalization to participatory democracybibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2014-89-6040La adaptación de las reglas institucionales mexicanas a las exigencias de una democracia multipartidaria consolidada es objeto de discusión desde el principio de la transición iniciada en los años setenta y desarrollada entre 1988 y 2000. El punto de llegada de este debate es por el momento la reforma constitucional del 9 de agosto de 2012, que es el resultado de un proyecto de reforma política presentado en 2009 al Congreso mexicano por el entonces Presidente Felipe Calderón, afecta a 14 disposiciones constitucionales y tiene por objeto —además de otros asuntos de menor relevancia— tres importantes materias.
En el procedimiento legislativo federal se reconoce al Presidente la facultad de presentar en cada sesión del Congreso tres proyectos de ley de «iniciativa preferente», reconociendo así al jefe de estado el poder de impulsar la realización de su agenda legislativa.
Se disciplina la sustitución del Presidente de la República en los casos de falta absoluta o temporal, valorizando el papel del Secretario de Gobernación.
Se introducen por primera vez en la Constitución mexicana unos procedimientos de democracia participativa: la iniciativa popular de las leyes y la consulta popular. El ensayo analiza la disciplina jurídica y los posibles impactos de estas reformas, en particular de la consulta popular, evidenciando unos perfiles contradictorios de su regulación constitucional, que la diferencian de los referéndum y que al mismo tiempo le atribuyen efectos vinculantes para las autoridades de gobierno.
Las reformas de 2012 modernizan a la Constitución mexicana, pero dejan esencialmente inalteradas las contradicciones de la forma de gobierno presidencial prevista por la Constitución de 1917, que desde 1997 es caracterizada por una situación de «gobierno dividido» en el cual una separación de poderes de estilo norteamericano convive con un sistema de partidos disciplinados de tipo europeo y con una cultura presidencialista de estilo latino-americano.The adaptation of Mexican constitutional rules to the context of a stable multiparty democracy has been discussed since the beginning of the transition that begun in the 1970s and was implemented between 1988 and 2000. The result of this debate is now the constitutional reform of August 9th, 2012, that was originated by a project of political reform submitted in 2009 to the Mexican Congress by the President Felipe Calderón, concerns 14 constitutional provisions and has three main objects (besides some other questions of minor importance).
In the federal legal process the reform recognizes to the President the power to submit to the Congress two bills of «preferential initiative», that have the prerogative of being discussed with priority during the session, thus recognizing to the President the right to foster the implementation of its legislative agenda.
The substitution of the President in the cases of temporary or absolute failure is regulated recognizing the power to substitute provisionally the President to the Home Affairs Secretary (Secretario de Gobernación). For the first time some procedures for participatory democracy are introduced in the Mexican Constitutional system: the popular initiative of federal legislative acts and the popular consultation.
The article analyzes the possible impact of these reforms, specially of the popular consultation, highlighting some ambiguities of its regulation, that differentiates it from the referendums but at the same time recognize to it the effect of binding the governing authorities.
The reforms of 2012 includes some modernizations of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, but leave unchanged the contradictions of the Mexican system of government, that since 1997 is characterized by a «divided government» where an American-style separation of powers works with some difficulties with a European-style party system and with a Latin American presidentialist political culture.07062<a class="citation_author_name" title="Browse by Author Name for Olivetti, Marco" href="/fez/list/author/Olivetti, Marco/">Olivetti, Marco</a> . (<span class="citation_date">2014</span>) <a class="citation_title" title="Click to view : La reforma constitucional mexicana del 9 de agosto de 2012, entre racionalización débil de la forma de gobierno presidencial y tímida apertura a la democracia participativa = The mexican constitutional reform of august 9, 2012. between the form of presidential govern¬ment and timid opening weak rationalization to participatory democracy" href="/fez/view/bibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2014-89-6040">La reforma constitucional mexicana del 9 de agosto de 2012, entre racionalización débil de la forma de gobierno presidencial y tímida apertura a la democracia participativa = The mexican constitutional reform of august 9, 2012. between the form of presidential govern¬ment and timid opening weak rationalization to participatory democracy</a>. RecordArtículo de revistaPublishedhttp://udcdata.info/021523DerechoUniversidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (España). Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Derecho PolíticoOlivetti, Marcobibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2014-89-6040bibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2014-89-6040esDocumento.pdfbibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2014-89bibliuned:Setopenairebibliuned:SetarticuloRevista de derecho político. Año 2014, n. 89Set de openaireSet de artículohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0Licencia Creative CommonsOlivettiAcceso abierto0.799174334232013-05-01T00:00:00Z3992014-07-01T23:19:27ZDemocracia directa y religión: problemas derivados de la decisión suiza de prohibir los minaretes = Direct democracy and religion: problems derived from the swiss ban of minaretsbibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2013-87-6045La posibilidad de aprobar por referéndum reformas constitucionales de
iniciativa popular caracteriza el régimen suizo en línea con su apuesta
por la utilización de mecanismos de democracia directa. Sin embargo,
la estrechez de los límites constitucionales impuestos a estas iniciativas
puede dar lugar a serias contradicciones entre el orden jurídico-político
interno y los compromisos internacionales asumidos por el país, lo que
resulta particularmente grave en lo que se refiere a los derechos humanos.
Así, la aprobación en 2009 de una nueva disposición constitucional
que prohíbe taxativamente la construcción de minaretes en la Federación
Helvética supone una fuente de conflictos normativos que parte
desde la posible violación de la libertad religiosa o el derecho a la no
discriminación, protegidos por las principales normas internacionales de
derechos humanos. En las condiciones actuales, hallar una solución estable
a esta suerte de contradicciones normativas resulta complicado, toda vez que la cultura política suiza es reacia tanto a ensanchar los límites de
la soberanía popular como a recibir correcciones de jueces extranjeros.
De este modo, se presentan por un lado una serie de problemas o dificultades
de orden jurídico y por otra parte, cuestiones de naturaleza
política. Entre las primeras, debe analizarse en primer lugar si una prohibición
de la construcción de minaretes en sede constitucional entraña
una violación de los derechos a la libertad religiosa o a la no discriminación
tal y como se recogen en normas internacionales, especialmente
el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Respecto a este mismo
punto, cabe estudiar el acceso al Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos
como garante de dicho convenio contra la disposición constitucional
suiza o las decisiones tomadas en aplicación de la misma. En segundo
lugar, es preciso estudiar los conflictos que pueden producirse en el
orden suizo entre normas constitucionales y normas internacionales, así
como plantear posibles soluciones a las mismas. Por lo que se refiere a las cuestiones de orden político, su análisis
deviene relevante para contextualizar adecuadamente las dificultades
jurídicas explicadas. En primera instancia, es conveniente estudiar el
significado del referéndum planteado en 2009 respecto de la construcción
de nuevos minaretes en un país que apenas cuenta con cuatro de
estas construcciones. La cultura política tradicional de Suiza ayuda en
este sentido a entender las dificultades de articulación entre la democracia
directa y un posible control jurídico internacional, así como la
relativa ausencia de controles internos, en sede judicial o parlamentaria
de las iniciativas populares. El peculiar modelo suizo se presenta
así problemático en un contexto de armonización europea sobre la
base de un marco común de protección de derechos humanos.
El análisis conduce a resaltar la necesidad de ensanchar los filtros de
admisión de iniciativas populares, reinterpretando el concepto de
normas imperativas de Derecho internacional a fin de incluir en las
mismas los elementos de los derechos humanos que pueden constituir
hoy en día parte de un acervo europeo común.The option to approve by referendum constitutional amendments proposed
by popular initiatives is one of the characteristic of the Swiss regime,
which fosters the use of direct democracy mechanisms. However,
the narrowness of the constitutional limits to this kind of initiatives
may open the door to serious contradictions between the domestic legal
order and those international commitments undertaken by the country,
being this particularly relevant in respect of human rights protection.
Thus, the approval in 2009 of a new constitutional clause banning the construction of minarets in the Helvetic Federation entails a set of legal
questions, starting from the possible violation of the religious freedom
or the right not to be discriminated against, both protected by the
highest international norms on human rights. Within the current conditions,
finding an stable solution to these legal inconsistencies seems
difficult, being the Swiss political culture reluctant to enlarge the limits
of the popular sovereignty and to receive mandates from foreign judges.
In this way, we face on the one hand problems or difficulties in the legal
field and, on the other hand, questions of a political nature. Among
the former, it must be firstly analysed whether the ban for construction
of new minarets at the Constitution entails per se a violation freedom of
religion or the right not to be discriminated against, in the way these
rights are understood in the main international human rights instrument,
such as the European Convention of Human Rights. In relation
to the same point, it is also possible to study the access to the European
Court of Human Rights as legal guarantee of the aforementioned treaty,
appealing against the constitutional clause or against the possible
decisions taken in its implementation. Secondly, it is necessary to reflect
about the conflicts that may arise at the Swiss legal order between
constitutional dispositions and international norms, as well as look for
possible solutions to these inconsistencies. As for the political aspects, their analysis becomes relevant to rightly
contextualize the aforementioned legal difficulties. Firstly, it is
necessary to reflect about the real meaning of the 2009 referendum
in a country where no more than four minarets can be found. The
traditional political culture of Switzerland helps in this respect to
understand the difficulties to put together direct democracy and
international legal controls, or the absence of parliament or judicial
domestic controls for popular initiatives. The peculiar Swiss model is
thus a problematic one in a context of European harmonisation on the
basis of a common framework of human rights protection.
The analysis brings us to underline the need to enlarge the admission
filters of the popular initiatives, adopting a new interpretation of the
concept of peremptory norms of international law, with the aim of
including in it those elements of human rights that constitute today
a European common acquis.08002<a class="citation_author_name" title="Browse by Author Name for Ruiz Vieytez, Eduardo J." href="/fez/list/author/Ruiz Vieytez, Eduardo J./">Ruiz Vieytez, Eduardo J.</a> . (<span class="citation_date">2013</span>) <a class="citation_title" title="Click to view : Democracia directa y religión: problemas derivados de la decisión suiza de prohibir los minaretes = Direct democracy and religion: problems derived from the swiss ban of minarets" href="/fez/view/bibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2013-87-6045">Democracia directa y religión: problemas derivados de la decisión suiza de prohibir los minaretes = Direct democracy and religion: problems derived from the swiss ban of minarets</a>. RecordArtículo de revistaPublishedhttp://udcdata.info/021523DerechoUniversidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (España). Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Derecho PolíticoRuiz Vieytez, Eduardo J.bibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2013-87-6045bibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2013-87-6045esDocumento.pdfbibliuned:DerechoPolitico-2013-87bibliuned:Setopenairebibliuned:SetarticuloRevista de derecho político. Año 2013, n. 87Set de openaireSet de artículohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0Licencia Creative CommonsRuiz VieytezAcceso abierto0.71912944333223333