Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
“Paz y Seguridad Internacional”

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS
AND
EGYPTIAN HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRANTS IN AUSTRIA

Alessia Bacchi Frenguelli
University Degree in Political Science

Thesis Director: Dra. Dª. Carmen González Enríquez

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AACC: Austro-Arab Chamber of Commerce
AECC: Austro - Egyptian Chamber of Commerce
AMS: Austrian Public Employment Service
ATM: Automated Teller Machine
CAPMAS: Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
DfID: Department of International Development of the United Kingdom
EC: European Commission
ENIC: European Network of Information Centres
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
EU: European Union
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
GAFI: Egypt’s General Authority for Free Zones and Investment
GAM: Global Approach to Migration
GAMM: Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
GCIL: Global Commission on International Migration
HCM: Egypt’s Higher Committee for Migration
HDI: Human Development Index
ICMPD: International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDA: Egypt’s Industrial Development Authority
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO: International Labour Organisation
IMC: Egypt’s Industrial Modernisation Centre
IMIS: Egypt’s Integrated Migration Information System
IOM: International Organisation for Migration
ISCED: International Standard Classification of Education
ISCO: International Standard Classification of Occupations
MIDA: Migration for Development in Africa
MIPEX: Migrant Integration Policy Index
MME: Egypt’s Ministry of Manpower and Emigration
MP: Mobility Partnership
MTM: Mediterranean Transit Migration dialogue
MTO: Money Transfer Operator
NAP: Austrian National Action Plan on Integration
NARIC: National Academic Recognition Information Centres
NELM: New Economics on Labour Migration
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RWR: Red-White-Red Card (Plus)
SFD: Egypt’s Social Fund for Development
SME: Small and Micro Enterprise
SYPE: Survey of Young People in Egypt
TOKTEN: Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
UN: United Nations
UNDESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Assimilationism**: paradigm that considers migration to be a discrete and definitive event according to which migrants move to settle for good. Therefore, migrants should progressively lose their ties with their homeland and assimilate into the destination country’s cultural identity in order to foster social cohesion.

**Brain Circulation**: flow of trade relations and contacts, new knowledge, innovations, mentality and information that migrants can introduce in their country of origin because of their experience abroad.

**Brain Drain**: term referring to the negative effects associated with the emigration of individuals whose skills are scarce in their country of origin (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

**Brain Gain**: term generally referring to the immigration of skilled individuals to a country resulting in a benefit for that country. Yet it is also used in reference to the country of origin, in the case of return from individuals who gained skills abroad through temporary migration (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

**Brain Waste**: term referring to the situation in which migrants work in positions below their qualifications and skills level in destination countries. It can refer as well to highly-skilled workers that are not able to work in positions in line with their skills in the country of origin.

**Chain Migration**: term referring to a situation when migrants from one particular region or city in a country move mainly to one specific region or city in another country, often for the presence of networks (IOM, 2010b).

**Circular Migration**: the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or permanent movement, which, when it occurs voluntarily and is linked to labour needs of countries of origin and destination, can be beneficial to all involved (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2008).
**Consumptive Investments:** investments concerning a capital transfer more than capital creation, such as the purchase of land.

**Country of Destination / Receiving Country:** a country that is the destination for a person or group of persons (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

**Country of Origin / Sending Country:** a country where a person or a group of persons originate(s), i.e. country of his/her nationality or in the case of stateless persons the country of usual residence (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

**Development:** process of improving the overall quality of life of a group of people, and in particular expanding the range of opportunities open to them (Global Migration Group, 2010).

**Diaspora/Migrant Community:** diaspora is the name given to a community of migrants settled permanently in countries other than their own. The concept of diaspora refers to a situation when people from a country are scattered abroad and form a community in their countries of destination. In contrast, a migrant community is generally thought of as a community of temporary migrants. Today, however, the distinction between the concept of diaspora and migrant community is blurred. Both terms are increasingly used interchangeably to refer to nationals from a country established abroad either temporarily or permanently and irrespective of their legal status (Global Migration Group, 2010).

**Emigrant Communities:** populations outside their country of origin, usually sustaining ties and developing links both with their country of origin and across countries of settlement/residence (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

**Financial Remittances:** earnings and material resources transferred by international migrants or refugees to recipients in their country of origin (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

**First Generation Migrant:** term referring to a foreign-born migrant who physically moved from one country to another country (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).
Highly-Skilled Migrant: a migrant performing a job for which a specific advanced degree, years of experience or copious on-site training are required (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

Integration: process that refers to the incorporation of new migrants into the social system and its economic, political, and social institutions and culture of the country of destination.

Low-Skilled Migrant: a migrant performing a job that does not require very much specific training and can be performed by many people without the need for advanced degrees or years of experience (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

Migrant: a person undergoing a (semi-)permanent change of residence, which involves a change of his/her social, economic and/or cultural environment (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

Migrant Flows: number of persons entering another country or leaving their own country during a certain time frame (statistics are generally provided annually) (Global Migration Group, 2010).

Migrant Stocks: total number of migrants present in a country (Global Migration Group, 2010).

Migration Syndrome: phenomenon according to which migration is cumulative and self-perpetuating when it becomes embedded in the culture of sending communities as a result of network connections that decrease the cost of emigration (Massey, 1989).

Multiculturalism: paradigm that recognises the non-homogeneity of nation-states and promotes cultural diversity as a desirable feature of a given society advocating for preserving minorities’ socio-cultural and political differences.

Permanent Migrants: permanent migrants are those migrants who go abroad without any intention of returning or who benefit from a status which allows them to remain in the host country indefinitely (Global Migration Group, 2010).

Productive Investment: investments generating employment and economic return.
Second Generation Migrant: term referring to children, born in a new country to first generation migrants but did not move themselves (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

Social Remittances: the ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities. Social remittances are transferred by migrants and travellers or they are exchanged by letter or other forms of communication, including by phone, fax, the Internet or video (Levitt, 2001).

Temporary Migrants: migrants who remain in a destination country for a limited period of time and then return home permanently, or for a short time before emigrating again (to the same or to another destination country). When this type of migration occurs back and forth between a specific home and host country, it is also referred to as “circular migration” (Global Migration Group, 2010).

Third-Country National: with this term European institutions designate nationals of countries that not members of the European Union.

Virtual Return: migrants perform a virtual return to their country of origin when they are involved remotely in its affairs through transnational activities that make use of the new communication technologies. This term is used in opposition to migrants’ physical return.
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INTRODUCTION

Research studies on the linkages between the migration phenomenon and the development of migrants’ country of origin - the so-called “migration and development nexus” - date back to the 19th century when the first academic study on this topic was published. Since then interest in this topic has swung back and forth. After some years of neglect, the publication of the World Bank’s Global Development Finance report in 2003 (Ratha, 2003), focusing on migrants’ remittances as a source of development finance for the sending countries, put again the migration and development nexus at the centre of a debate at the international level that sees the participation now not only of scholars but of political decision makers as well. During the last decade, conferences and international fora on this topic have multiplied.

Within the broad area of migration and development nexus, the role of highly-skilled migrants, whose migration flows from developing to industrialised countries have risen considerably, has gained momentum. The debate on the impact of highly-skilled migrants on the development of sending countries usually focuses on the potential loss (i.e. “brain drain”) or gain (i.e. “brain gain”) of knowledge that their departure results in. However, the discussion about the contributions of highly-skilled migrants to their homeland’s development being relegated to the dichotomy of brain drain – brain gain results is incomplete. Sen’s definition of development as “the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999) introduces the concept of human capability, namely people’s ability to lead their life and to amplify their possibility of choice, as the main parameter of development ahead of income and material growth. In line with it, the scope of migrants’ contributions broadens beyond their technical knowledge and skills to include social, economic, and cultural capital. These latter are potentially higher in the case of highly-skilled migrants compared to low-skilled migrants, since they have more cultural and financial means to exploit fully their experience abroad and capture and transfer new values and knowledge.

Until recently the academic study of the migration and development nexus has been shaped by strongly opposed views that alternatively have either claimed an absolute positive influence of migration on development of the countries of origin, or accused migration of impoverishing developing countries of the best component of their population and driving them in a circle of poverty. This criticism is exacerbated in the case of highly-skilled migrants.
whose move deprives sending countries of their knowledge and skills, considered key factors for economic development. However, a recent theoretical framework in migration studies that analyses the migration phenomenon in the context of the current globalised world, the “transnational” theory, rejects this Manichean approach. According to it, the current global economy and new technologies in the communication and transport sectors support migrants’ involvement in two or more countries at the same time, and so put in question the common assumption that the physical return of migrants is a prerequisite for contributing to the development of the country of origin.

Instead, according to this theory the final impact of migration depends on the sending countries’ policy framework. This should ensure a friendly environment to downsize the negative consequences of migration and amplify its benefits, as well as transform migrants into being “agents of development” for their country of origin. However, the countries of origin’s policies may not be sufficient to foster the development impact of migrants’ communities abroad. Transnational scholars have pointed out that the new technologies drive a perspective shift on migration, from a definitive move to a continuous and multi-dimensional process linking two countries. This creates a linkage between integration in receiving countries and migrants’ transnationalism, which are simultaneous processes reinforcing each other. As a consequence, destination countries have a key role to play in enhancing migrants’ development impact in the countries of origin, both through cooperation with these latter to promote transnational activities and in facilitating migrants’ integration in their territory.

I.I OBJECTIVES

This study focuses on Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria. Egypt represents an interesting case study to analyse the migration and development nexus because of the significant number of Egyptian migrants\(^1\) and the volume of remittances they send to their homeland.\(^2\) This huge source of migrants and remittances located at the southern side of the Mediterranean Sea meets in particular the interest of the European countries’ governments

\(^1\) According to UNDESA estimates Egyptian migrants abroad were about 3.47 million in 2013. Please see: UNDESA, 2013.
\(^2\) According to the Word Bank in 2012 Egypt was ranked the sixth - biggest remittance receiving country in the world with an estimated remittances inflow of about USD 20 billion in 2012. Please see: World Bank, 2013b.
and the European Union. Although the Gulf countries remain the main destination for Egyptian migrants, the pattern of highly-skilled Egyptian migration is shifting to countries who are members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The study focuses on Egyptian migrants in Austria because these have a high level of education. Austria has the fourth largest number of Egyptian citizen migrants with tertiary education in Europe, and the fifth in respect of the number of those highly-skilled Egyptian-born migrants who have acquired an EU country citizenship (OECD Statistics, 2014). Indeed, Austria has a long tradition of Egyptian academic migration that dates back to the 19th century and was reinforced after the 1956 Suez Canal crisis between Egypt and the United Kingdom and France. Additionally, since 2002 Austria has progressively oriented its immigration policy towards highly-skilled migrants through policies to attract and facilitate their integration in the country (Bittmann, 2013). These elements help explore the differences of approach and attachment towards their homeland between recent and long-term Egyptian highly-skilled migrants.

The purpose of this study is threefold. First, to analyse the current policies on migration and development adopted by the government of Egypt in respect of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants. Until now, studies on sending countries’ policies that are able to enhance the migration and development nexus have mainly focused on specific migrants’ contributions, such as remittances or knowledge and skills. However, this partial vision neglects the overall potential value of migrants’ experience abroad. At the same time, interventions targeting migrants may fail easily if not coordinated in a broader development plan covering the entire spectrum of their contributions. The corresponding research question is the following: *is the government of Egypt implementing effective policies aimed to increase the contribution of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants to their homeland’s development?*

The second purpose is to analyse the Austrian legal and policy framework’s ability to influence highly-skilled third-country nationals’ integration in its territory and their transnationalism. At present, the linkages between receiving countries’ legal and policy frameworks and development of sending countries are not fully explored. With migrants’ integration and transnationalism being simultaneous processes that reinforce each other, an analysis of policies able to foster migrants’ contributions towards their homeland should

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3 OECD members countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
cover both areas. The corresponding research question is the following: *is the legal and policy framework in Austria able to foster highly-skilled migrants’ integration and transnational activities?*

Finally, the study purpose is to analyse the nature and the characteristics of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria, in particular their sense of belonging and their contributions towards Egypt. In order to be effective, policies on the migration and development nexus should take into account migrants’ needs and objectives. At the same time, migrants’ communities are not forcibly homogeneous and therefore ignoring the characteristics of their different components risks to invalidate policies’ effects. The corresponding research question is the following: *are Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria interested and able to play the role of “development agent” for their country of origin?*

By answering the above questions, this study aspires to contribute to the accumulation of academic knowledge on the migration and development nexus, as well as to help design informed policies intended to increase the contributions of migrants to the development of their countries of origin.

### I.II METHODOLOGY

This study is undertaken within the transnationalism paradigm that highlights how the current global economy together with the new technologies in the communication and transport sectors allow migrants to adopt transnational identities. This makes obsolete the distinction between a permanent, temporary and return migrant and allows migrants to help their country of origin without coming physically back. The study follows, as well, the consequent approach towards integration in receiving countries - considered as a multipath and nonlinear process, where a person can be part of two societies at the same time – and the resulting linkages between integration in receiving countries and migrants’ transnationalism. Additionally, the study adopts Sen’s definition of development that broadens the scope of migrants’ contributions, beyond remittances and technical skills, to include social and cultural capital.

Concerning the methodology, the study starts with a review of the evolution of the academic thinking on the migration and development nexus up until the most recent academic
conclusions on the topic. Secondly, focusing on highly-skilled migration from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe, it analyses its grounds and the policy approaches of sending and receiving countries towards the migration and development nexus.

Thirdly, based on the literature on the migration and development nexus and personal reflection, the study provides an inventory of good policy practices to enhance the development impact of highly-skilled migrants in the country of origin to be implemented in both sending and receiving countries. This offers the analytical framework for the subsequent review of the ability of the legal and policy frameworks in Egypt and Austria to impact highly-skilled migrants’ contributions to the development of their homeland. Finally, the study analyses status and characteristics of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in OECD countries and in particular in Austria. It examines the potential effects of highly-skilled Egyptian migration, especially in Austria, on the development of Egypt.

The study uses secondary sources of data such as academic literature and statistical analyses. Furthermore, in order to answer the third research question the study includes the findings of a qualitative research conducted among Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria. The investigation aimed at exploring the sense of belonging Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria had towards their homeland and their contributions to its development. In particular, it aimed at understanding whether their length of stay in Austria has been affecting the intensity and the approach of their engagement to Egypt.

The investigation had primarily an exploratory nature and adopted a qualitative approach. It was based on expert interviews with Egyptian community organisers and in-depth interviews with Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria. These latter were based on a questionnaire with open-ended questions in order to explore in detail respondents’ contributions and understand their sense of belonging towards their homeland, while allowing comparison across topics. They focused on three topics: biographical data and migration history; sense of belonging towards Egypt and Austria; and transnational activities in terms of brain circulation, monetary remittances, and social remittances. The research was conducted between November 2012 and January 2015. Respondents were reached through social networks and snowball techniques and selected according to two criteria: a) at the time of the interview they should have been living in Austria; and b) they should hold at least a university level of education.

The analysis of the interviews involved three stages. First, answers to open-ended questions were compared to identify similarities and differences across the mentioned topics. Second, interviews’ content was analysed according to the predefined research questions.
Finally, the sample was separated into two groups: recent migrants and long-term migrants. This allowed for an examination to determine whether the length of stay in Austria affects the intensity and/or the nature of their engagement with their home country, and to verify the transnational paradigm’s hypothesis that migrants’ commitment to their homeland is not inversely proportional to the integration and the length of period in the receiving country.

This study presents three kinds of limitations. First, the size of the sample is small since only twenty-six Egyptian highly-skilled migrants could be interviewed. Although the interviews were anonymous, potential respondents were reluctant to take part since they were highly suspicious about the real purpose of the study. Second, the sample is not gender-balanced and only two women were interviewed. Egyptian women were more indisposed to take part in the study. Finally, the survey relies on the snowball technique rather than on a random probability sample. Although these limitations do not allow generalising of the research findings, the information provided offers a preliminary understanding of the profile of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants living in Austria, of their ties with their homeland, and of their contributions to its development.

The study’s outline is structured in eight chapters.

Chapter One – The Migration and Development Nexus in Academic Literature: this chapter analyses the evolution of the academic thinking on the migration and development nexus as it derives from changes in both migration studies and the concept of development. The time period taken into consideration is from the 19th century until the present.

Chapter Two – Highly-Skilled Migrants: Overview of Policy Approaches to Maximise their Contributions to Development: this chapter offers an overview of policy approaches to maximise migrants’ contribution to the development of their country of origin, focusing on highly-skilled migration from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe. The first part provides a historical overview of policy approaches on migration and development adopted by sending and receiving countries since the end of the Second World War until now. The second part explores highly-skilled migrant flows from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea. It analyses the grounds of their migration, the international mobility framework concerning them and their main destination countries’ policies towards highly-skilled migration, with a focus on the EU regulations.

Chapter Three – Highly-Skilled Migrants’ Contributions to the Development of Sending Countries: Policy Measures: this chapter provides an inventory of good policy practices to enhance the development impact of highly-skilled migrants in their country of origin. They are divided into two groups: first, policies to be implemented by sending countries; and
second, policies to be implemented in receiving countries. The policy measures derive from literature on the migration and development nexus and from personal reflection.

Chapter Four – Egyptian Highly-Skilled Migration: this chapter focuses on Egyptian highly-skilled migration by first analysing Egyptian migration flows since the early 1970s, when the Egyptian government started to facilitate it, until now. It then explores the characteristics of the current Egyptian migration and its potential effects on the development of Egypt. Finally, it analyses the features of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria.

Chapter Five – Egyptian Governmental Policies to Foster Development through Highly-Skilled Migrants: this chapter analyses Egypt’s major policies on migration and development with a special focus on those aiming at enhancing highly-skilled migrants’ contributions to the development of the country. In addition, the study explores Egypt’s governmental measures on migration and development adopted towards Egyptian migrants settled in Austria. The analysis takes into account the good policy practices on migration and development for highly-skilled migrants identified in the third chapter.

Chapter Six – Austrian Governmental Policies to Foster Development of Sending Countries through Highly-Skilled Migrants: this chapter analyses the ability of Austria’s policy and legal frameworks to influence sending countries’ development through highly-skilled migrants’ moves to its territory. The analysis takes into account the policy framework on migration and development for highly-skilled migrants identified in the third chapter. In line with it, policies are divided into two broad categories: a) policies able to enhance highly-skilled migrants’ transnational activities, and b) policies able to foster their integration in Austria.

Chapter Seven – Egyptian Highly-Skilled Migration in Austria: an Empirical Study: this chapter analyses the findings of the above mentioned qualitative study on highly-skilled Egyptian migrants in Austria. This investigation aimed at exploring prevalent trends among Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria, the nature of their contributions to Egypt and of their sense of belonging towards their homeland. In particular, the research aimed at finding out whether their length of stay in Austria has been affecting the intensity and the nature of their engagement to their home country. To meet this goal, the study addresses the following points:

1. whether the Egyptian highly-skilled migration to Austria can generate an effective brain circulation between Austria and Egypt;
2. the overall potential contribution of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria to the development of their homeland;
3. the level and nature of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants’ engagement with their homeland.

The study takes into account the transnational paradigm that highlights how the current global economy, together with the new technologies in the communication and transport sectors, allow migrants to adopt transnational identities. In analysing the contribution of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants to their homeland the study adopts Sen’s definition of development that broadens the scope of migrants’ contributions to include social and cultural capital. The findings are divided into five sections. The first one contains respondents’ background characteristics. The other four are related to migration and development policies areas: a) brain circulation; b) remittances transfer; c) remittances’ productivity; and d) other forms of migrant engagement with their country of origin.

Chapter Eight – Conclusions: this chapter presents the study’s findings and draws its main conclusions. These aim at addressing the study’s research questions as well as informing the current debate on the migration and development nexus and in particular on the role of highly-skilled migrants as agents of development for their homeland.
CHAPTER ONE

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS
IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE

This chapter analyses the evolution of the academic thinking on the migration and development nexus since the 19th century. This derives from changes in both migration studies and the concept of development.

1.1 NEO-CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE

The academic study of the migration phenomenon and its relationship with the development of the country of origin has been influenced, and at the same time limited, by the lack of a specific and autonomous discipline on migration until recently (De Haas, 2008). In the past, the study of migration flows and their patterns has been produced within other sciences, namely geography, economics and sociology. The first author to talk about a nexus between migration and country of origin development was a geographer in the 19th century: in 1885 Mr Ernest George Ravestein published the article “The Laws of Migration” where he claimed migration to be an important factor of development of migrants’ sending areas (Ravestein, 1885).

However, since the late 19th century until most of the 20th century, the major academic thoughts behind migration studies have commonly captured concepts and research methods from the economic science. Two economic theories that have been highly influential are the neo-classical economic theory and the historical-structural theory. Although these paradigms reach opposite conclusions, both of them consider migration as regulated by market laws like capital flows.

According to the studies produced within the “neo-classical economic” thought, predominant between the 1950s and 1970s, the main cause of migration is the difference in labour supply and demand between different geographic areas (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008). This gap in the labour market generates a salary increase due to a labour demand
higher than the labour offer. Therefore, people migrate towards countries where the labour supply is lower and the wages higher. These migratory flows go in the opposite direction of capital flows. Through the market laws, eventually this process levels the wages in the country of origin and the country of destination and ends the migration process. At the micro level, these scholars borrow from the market models the principle of the rationality of the process actors: migrants are rational individuals with free choice and full information of market conditions. Therefore, migration is seen as the result of a rational migrant’s single decision with the exclusive aim to improve their economic situation.

Consequently, the neo-classical economic theory recognises migration’s positive effect on the sending country’s development and prefigures a win-win situation. First, at a global level it produces a balance between labour supply and demand that levels wages in sending and receiving countries. Second, at a micro level it improves migrants’ economic conditions since they move to a country with higher salaries. Additionally, the remittances migrants send back home increase the income of their relatives that have remained in the country of origin.

A popular output of the neo-classical economic thought is the “push-pull” model developed by Lee in 1966 (Lee, 1966). Lee distinguishes between two categories of factors determining migrants’ decision to move: first, the factors pressing migrants to leave their country of origin (i.e. push factors); second, the factors attracting them towards the country of destination (i.e. pull factors). Researchers usually consider economic and demographic conditions as the main push-pull factors. Migrants are usually pushed to leave their country by population growth and low economic conditions, while being attracted by countries with higher wages and a better social environment than their homeland.

This model is still commonly used to study the root causes of migration. It is an equilibrium model based on the same assumptions of the economic theories it derives from: a) migrants are rational individuals with free choice and full information; and b) they are driven by economic reasons. These assumptions strongly limit the efficacy of this model in understanding migration from developing countries since they ignore other migration determinants, such as socio-economic needs or family reasons. Additionally, considering migrants to be fully aware of the socio-economic environment in the country of destination is quite unrealistic.
1.2 HISTORICAL-STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE

In the 1970s a new phase in migration studies started. This was predominated by the “historical-structural” thought. As with the neo-classical economic paradigm, this theory makes use of economic laws to explain migration patterns although it arrives at opposite conclusions. For its scholars, capitalism reinforces the unequal distribution of resources between countries instead of equalising them. In opposition to the neo-classical economic theory, they postulate that labour flows go in the same direction of capital. As a consequence, in reality migration deepens the gap between developed and developing countries and creates a vicious circle of underdevelopment (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008).

Unlike previously, this theory considers the nexus between migration and development to be negative, since migration is not considered the result of a free choice but an escape from misery and ultimately aggravates the economic situation of the migrants’ sending countries (De Haas, 2007). In particular it blames migration for the loss of the population that can best contribute to the growth of the country of origin, usually young workers with an entrepreneurial and brave spirit. The negative effect is further increased when migrants are highly-skilled. In this case we are at the front of the phenomenon called “brain drain”, which designates the cross-border movement of highly-skilled workers who stay abroad for a long period of time (IOM, 2003). This loss of valuable human capital perpetuates sending countries’ underdevelopment. These scholars accuse industrialised countries of putting in place policies to attract foreign highly-skilled professionals without any consideration for the negative consequences on the developing countries’ economies. This argumentation is still considered valid by some scholars. For instance, Portes has highlighted that the root cause of migration of professionals is the search for better work conditions and opportunities for self-development (Portes, 2008). Therefore, a key reason for migration in the case of highly-skilled workers is more the inability to make possible a decent lifestyle in their own country than the comparison of salaries with those in the developed world. Figure 1 below illustrates the dynamics of brain drain according to Portes.
The positive contribution of migrants’ remittances are put under question as well. According to Lewis, the improvement of the households’ welfare generated by remittances is just cosmetic, temporary and artificial (Lewis, 1986). They are cosmetic because remittances are mainly spent on consumption goods, such as houses, or imported goods instead of productive investment that can boost the local private sector and create employment and economic growth. They are temporary because the volume of remittances is inversely proportional to the length of migrants’ stay in the receiving country. Remittances decrease and eventually disappear once migrants are settled in the new society and decrease their ties with their relatives in the country of origin. Finally, they are artificial because remittances are blamed for creating disparities between households and therefore an income distortion (De Haas, 2008). At the same time, remittances may generate an economic dependence in the households with dangerous consequences in the case of where migrants come back home.
1.3 TOWARDS A MORE COMPOSITE VIEW OF MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Already in the 1970s the introduction of socio-anthropologic elements in the migration study, together with a wider use of the empirical approach, had put under question both the neo-classical economic and the historical-structural theories. These appeared too simplistic and inconsistent with the much more complex migration patterns observed through fact-finding (De Haas, 2008). The relationship between migration and development emerged more composite and less univocal than the one described by the previous models. For example, Zelinsky argues in his “transitional theory” that the migration and development nexus evolves over time. In his view, societies develop through different phases, from a pre-modern to a super-advanced stage, and the migration process changes accordingly (Zelinsky, 1971). Moreover, the relationship between development and migration should not be considered unidirectional since the development of the country of origin influences in its turn migration flows. According to Zelinsky, during the early stages of development, migration flows tend to increase instead of diminish. Migration is selective and only few people can afford the financial costs and risks to migrate so that, often, migrants are not the poorest ones. However, the improvement of welfare enhances both people’s aspirations and capabilities to migrate and migration flows augment consequently. Only later migration movements stabilise and eventually decrease as a consequence of a satisfying level of well-being reached by the population.

Martin and Taylor develop further the transitional theory, designing the “migration hump” model (Martin and Taylor 1996, 43-62). This is a dynamic model that studies the relation between economic development and decreasing income differentials and its influence on the migration phenomenon. This is composed of a J-curve (i.e. for immigration flows) and an inverted U-curve (i.e. for emigration flows). According to this model, a certain ceiling of welfare is necessary to overcome costs and risks associated to migration. As shown in the figure below, the number of migrants increases sharply after the sending countries reach this critical stage of development. These authors also incorporate in the model a subjective element, since migrants’ decision to move is not resulting from the objective difference in the development level between their country of origin and the country of destination (i.e. “absolute deprivation”) but from migrants’ perception of it (i.e. “relative deprivation”).
Consequently, an immigration country may become an emigration one when its comparative level of development declines (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008).

Other studies have focused on the “migrant networks” influence on the decline of the migration selectivity and therefore in the growth of migrant flows. Accordingly, the first groups of migrants settled in the new country support friends, relatives and co-nationals arriving later to find a job, to send remittances and in general to establish themselves in the new environment. Eventually, migrants form organised communities in the receiving country thereby helping to afford the costs and risks associated to migration, which diminishes migration’s selectivity. Some scholars also believe that once the number of network connections reaches a critical point, migration becomes embedded in the culture of sending communities and therefore cumulative and self-perpetuating (Massey, 1989). In such cases, it can be expected that certain segments of the population will emigrate (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008). They call this phenomenon “migration syndrome”. Migrant networks can facilitate the phenomenon called “chain migration”, when migrants from one particular region or city in a country move mainly to one specific region or city in another country (IOM, 2010b).
The “migration system” theory, developed by Mabogunje (1970), analyses the influence of migration flows on both the sending and receiving country. According to this author, when migration flows follow consolidated patterns between two specific areas, for example two countries, they create a common space where people, goods, information and cultural values are exchanged through migrants. These exchanges gradually influence the social, cultural, economic and institutional environment in both sending and receiving countries. In turn, the new economic and social conditions can influence migration flows by interconnecting further the two countries and facilitating the formation of organised migration flows in the long run. This implies that the nexus between migration and country of origin’s development is not only dynamic but also reciprocal. Additionally, the two terms are not any longer considered substitutive but complementary.

In the 1980s and 1990s the “new economics of labour migration” (NELM) theory emerged as the main opponent to the neo-classical migration theory, accusing it to be simplistic and too centred on individual motivations. According to the NELM paradigm, it is not the individual that decides whether to migrate or not but the household, for the main motivation is mainly to increase the family’s economic security by diversifying the income resources (Stark and Bloom, 1985). Therefore, the migrant’s departure aims not only at increasing the income but mainly at minimizing the family’s economic risks, which can explain migration in the absence of expected wage differentials (De Haas, 2008). Migration is therefore part of the household livelihood strategy since these new economic resources are usually used to improve the family members’ livelihood and productive investment, not purely for their survival. Usually this strategy applies in countries where the government and the market do not offer adequate and affordable social services, such as for healthcare and education. Therefore, this approach stresses the need to study the migration phenomenon within the social and economic migrant’s context that influences its trends.

In the 1990s, Amartia Sen helped scholars to see the migration and development nexus under a different perspective by formulating a new revolutionizing definition of development. This author defines development as “the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999), and therefore links it to people’s freedom instead of their income. Since income and material growth are limited parameters to measure this freedom, Sen uses the concept of human capability, namely the people’s ability to lead their life and to amplify their possibility of choice. This includes the decision to migrate to improve their livelihood. Therefore, economic indicators, such as gross national product per capita, are not anymore sufficient to measure the country’s level of development. These should come with socio-
political elements that measure the quality of life, such as social well-being, income inequality, gender equality, universal access to primary education, health care and meaningful employment. As regards the impact of migration on the development of sending countries, this is influenced by other elements besides economic factors such as socio-cultural ones. Under the influence of Sen’s concept of development and through new empirical researches, scholars have demonstrated that the effects of migration on the development of sending countries are more complex and less predictable than thought by the historical-structural authors. As described here below, revision has concerned in particular the migrants’ remittances and their composition.

**Remittance Effects**

Scholars have started to consider the macro effects of remittances on the economy of sending countries. Since they are less volatile and cyclical than capital flows, remittances result in being an important source of foreign currency that helps in stabilising the currency value. Therefore, their contribution to development is not only linked to the way migrants spend them in the territory (i.e. for investment or consumption): remittances affect positively also the monetary situation of their countries of origin and eventually increase the trust of foreign investors.

Regarding the way migrants’ households make use of remittances, several recent studies have demonstrated that households receiving remittances have higher propensity to invest than the other ones (De Haas, 2008). These data derive especially from an enlarged concept of “productive investment”. As mentioned above, in the past scholars argued that the main households’ expenditures (i.e. on education, health, food, medicines and housing) are merely “consumptive investments” since they do not generate employment and economic return, in opposition to productive investments. However, if we adopt the concept of human capability as measure of development then these kinds of expenditures can be considered productive investment as well. They indirectly contribute to the economic development of the area by: a) enhancing the well-being of migrants’ households, in terms of health and education for example; and b) supporting the well-being of non-migrants as well, through an increase of consumption and working opportunities rate in the area (Conway and Cohen, 1998).

Additionally, the new studies highlight that the impact of remittances on income inequalities is unpredictable. In some cases remittances reduce inequalities because they

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Please refer to glossary
reach the remote areas where migrants originate. In other cases they aggravate income gaps because the access to migration opportunities differs between social groups according to the existence of financial, educational and social capital (Jaulin, 2010). Moreover, their distortion effects are limited in the case of where migrants’ remittances are channelled to fund community projects for the benefit of the area of provenance. There are successful examples of where migrants have financed new infrastructures and social services through taxes or volunteer contributions. However, the government’s role to promote this kind of community investment is critical (De Haas, 2007).

Social Remittances

Under the light of the new concept of development, scholars now extend the concept of innovation beyond the working ambit to the cultural and socio-political environment. This changes the composition of remittances. Besides the technical knowledge and the financial resources, migrants are carriers of what authors call “social remittances” (Levitt 1998, 926-948), which include ideas, behaviours and identities captured in receiving countries. These can influence the social, cultural and political development of the country of origin, eventually driving a socio-political reform. In this sense, migrants associations abroad have usually a key role (De Haas, 2007). Qualified migrants who return to their country of origin frequently become involved in national and local politics, and migrants communities are often active lobbyists for the promotion of democracy in their country of origin (Jaulin, 2010).

1.4 TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The transnational theory is a recent theoretical framework in migration studies that analyses the migration phenomenon in the context of the current globalised world. The concept of transnationalism emerged in the early 1990s and refers to migrants’ regular involvement in the economic, political and cultural lives in their country of origin. These cross-border activities should be part of migrants’ daily routine and not occasional such as rare trips or a singular cross-border monetary transaction to their country of origin. Although migrants have always been involved in transnational activities (Schiller, Basch, and Blanc, 1995, 48-63) the intensity of their engagement has been enhanced during the past two decades.
thanks to advances in communication (i.e. fax, satellite television and the Internet) and transportation technologies (De Haas, 2008). Migrants’ transnational activities may range from the economic to the socio-political and cultural sectors. Table 1 here below lists some examples.

Table 1: Types of Transnational Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Examples of transnational activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Business investments in the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer of monetary remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Membership in political parties in the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voting in the country of origin’s elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Running for political office in the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Migrants’ visits to their home countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correspondence between country of origin and destination (e.g. emails, online chat sessions, telephone calls, social networks, and traditional letters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation to associations in the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Participation to cultural organisation in the country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer of knowledge through participation to seminars in the country of origin or online</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Periods of secondment in the country of origin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.4.1 Correlation between Transnationalism and Integration in Receiving Countries

The transnational theory influences the approach to migrants’ integration in the country of destination. Integration is a process that refers to the incorporation of new migrants into the social system and its economic, political and social institutions and culture of the country of destination. The traditional approaches to integration derive from the Assimilationist and Multiculturalism paradigms. “Multiculturalism” recognises the non-homogeneity of nation-states and promotes cultural diversity as a desirable feature of a given society advocating for preserving minorities’ socio-cultural and political differences. With the rise of international terrorism and the recent financial crisis this approach has been mostly abandoned in favour of “assimilationism” (Triandafyllidou, Modood, and Meer, 2011). This latter considers migration to be a discrete and definitive event according to which migrants move to settle for
good. To foster social cohesion they should progressively lose their ties with their homeland and assimilate into the country of destination’s cultural identity. Under this view, persistent transnational activities may jeopardise migrants’ integration in the new country of destination.

In contrast, the transnational theory claims that the new technologies increase migrants’ possibilities to be involved in two or more countries at the same time. This drives a perspective shift on migration, from a definitive move to a continuous and multi-dimensional process linking two countries (Faist, 2008). Eventually, migrants adopt transnational identities and develop double loyalties towards both the country of origin and destination. As a consequence, integration is considered to be a multipath and nonlinear process, where a person can be part of two societies at the same time. Figure 3 below illustrates the dynamics of migrant transnationalism (De Haas, 2008).

**Figure 3: The Process of Migrant Transnationalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sending Country</th>
<th>Receiving Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kin and communities support the emigration of some of their own in search of better conditions.</td>
<td>1. Migrants gain a precarious foothold and begin to send modest contributions to their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Remittances and news from the migrants begin to change the character of local life. It becomes increasingly geared to events abroad.</td>
<td>2. As migrants consolidate their economic position, the flow of remittances and investments increases. They make the first visits home and create incipient hometown associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The flow of remittances, investments, and information transforms the local culture. An increasing traffic of goods and people develop. Local religious and political authorities travel abroad to request support from their expatriates.</td>
<td>3. Migrants make significant investments in their home communities and strengthen their organizations. Their economic power gives them increasing voice in local political and religious affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Governments enter the scene making concessions to their diasporas and counting them for economic and political support. The traffic of goods, information, and people surpass local communities to become national in scope.</td>
<td>4. Migrant organizations become interlocutors of sending country governments and, simultaneously, start taking part in local politics in their areas of settlement. The flow of investments increases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Castells and Delgado Wise, 2008.*
1.4.2  Implications of Transnationalism for Sending Countries’ Development

Migrants’ possibilities to develop transnational identities challenges the historical-structural authors’ negative perception of migration on the development of their country of origin. The transnational paradigm denies that migration implies a definitive loss of economic and human capital for sending countries since migrants’ transnationalism puts under discussion three main assumptions of the historical-structural paradigm.

Virtual Return versus Physical Return

In the past, development aid actors, especially in receiving countries, have implemented many returning programmes based on the assumption that the physical return of migrants is a prerequisite for the development for the country of origin. In contrast, the transnational theory claims that the new available technology allows contact and knowledge transfer, and remote project/company management from the country of destination. In this case, migrants perform a “virtual return” to their country of origin by holding distance fora and seminar, and by participating in networks linking professionals from countries of origin and destination and joint projects (De Haas, 2007). Moreover, since migrants develop double loyalties towards both the country of origin and destination, the terms normally used to categorise migrants, such as permanent, temporary, and return migrant\(^5\) become obsolete.

Brain Gain versus Brain Drain

As seen previously, historical-structural scholars believe that migration of intellectual and technical elites has mostly a negative impact on sending countries. They label this loss of resources as brain drain. However, recently other authors point out that migration of highly-skilled workers can result instead in a “brain gain”, namely a final resource profit in the long-term (Hunger, 2002). The loss of highly-skilled workers can be countered in the long run by the flow of trade relations and contacts, new knowledge, innovations, mentality and information that migrants gain from their experience abroad and can introduce in their country of origin. This form of knowledge and skills transfer between the two countries involved in the migration process is called “brain circulation”. Considering the actual trend towards a knowledge society, the role of knowledge and skills transfer in the development process is increasing (Hunger, 2002).

\(^5\) See the glossary of terms.
Already in the 1970s, Bovenkerk theorised that migrants may generate an innovative force engendering a change in mentality and ideas in economic and industrial amits of the country of origin (Bovenkerk, 1974). Nevertheless, the extent of the innovation is determined by different factors such as the size of the returning population, the duration of the migrants’ stay abroad and the migrants’ working qualifications (Fargues, 2008). Other authors warn that sending countries can benefit from migrants’ experience abroad only if it brings an additional value to their initial professional skills and financial resources (Gmelch, 1980). According to Cassarino (2004, 253-279), migrants can reintegrate in the labour market of their country of origin and so make use of their new knowledge and skills only if they have well planned their return and can mobilise resources once back home. The table below summarises the trigger factors for innovation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors that trigger innovation</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The size of the returning population</td>
<td>Large numbers may form a critical mass necessary to initiate changes, while small numbers will have less influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The duration of migrants’ absence</td>
<td>Short periods abroad and short exposure to another culture will bring fewer changes than longer periods; on the other hand, when migrants stay a long time abroad their readjustment upon return may be problematic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The social class of the migrants</td>
<td>Returning members of the elite may have a greater impact than unskilled workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quantity and quality of the acquired skills</td>
<td>Innovation may be fostered more by the acquisition of general skills than by a specialised education that would be difficult to apply in the context of origin countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The differences between origin and destination areas</td>
<td>Those who migrated to metropolitan areas will have more impact if they return to urban centres than to rural areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of return</td>
<td>Mobilised resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Fargues, 2008.*

More recently, some authors have pointed out that education is inter alia a key factor in triggering transnational activities. According to Levitt (2003, 177-194) and Portes (2007, 73-97), the better educated migrants are the most likely to engage in transnational activities.
Trade-off between Integration and Development of Countries of Origin

Historical-structural scholars argue that migrants’ commitment to the society of origin and remittances flows are inversely proportional to the integration and the length of period in receiving countries (De Haas, 2008). This is in line with the assimilationist concept of integration that implies a progressive disengagement from the country of origin.

On the contrary, under the transnational theory migrants’ integration in receiving countries can coincide and even amplify their engagement in the development of countries of origin. As shown in table 3, according to De Haas migrants and their descendants exhibit a continued interest in their countries of origin that may be expressed for example through community associations, investments and participation in the political life (De Haas, 2006).

Table 3: The Relation between Household Migration Stage, Consumption and Investments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Consumption and investment patterns by migration households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Migrant is in the process of settling</td>
<td>Most urgent needs are filled if possible: food, health, debt repayment, education of children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Migrant is settled and has more or less stable work</td>
<td>Housing construction, land purchase, basic household amenities, continued education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIa</td>
<td>Ongoing stay</td>
<td>(Higher) education of children. Diverse investments: commercial housing and land, shops, craft industries, agriculture. Magnitude, spatial and sectoral allocation depending on household income, macro and local development/investment context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIb</td>
<td>Return</td>
<td>Continuing investments (as IIIa) if the household has access to external income (for example, pensions, savings or creation of businesses).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIc</td>
<td>Family reunification</td>
<td>Traditional view: no significant investments besides help to family/community members; this view is challenged by evidence that more and more migrants seem to adopt transnational lives and identities, which may be associated with continued home country engagement and/or investments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Furthermore, according to Barulina et al. the length of the stay and the consequent migrants’ integration in the receiving country facilitate the possibility to invest in the country.
of origin. For example, migrants with a permanent residence permit can enjoy equal opportunity to access the labour market and therefore contribute the most to the development of their countries of origin. Baraulina et al. conclude that a policy promoting integration at the same time will foster migrants’ involvement with their countries of origin (Baraulina, Borchers, and Schmid, 2008).

1.4.3 Implications of Transnationalism for Destination Countries

According to the transnational theory, transnationalism and integration are simultaneous processes that reinforce each other. Therefore, integration facilitates migrants’ transnational activities while these latter create the basis for successful integration. According to Portes, transnationalism offers an alternative path to migrants’ economic and status achievement since it supports them in circumventing market constraints and natives’ prejudice (Portes, 2001, 181-194). Therefore, transnational involvement facilitates integration, in particular of migrants with fewer resources, by providing them with socio-economic opportunities and a sense of purpose and self-worth (Portes, 1999, 463-477).

Moreover, Lacroix (2005) points out that transnational activities foster as well the integration of migrants with already a certain level of social resources and are actively involved in development projects. Their transnational engagement will support them to establish and strengthen contact with state institutions in the country of destination. Therefore, in contrast with assimilationists, for these scholars transnational engagement is not a step prior to integration but instead it facilitates and is part of the process of integration (Portes, 2001, 181-194).

1.5 THE NEED FOR A HOLISTIC APPROACH

As seen previously, in contrast with the historical-structural theory, since the late 1990s scholars have revalued the benefits of migration and downsized its negative aspects. However, unlike in the past, these scholars do not consider the consequences of migration as resulting from a deterministic model. The actual impact of migration on the development of the country of origin depends on too many variables to be predicted. Therefore, migration cannot be considered a panacea to improve definitely the countries of origin’s development.
When questioning whether the migration and development nexus is positive or negative there is not a univocal answer.

Instead, most scholars admit the importance of the local social and economic conditions on the actual impact of migration on the sending countries’ development. Remittances, knowledge transfer and social networks that migrants can offer to their homeland need a fertile environment that ensure their fruitful use, such as a business-friendly climate and active academic institutions. The government in the country of origin has a crucial responsibility in ensuring that these conditions are in place. This can be done by formulating a broader development plan that integrates migration and development policies under a holistic approach and ensure a coordination between receiving and sending countries as well (De Haas, 2005). Developing the Mabogunje’s migration system theory, De Haas elaborates a model that describes this reciprocal relationship between migration and a broad development process. As shown in the figure below, the macro development context at country level (a) changes the local context while both influencing the population’s migration aspirations and capabilities (b and c). In turn, migration changes as well the local development context thanks to the transfer of ideas, knowledge and economic resources (d). Finally, the resulting new local environment influences the macro development context although at a limited level (e).

**Figure 4: The General Conceptual Framework for Analysing Migration-Development Interactions**

![Diagram of the General Conceptual Framework for Analysing Migration-Development Interactions](source: De Haas, 2008.)

However, countries of origin’s policies may not be sufficient to foster the development impact of migrants’ communities abroad. As seen previously, transnational scholars have pointed out that transnational engagement and integration in the receiving country are
simultaneous processes that reinforce each other. This implies that the level of integration in the receiving country determines the level of migrants’ transnational activities. The set-up of transnational businesses, participation to secondment programs or to cultural and social organisations in the country of origin need a stable inclusion in the receiving country’s economic, political and social systems. Therefore, the countries of destinations have an important role to play in enhancing the migrants’ development impact in the countries of origin, both through cooperation with these latter to promote transnational activities and by facilitating migrants’ integration in their territory (e.g. measures to avoid double taxation, to facilitate transferability of pension benefits and recognition of qualifications). Receiving countries’ policies on foreigners’ entry, stay, and integration policies influence the contributions of migrants towards their homeland.

Furthermore, the linkages between transnationalism and integration in the receiving countries forces to adopt a holistic view of the migration and development nexus that joins together country of origin, country of destination and migrants. Studies on the migration and development nexus usually focus on the development of the country of origin. However, as the migration system theory has underlined, migratory flows influence both sending and receiving countries. Moreover, as mentioned previously, transnational activities not only foster sending countries’ development but integration in receiving countries as well. The emergence of transnationalism over the last two decades has created the need for a holistic approach to the migration and development nexus that goes beyond a narrow focus on the effects of migration in the sending countries, by studying the role that migrants play in the development of receiving countries as well, especially in terms of knowledge transfer in the case of highly-skilled migrants.

1.6 CONCLUSIONS

The academic thinking on the migration and development nexus has been subject to a deep evolution over time due to the occurred changes in both migration studies and development’s definition. On one side, while initially the migration phenomenon was studied exclusively under an economic point of view, later sociology and anthropology sciences brought important contributions. This helped pass from objective, static and deterministic studies to subjective, dynamic and less predictable models.
On the other side, in the last decade the concept of development has expanded beyond economic growth to become linked to people’s freedom. Human capabilities, namely the people’s abilities to lead their life and to amplify their possibilities of choice, have become the main indicators of development ahead of income and material growth. Consequent empirical researches have demonstrated that the effects of migration on the development of sending countries are more complex and less predictable that previously thought. First, the scope of migrants’ contributions goes beyond economic growth to include social remittances, skills and knowledge. Second, the distinction between productive and consumptive investments has been dropped since households’ expenditures on property, education and health contribute indirectly to the economic development of the country of origin. Finally, the new technologies and the globalisation phenomenon facilitate the potential of migration’s benefits since their physical return to their homeland is not anymore a necessary prerequisite.

The transnational paradigm highlights how the advances in the communication and transport technologies drive a perspective shift on migration, from a definitive move to a continuous and multi-dimensional process linking two countries. Eventually, migrants adopt transnational identities and develop loyalties towards both countries. This puts into question the usual assumption that migrants’ engagement to their homeland is inversely proportional to the length of stay and their integration in the receiving country; on the contrary, transnational engagement and integration in the receiving country are simultaneous processes that reinforce each other.

Therefore, although in the past migration was judged either absolutely positive or negative for the sending countries, currently the prevalent thinking rejects this Manichean vision. The actual impact of migration on the country of origin depends on too many variables to be predicted. However, scholars stressed the importance of the decision makers’ role in ensuring a friendly environment that can downsize the negative consequences of migration and amplify its benefits. To this aim, sending countries’ migration and development policies need to be part of a national broader development plan to ensure a fertile environment for the entire spectrum of migrants’ contributions.

However, the transnational perspective demands a holistic approach towards the migration and development nexus that goes beyond the relation between migrants and sending countries to include receiving countries as well. These latter play an important role in enhancing migrants’ development impact in sending countries, both through cooperation with these latter to promote transnational activities and by facilitating migrants’ integration in their territory.
CHAPTER TWO

HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRANTS:
OVERVIEW OF POLICY APPROACHES TO MAXIMISE THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEVELOPMENT

As underlined in the previous chapter, the policies put in place by governments of both sending and receiving countries are the determinant key for the enhancement of the country of origin’s development through migrants. This chapter offers an overview of policy approaches to maximise migrants’ contribution to the development of their country of origin. It focuses on highly-skilled migration from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe. The first part provides a historical overview of policy approaches on migration and development adopted by sending and receiving countries since the end of the Second World War until now. The second part explores highly-skilled migrant flows from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea. It analyses the grounds of their migration, the international mobility framework concerning them and their main destination countries’ policies towards highly-skilled migration, with a focus on the EU regulations.

2.1 HISTORY OF POLITICAL APPROACH ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Focusing on migration flows from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, since the end of the Second World War both sending and receiving countries’ migration policies have been shaped by both the main academic conclusions on the impact of migration on development and major geopolitical events. De Haas identifies four main phases, summarised in the table below.
Table 4: Main Phases in Migration and Development Research and Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Research community</th>
<th>Policy field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s - 1973</td>
<td>Development and migration optimism</td>
<td>Developmentalist optimism; capital and knowledge transfers by migrants would help developing countries in development take-off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1990</td>
<td>Development and migration pessimism (dependency, brain drain)</td>
<td>Growing scepticism; concerns on brain drain; after experiments with return migration policies focused on integration in receiving countries. Migration largely out of sight in development field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2001</td>
<td>Readjustment to more subtle views under influence of increasing empirical work (NELM, livelihood approaches, transnationalism)</td>
<td>Persistent scepticism; tightening of immigration policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 - until present</td>
<td>Boom in publications: mixed, but generally positive views.</td>
<td>Resurgence of migration and development optimism under influence of remittance boom, and a sudden turnaround of views: brain gain, diaspora involvement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: De Haas, 2008.

2.1.1 Migration Optimism Phase

During the period that goes from the beginning of the 1950s until the end of the 1960s the colonization era was at its final stage as most colonies were gaining their independence. Under a euphoric atmosphere, the governments of the new born countries were convinced that a large capital transfer and industrialisation programmes would have boosted a rapid economic growth and modernisation in the country (De Haas, 2007). In line with neo-classical economic models, they encouraged massive labour migration to boost economic development through remittances flows and the knowledge transfer it could generate (De Haas, 2008). Meanwhile, northern European countries were experiencing a high economic growth rate of up to 5 percent per year and a high need of additional workforce to reconstruct the infrastructures destroyed during the war. For instance, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands recruited workers from the Maghreb countries through the “guest-workers” programmes, which offered temporary working permits especially for low-skilled workers (Jaulin, 2010). Both receiving and sending countries treated these migrants as temporary, expecting that they would have returned after having saved a certain amount of money to buy
some land, construct a house or start their own enterprise in their country of origin. In this way, migration would have facilitated investments and knowledge transfer to the country of origin (De Haas, 2008a).

2.1.2 Migration Pessimism Phase

As mentioned previously, in the early 1970s the historical-structural scholars started to criticize the supposed positive effect of migration on the development of sending countries and alleged that instead it leads to brain drain, economic distortion and remittances dependence. They warned sending countries against migration, considering it a factor perpetuating the economic gap between countries.

Meanwhile, the economic boom predominating during the previous decade in Northern Europe had an arrest due mainly to the 1973 oil crisis. The following economic stagnation resulted in structural unemployment and a low demand for unskilled labourers (De Haas, 2008a). For instance, in France, Belgium and the Netherlands the unemployment rate raised from under 2 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1985 (Jaulin, 2010). Therefore, the governments of North European countries implementing guest-workers programmes decided to stop them. At the same time they started applying strict visa policies and launching initiatives to encourage migrants’ return to their countries of origin. However, in the following years the number of migrants increased instead of diminished (De Haas, 2008a). These policies to facilitate migrants’ return mainly failed because the receiving countries’ legislation provided migrants with the possibility to shift from temporary to permanent settlement, which allowed a large-scale family reunification as well. Migrants preferred to settle in the host country instead of returning to their country of origin because of the lack of opportunities for economic reintegration there and for fear of not being allowed to come back later.

2.1.3 Readjustment Phase

As seen in the previous chapter, in the 1990s academic theories such as the NELM and the transnational theory challenged the univocal pessimistic conclusion of the historical-structural authors, and gave a much more complex interpretation of the relationship between migration and development, especially in the context of the new globalised world.
Meanwhile, as a consequence of globalisation, migration flows across the Mediterranean Sea increased further due to high unemployment rates and political instability in sending countries as well. These flows were directed towards new countries of destination such as Greece, Spain and Italy. European countries reacted to these sudden arrivals by increasing migration control and labour market policy measures. However, these restrictive visa policies, for which family reunification or asylum became almost the only channels for legal migration, facilitated the emergence of illegal migration flows (Jaulin, 2010). Irregular migrants easily found work opportunities in the agricultural and construction sectors and in the catering industry where negative demographic trends had created a huge labour force demand (Baruah and Cholewinski, 2007).

2.1.4 Resurgence of Migration as a Key Factor for the Sending Countries’ Development

In the early 2000s, suddenly both policy-makers and aid development actors rediscovered the nexus between migration and development. Attention rose after the publication of the Global Development Finance report by the World Bank, and more specifically of its chapter written by Ratha (2003) underlining the value of migrants’ remittances as a source of development finance in sending countries.

Certainly remittances flows have increased massively during the last decade, from $31.1 billion in 1990 to $76.8 billion in 2000 and to no less than $167.0 billion in 2005 (De Haas, 2007). The World Bank estimated that in 2013 remittances to the developing world were expected to grow to $414 billion and are projected to cross the half-trillion mark by 2016 (World Bank, 2013). Their volume is nearly three times the value of the official development assistance provided to low-income countries and they represent the second largest source of external funding for developing countries after foreign direct investment (Global Commission on International Migration, 2005). These figures increase notably if we consider that most remittances are sent through informal channels instead of the banking system.

The publication of the World Bank’s report has the merit to have relaunched the debate on the migration and development nexus at the international level, and conferences and international fora on this topic have multiplied since then. Soon after it, the World Bank organised with the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID) the first global meeting on migrants remittances which was attended by 42 countries’ representatives (De Haas, 2008a). In December of the same year, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the Global Commission on International
Migration, an independent body to provide a framework to strengthen the governance of international migration, whose report explored other possibilities than remittances to enhance development through migration. Bilateral and multilateral agreements and regional consultative processes have explored the linkages between migration and development as well. Concerning the Mediterranean area, an example is the 5+5 Process (five European countries and five from North Africa) annual meeting instituted to discuss migration issues (Doukouré and Oger, 2007). Another example is the Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) dialogue, an inter-regional consultative platform between migration officials in countries of origin, transit and destination along the migration routes in Africa, Europe and the Middle East (i.e. with the participation of more than 40 partner states and seven international organisations as partner agencies). One of its thematic areas is migration and development (including expatriate and emigrant affairs, remittances and sustainable return).

The European Union (EU) in turn has opened three fora. The first one is the Rabat Process, begun with the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in July 2006, followed by another in Paris in 2008. Later, in 2011, Senegal hosted the Third Euro-African Ministerial Conference which finally adopted the Dakar Strategy and Road Map for the years 2012 – 2014. The third pillar of the strategy is about strengthening the synergies between migration and development (Rabat Process, 2011). The same pillar was confirmed in the Rome Declaration and Programme for the years 2015 – 2017 adopted during the Fourth Euro-African Ministerial Conference n November 2014 (Rabat Process, 2014). The second forum is called the Tripoli Process. The first summit between the EU and the African Union on migration and development was in November 2006. The following summit in Lisbon held in December 2007 produced a joint EU-Africa Strategy and Action Plan, including a Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment. The next EU-Africa Summit held in November 2010 in Tripoli adopted the action plans for 2011-2013 (Africa-EU Partnership, 2010). The final forum is the Euro-Mediterranean Process, called also the Barcelona Process, which aims to create an area around the Mediterranean with peace and stability, shared prosperity and strengthened cooperation on social and cultural issues through the Union for the Mediterranean. In November 2007, the 39 member countries gathered at the first ministerial conference in Albufeira. This resulted in a political declaration and action plan in

the three priority areas of legal migration, illegal immigration and migration and development (EuroMed, 2007).

The role of the migration and development nexus within the EU’s policies on migration has increased during the last decade. In December 2005, the Council of the EU adopted the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), a global and coherent strategy to address irregular migration and human trafficking while managing migration and asylum through cooperation with third countries (European Council, 2005). This was renewed in 2012 and renamed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), to include short-term movements (e.g. visitors, tourists, students, researchers, business people or visiting family members) besides long-term migratory flows. The GAMM represents the overarching framework for the EU external migration policy and includes among its four priorities areas “Maximising the development impact of migration and mobility”. In addition, respect for the rights and dignity of migrants - under the name migrant-centred approach - is an essential cross-cutting dimension of this policy framework (European Commission, 2011).

2.1.5 The Linkage between Migration, Security and Development

The 2003 World Bank report caught especially the attention of receiving countries - in particular the industrialised countries in Europe and North America - and of the international organisations led by them. The main reason for this interest is that the report links development to migrants’ remittances and therefore is in line with the economic thinking predominant in these countries during the 2000s, called the “Washington consensus”. This is a neo-liberal doctrine disregarding the role of state as service provider and market regulator in favour of a bottom-up approach. A second reason is that the focus on migrants as agents of development seemed to help address the root causes of migration flows, perceived by these receiving countries mainly as a problem menacing their security and stability. The increase of sending countries’ development and well-being would enhance their stability and ultimately the receiving countries’ security through a decrease of migration flows. However, some authors warned the development community against a naïf enthusiasm towards remittances and claimed that these cannot in anyway become a substitute of foreign aid because of the unknown consequences of remittances on long-term economic development (Kapur, 2004).

These receiving countries have led the debate on migration and development nexus generated by the World Bank report, while sending countries and civil society organisations have been left the mere role of implementation partners. Therefore, the debate and the related
action plans and political declarations present some limits resulting from the receiving countries' priority on controlling migration flows. First, migration and development measures are merely used as a quid pro quo tool to convince sending countries to collaborate in the migration management. Second, the debate focuses mainly on the impact of development on migration flows but seldom on the reverse, namely the impact of migration upon economic development at origin. Third, the debate is centred on the economic development and neglects the other aspects derived from Sen’s definition of development as a process of expanding the people’s substantive freedoms. Sen’s definition goes beyond material aspects, such as income per capita, to include as well moral aspects like enjoying freedom, gaining knowledge, human dignity, self-expression, justice, equal treatment and participation to national political affairs. These latter can be guaranteed only by a political regime that is based on democratic and good governance principles and respect of human rights. Because of these limits, receiving countries in Europe and North America have adopted a twofold strategy that has been strengthened since the terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001. First, they have promoted economic development in the Arab world by liberalising trade and financing development programmes. Second, they have backed sending countries’ autocratic governments, such as the dictatorial regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, considered a brake against religious fundamentalists.7

However, this strategy has not been successful. These tyrannical regimes have affected negatively the development of their countries by eliminating political opposition and facilitating a corruption climate undermining free market competition and meritocracy. As the turmoil in Tunisia and Egypt have demonstrated, economic development is not enough to maintain stability, as good governance and justice are critical factors for the country’s development and ultimately for its internal stability and the international security. In these countries, mass discontent was motivated not only by economic and social factors but as well as by the need of individual freedom, equal opportunities, and justice (De Greiff, 2011). Moreover, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt had mainly a secular character and Islamist movements had a marginal role, at least at the beginning. This has put under discussion northern industrialised countries’ assumption that illiberal regimes with their strong security apparatus are necessary to ensure the country’s stability against Islamists groups (Silvestri, 2011). Ultimately, the main consequence of the fall of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia has been an increase of illegal migration flows towards Europe.

2.2 HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRATION

This part focuses on highly-skilled migrants from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea. First, it analyses the grounds of their migration. Second, it describes the international mobility regime regarding them. Third, it analyses their main destination countries’ policies towards highly-skilled migration.

2.2.1 Grounds of Highly-Skilled Migration

Recently, migration flows from developing to industrialised countries have increased mainly for economic and demographic changes. These are partly due to the mentioned neo-liberal economic doctrine called the Washington consensus and adopted by most of the industrialised countries and the main financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the regional development banks (the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, etc.). These have pushed developing countries to apply neo-liberal strategies to liberalise capital and commodity markets, privatize industry and services, and reduce social expenditures. Even though these measures have produced some degree of economic stabilisation, they have mainly resulted in social inequalities and eventually in a wider economic gap between industrialised and developing countries. This situation has induced people in developing countries to look abroad for decent life standards (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008), especially highly-skilled professionals: the impoverishment of sending countries’ life standards does not allow highly-skilled professionals to practice their careers in relatively good conditions at home and eventually pushes them to migrate (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

The labour market structure within the countries of origin helps increase the international labour offer of highly-skilled workers as well. For instance, in the South-East Mediterranean area considerable investments in tertiary education during the past decades have not been accompanied by investments in technology. As a result, the prevalent economic model is labour intensive. The consequent mismatch between the skills learned at the university and labour market needs produces a high unemployment rate among university graduates (Fargues, 2010). Moreover, limited number of tertiary education institutions, low wages, contracts’ poor terms and conditions, and a lack of opportunities for career development can fuel academic and educational service providers’ as well as students’ migration (Global
Migration Group, 2010). Other grounds of highly-skilled migration are usually lack of good governance and the presence of a working culture of migration that values the training and working experience abroad (Fargues, 2010).

International migration is triggered as well by labour demand. To maintain their central position in the prevalent knowledge-based economy, industrialised countries in Europe and North America need a great number of highly-skilled workers not all of which can be found in their stagnant or declining population (Giannoccolo, 2006). However, although labour demand exists at both highly-skilled and low-skilled levels, receiving countries' governments tend to restrict legal migration opportunities for low-skilled workers but facilitate highly-skilled migration (Koser and Laczko, 2010). The main reason is that low-skilled migrants seem to have more difficulties of integration in the local society that perceives them as a threat to its security and culture. Additionally, receiving countries assume that in the long term, highly-skilled migrants increase the national income more than low-skilled migrants. This need for highly-skilled professionals generates competition between industrialised countries to attract them from all over the world (Lucas, 2005). This labour demand does not appear affected by the current financial crisis (League of Arab States, 2009) and can result easily in a plundering of human capital from developing countries, and therefore brain drain, unless it respects the principles of ethical recruitment (Fargues, 2010). These principles are embodied for example in the Commonwealth Code of Practice for International Recruitment of Health Workers, whose main objective is to control the outflow of health personnel in large numbers from regions and countries where these skills are in short supply and high demand (Koser and Laczko, 2010). However, ethical recruitment measures should take into consideration that preventing highly-skilled people from taking advantage of migration simply because of their country of origin is discriminatory and violate the basic human right of exit. For this reason, some practitioners argue that instead of refraining highly-skilled migration it would be more useful to reduce its negative impact by applying measures to encourage compensation, reparation and restitution for the affected countries, including promoting return. Yet, although there are proposals on this sense, at the moment the possibility to reach an agreement is quite feeble (Lucas, 2005).

2.2.2 International Mobility Framework

As highlighted previously, migration management in a globalised world requires a strong coordination between sending and receiving countries. Despite the multiple official
declarations there have not been concrete coordinated action between receiving and sending countries to regulate the circulation of highly-skilled workers until now. Instead, governments have focused their policies more on low-skilled migration (Fargues, 2010). Presently, there is not a comprehensive international migration regime but rather national laws and policies regulate the admission of persons for the purpose of employment (Baruah and Cholewinski, 2007). The labour immigration policy area is the global governance area with the least formalized structures and mainly remains in the hands of individual sovereign states. These keep the right to control the foreigners’ entry into their national labour markets to defend the interests of all national workers as well as specific groups of interest (Betts, 2010).

During the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in September 1994, more than 180 states adopted a declaration to develop a coordinated legal migration system but its implementation remains limited (Doukouré and Oger, 2007). At the global level, only the Mode IV of the 1994 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains provisions to enable natural persons to cross international borders for the purpose of providing a service. However, despite developing countries’ efforts to widen its spectrum, the Mode IV refers only to a limited category of professionals working for multinational companies (e.g. executives, managers and specialists, and intra-company transferees). Additionally, permits are only temporary, for ninety days. Therefore, the Mode IV excludes permanent migration and does not apply to individuals independently seeking access to a member state’s labour market (Baruah and Cholewinski, 2007).

International organisations have tried to fill the vacuum left by national governments in coordinating highly-skilled migrants’ circulation but with limited success (Fargues, 2010). For instance, since the 1970s the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has managed the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme that organises short-term consultancy missions of qualified migrants to their country of origin. However, despite its success (it has placed until now about 5000 professionals in 49 countries) it can target only migrants that are able to volunteer since the proposed fee is only about one-quarter that of a traditional international consultant (De Haas, 2006). Other international organisations, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) have instead mainly worked to promote permanent return of highly-skilled migrants (Fargues, 2010). The Assisted Voluntary Programme, operated by IOM, supports the return of asylum seekers, denied asylum seekers and other migrants who are willing to come back to their home country by providing information and counselling to potential returnees, travel arrangements and medical
assistance, post-arrival reception, information, referral, onward travel to the home location and reintegration assistance. Between 1993 and 2002, IOM assisted more than 3.5 million migrants’ return to over 160 countries. In contrast, the IOM’s Return of Qualified Nationals programme targets highly-skilled migrants and provides them with public sector job placements and financial incentives such as transportation and reintegration costs, medical insurance and salary subsidies. Another of IOM’s programmes, the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) in cooperation with the Organisation of African Union, focuses on enhancing the country of origin’s development by facilitating the transfer of vital skills and resources of African diaspora to their countries of origin through temporary, long-term or virtual return without jeopardising migrants’ legal status in their host countries or newly adopted home countries. Additionally, it avoids the return conditionality, which is the most significant difference to the previous programmes.

2.2.3 Main Receiving Countries’ Policies towards Highly-Skilled Migrants

As mentioned above, despite timid attempts of establishing a common framework to regulate migration flows, these are currently regulated by national policies of receiving countries. Focusing on highly-skilled migrants from the North Africa and Middle East regions, their main destinations are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\(^8\) and the OECD member states.

2.2.3.1 GCC

The six members of the GCC have a very close relationship with the developing countries in the North Africa and Middle East areas. Migrants constitute 70 percent of their entire population, corresponding to about 13 to15 millions. The GCC countries adopt the “kefala” or sponsorship system that forbids permanent residency and citizenship possibilities to foreigners (Jureidini et al., 2010). This has facilitated temporary and circular migration: after a few years, migrants usually come back to their country of origin to migrate again later only for economic and career purposes (Fargues, 2010). ILO expects a decrease of the demand for highly-skilled workers in GCC countries as a consequence of the financial crisis begun in 2007 after years of economic boom (Cerna, 2010).

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\(^8\) The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic union of Arab states bordering the Persian Gulf, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
2.2.3.2 OECD

Compared to the GCC countries, the OECD members adopt a different approach: they offer the possibility to access permanent residence and citizenship, which therefore stimulates permanent migration. As noted above, usually these countries promote migration of highly-skilled workers with various tailored tools (e.g. dedicated visa type and scholarships) while refraining low-skilled migration (Fargues, 2010). Among OECD countries, highly-skilled Egyptian migrants’ preferred destinations are the USA and the EU’s Member States.

As regards in particular the USA, highly-skilled migrants are accepted under the H-1B programme that allows employers to hire foreigners with a simple declaration. The programme is based on the assumption that the USA is in need of specialised professionals in the growing employment sectors, such as science and engineering. However, highly-skilled migration in the USA has been decreasing as a consequence of the financial crisis begun in 2007: enterprises have diminished their labour demand of the highly-skilled while the government has recently restricted the visa facilitations (Cerna, 2010).

Regarding the EU, its member states are facing an urgent problem of under-population and decreasing levels of fertility that, together with high levels of life expectancy, have led to the problem of an ageing population. This results in a continuous decrease of the percentage of population in productive age (15-64 years old). By 2020 the EU’s working age population is estimated to shrink from 303 million to 295 million and then to 280 million by 2030 (Zohry, 2005). This demographic change puts in danger member states’ economic growth and consequently their welfare system, which is mainly based on taxes upon the population’s revenue. Therefore, migration of foreign workers would support the EU member states to ensure the sustainability of the welfare state.

Despite that, the EU has built since the 1990s a system focused on migration management and security that has been called by migration practitioners “Fortress Europe” to indicate an area where internal mobility is promoted while barriers are erected outside (Talani, 2003). This system aims at avoiding mass migration for fear that the local population would accept it with difficulty, causing political unrest, social conflict, cultural clashes, or religious struggles as a consequence.

Although it is early to talk about a comprehensive EU migration policy since member states retain the right to determine migrants’ admission (Fargues, 2010), a framework has been set up through several documents. These include the Title IV of the European Community Treaty providing with the legal basis of the EU migration policy, the 2004 Hague Programme, the 2009 Stockholm Programme, and the Lisbon Treaty. This latter has
reconfirmed the EU’s commitment to the development of a common immigration policy and extended qualified majority voting procedures to apply to asylum and immigration issues (Jaulin, 2010). This framework is based on the internal market rational and on the balance of the member states’ labour market needs with a preference for EU nationals, which means that admission for working purposes is subject to the unavailability of the required skills in the local market (Cremona, 2008). As a consequence, legal migration possibilities are narrowed while the framework intensifies borders controls against illegal migration. As previously said, in 2012 the EU adopted the GAMM, a non-binding global strategy on migration to address inter alia irregular migration and to manage migration and asylum through cooperation with third countries. Under this approach and through the Barcelona Process, the EU and its southern member states have signed association agreements with the South-East Mediterranean countries to share the border control, to stipulate agreement for the readmission of illegal migrants. Additionally, the GAMM promotes the Mobility Partnership (MP), the main tool for cooperation in the area of migration and mobility between the EU and third countries. In line with the “more-for-more” approach, the MP offers visa facilitation upon conclusion of a readmission agreement with the EU (European Commission, 2011). This approach is also at the basis of the EU’s strategy towards North African countries developed in 2011 in response to the political uprising in the region. In order to address possible growing migration flows from these countries towards Europe as a consequence of the uprising in the region - the so-called “Arab Spring” - the strategy reaffirms the MP as the main instrument of partnership. Through it, the fight against illegal migration through border management and readmission agreements comes together with increased mobility for students, researchers and business persons (European Commission, 2011a).

Yet, the EU looks as well for promoting economic growth and job creation in the countries of origin with the aim to address the root causes of migration. One of the GAMM pillars is about maximising the development impact of migration and mobility especially in terms of channelling remittances into productive activities. Moreover, the UE works to liberalise trade and establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. However, trade and aid have had a minimal effect on reducing the volume of migration flows until now. Moreover, the Migration Hump model suggests that the establishment of free trade in the Mediterranean area would not reduce migratory pressures in countries of the South in the short term but, on the contrary, it will probably lead to their increase.

Concerning highly-skilled migration, as mentioned previously the EU is interested in attracting talented workers. To this aim, the EU Council issued in 2005 the so-called
“researchers directive” (Council of the European Union, 2005). This directive reduces obstacles to entry and residence in the EU of third-country national researchers\(^9\) and to grant them intra-EU mobility rights for more than three months. It provides for a fast-track procedure for their admission and grants a specific residence permit, which is based on a hosting agreement between an accredited research organisation and a researcher. The permit automatically grants the right to work and to teach, as well as the same treatment as nationals in areas like social security and working conditions. In addition, it grants the right to family reunification and free travel for research purposes. Member states transposed the directive into their national legislation by October 2007.

The practical implementation of the directive has also been affected by a number of legal instruments that have been adopted at the EU level since 2005, particularly the “EU Blue Card Directive” (ICMPD, 2012). This was adopted in May 2009 by the Council of the EU but the regulation of numbers and conditions for highly-skilled migrants remains at the national level. The EU Blue Card allows highly-skilled third-country nationals with a job offer to work in an EU country for a maximum of four years. After 18 months, the migrant could move to another EU country. Highly-skilled migrants can bring their families, and a work permit is also offered to the spouse. The applicant’s salary has to be at least 1.5 times the average gross salary in the member state, lowered to 1.2 in sectors with a particular need for highly-skilled workers (e.g. engineering or health care). However, governments can refuse to issue EU Blue Cards, citing labour market problems or if national quotas are exceeded (Cerna, 2010).

The EU is also discussing the promotion of a circular migration system. The European Commission (EC) proposed it in 2005 (i.e. in its Communication Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientations) and developed it in 2007 (i.e. through its Communication from the European Commission on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and Third Countries) (European Commission, 2007). The EC defines circular migration as “a form of migration that is managed in a way allowing some degree of legal mobility back and forth between two countries”. It applies both to third-country nationals who engage in an activity in their country of origin while retaining their main residence in an EU member state, and to “persons residing in a third country who come to the EU temporarily for work, study, or training on the condition that, at the end of the period for which they were granted entry, they must re-establish their main residence and

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\(^9\) With the term “third-country national” European institutions designate nationals of countries that not members of the European Union. Please see the glossary.
their main activity in their country of origin” (European Commission, 2007). Circular migration has been claimed to represent a triple win: firstly, for European countries since it addresses labour shortages without granting long-term residence; secondly, for sending countries since it offers a pressure valve for their high rate of unemployment and promotes development through remittances; finally, for the migrants themselves since it gives the possibility to develop their skills through work experience abroad without leaving their country indefinitely. However, its application would be within the MP and therefore subject to sending countries’ commitment to collaborate in fighting illegal migration and facilitating reintegration of returnees (Newland, 2009). Therefore, circular migration looks like more of an EU tool to encourage collaboration from sending countries in fighting illegal migration and to dampen permanent settlement in European countries, rather than one to enhance development in sending countries. Indeed for these latter, the advantage is not evident considering that they benefit greatly from migration for remittances and the decrease of the unemployment rate. For this reason, sending countries have welcomed the initiative with suspicion as a way to limit migration flows, which can put at risk the achievement of the MP (Cassarino, 2004).

2.3 CONCLUSIONS

Focusing on migration flows from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe, since the end of the Second World War until now the approach of both sending and receiving countries towards the migration and development nexus has followed four phases according to the main academic conclusions on the impact of migration on development and to major geopolitical events. From an initial optimism they have passed to a phase of pessimism, then a readjustment stage to the current phase that sees a renewed interest on the topic. Since the early 2000s international organisations, political decision makers and academic scholars have debated through international fora and conferences how to enhance the contribution of migration on sending countries’ development. However, this debate presents the limitations derived from being initiated and led by receiving countries, in particular the industrialised countries in Europe and North America, and the international organisations led by them. These limitations include: a strong focus on sending countries’ security and stability; more attention to the impact of development on migration than the
reverse; and a preference for the economic aspects of development that neglects the moral aspects of Sen’s definition of development.

Looking closely at the highly-skilled migration flows from southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea, their grounds are both external and internal to sending countries’ situations. First, the globalisation and the prevalent liberal economic doctrine have widened the economic and social gap between industrialised and developing countries. This pushes highly-skilled migrants to migrate in search of better working and life conditions. Second, sending countries’ investments on tertiary education have not been accompanied by investments in technology. The result is that the prevalent economic model is labour intensive. The consequent mismatch between the skills learned at the university and labour market needs produces a high unemployment rate among university graduates. Finally, industrialised countries compete to attract highly-skilled workers to maintain their central position in the prevalent knowledge-based economy thereby generating a high labour demand.

Concerning the mobility regime, although migration management in a globalised world requires a strong coordination between sending and receiving countries, the foreigners’ entry and stay regulations are still under national regimes. The OECD countries and in particular the EU have put in place instruments to facilitate the admission and circulation of highly-skilled workers while they are less keen to facilitate the entry and stay of low-skilled migrants. However, the EU framework offers narrow migration possibilities to highly-skilled workers as well since it is based on the internal market balance: admission for working purposes is subject to the unavailability of the required skills in the local market. Since the 1990s, the EU has been setting up a system that facilitates internal mobility while erecting barriers to migrants from third countries. This is based on the more-for-more approach that offers third countries visa facilitation upon conclusion of a readmission agreement. The EC proposal to enhance circular migration prefigures a model similar to the one in place in GCC countries that offers multiple entrance visas without residency rights. In this way the EU would address the lack of labourers and maintain the welfare state while avoiding integration challenges. However, a circular migration system needs a strong coordination with sending countries, which may not be so interested since they would renounce migration as an unemployment valve.
CHAPTER THREE

MAXIMISING
HIGHERLY-SKILLED MIGRANTS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SENDING COUNTRIES: POLICY MEASURES

The new focus on the migration and development nexus has not just stimulated debate and reflections, but also pushed sending and receiving countries’ governments and international organisations to formulate policies and implement programmes to enhance migrants’ involvement in their country of origin’s development. This chapter provides an inventory of good policy practices to enhance the development impact of highly-skilled migrants. They are divided in two groups: first, policies to be implemented by sending countries; and second, policies to be implemented in receiving countries. The policy measures listed in the tables derive from literature on the migration and development nexus analysed in this and previous chapters and from personal reflection.

3.1 POLICIES TO IMPLEMENT IN SENDING COUNTRIES

There is a vast body of literature on policy measures that are able to enhance migrants’ contributions to their homelands’ development. During the last decade, aid actors and international organisations have multiplied projects and programmes to include migration in their development agenda (De Haas, 2006; House of Commons, 2004; Keusch and Schuster, 2012; Nyberg-Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). Decision makers in both sending and receiving countries have exchanged best practices on migration and development within international fora such as regional consultative processes and international dialogues on migration (ICMPD and IOM, 2010; Harns, 2013). These cover different areas from remittances (Commission Economique pour l'Afrique Du Nord, 2007) to brain circulation (Wickramasekara, 2003) and diasporas’ engagement (Noack and Wolff, 2013).
This study identifies four broad areas in which sending countries’ governments can strengthen highly-skilled migration contributions to their development: remittances transfer, remittances productivity, facilitating brain circulation, and engaging diasporas. This allows exploiting the full range of highly-skilled migrants’ contributions. The policy practices identified in this chapter are in line with the transnationalism paradigm that does not require migrants to return definitely to their homeland. According to it, permanent return is not the main solution to be involved in its affairs but just one of the possible options migrants have.

However, as stressed by De Haas, these policies have a limited impact if they are not included in a broader country development strategy. Governments should mainstream them in the national development plan in order to ensure a coherent approach and facilitate synergy and coordination among all government departments (Koser and Laczko, 2010). Most important, it guarantees their impact is effective and long-lasting. For instance, facilitating transfer of remittances and knowledge would be useless if not accompanied by policies to reduce corruption, bureaucracy and create an investment-friendly climate, while brain circulation would be fruitless without an industry or a technology centre to use migrants’ knowledge.

3.1.1 Remittances’ Development Impact: Improving transfers’ Monitoring and Promoting Formal Channels for Remittances

It is extremely difficult to calculate the exact volume of remittances sent by migrants since usually the majority use informal channels. This jeopardises governments’ capacity to monitor their flows effectively and to make informed decisions. Moreover, boosting the use of formal channels improves the national financial system and benefits migrants themselves since they can have easier access to investment and credit facilities and insurance (Ocampo, 2013).

Policies to encourage remittances transfer through formal channels can be grouped into two pillars: a) policies to reduce transfer costs (Carling, 2008); and b) policies to improve access to remitting services (IFAD, 2006). Finally, policies enhancing the transparency of informal money transfers improve transfers’ monitoring.
## Table 5: Policies to Improve Transfers’ Monitoring and Promote the Use of Formal Channels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances’ development impact</strong></td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve transfers’ monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance transparency of money transfers</td>
<td>Impose travellers into the country to declare values they carry, above a certain amount. Forbid money transfer through mail.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease transfer costs by promoting fair competition and pricing</td>
<td>Improve financial services regulation. Encourage transparency of prices and services, such as by increasing information on the comparative costs of transfer of remittance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage transfer through formal channels</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase access to remitting services</td>
<td>Assess what proportion of transfers in any given remittance channel is sent informally, and the reasons why Give authority to micro-finance Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and commercial institutions to provide remittance-related services. Promote partnerships between banks in destination countries of origin to increase outreach of financial services. Limit paperwork to the administrative minimum required by security constraints. Provide identity cards to migrants (regardless of their migration status) for opening a bank account through consulates. Spread the use of new technology to remit (e.g. through the Internet, mobile phone, Automated Teller Machine (ATM), etc.). Improve migrants’ financial literacy through dedicated courses. Mass information campaign on remittances and financial literacy (e.g. through television, radio, volunteer networks, and leaflets at border-crossing checkpoints). Encourage employers to send transactions directly to the employee’s home account. Encourage payroll deduction of transfers, which can result in bulk discounts in the transfer process. Encourage employers to offer on-site banking with access to an ATM machine / mobile bank units.</td>
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3.1.2 Remittances’ Development Impact: Maximizing Remittances’ Productivity

In developing countries with a weak welfare state, households usually spend remittances in so-called unproductive activities, such as education, health, construction and as informal insurance. Although new studies have widened the concept of productive investment to cover this kind of expenses, remittances’ productivity is maximized when they are channelled towards activities that generate employment and economic return. However, remittances are private flows and migrants are entitled to determine their use and the role of government is limited to encourage and facilitate investments (Terry, 2004). This can be done through policy measures that either target directly migrants and their relatives or facilitate a business-friendly climate. The first kind of measures offers specific products to migrants and their households such as financial incentives, special saving packages, and programmes to encourage investments. These contain a high political risk since they may increase income distortions while raising the discontent of the local population that may perceive them as deserving special attention to an already privileged elite. Instead, the second kind of policies addresses structural problems that can benefit the entire population such as measures to eliminate bottlenecks restricting investments and to facilitate an investment-friendly environment (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008). These include measures to stimulate indirect investment of migrants’ remittances.
Table 6: Policies to Maximize Remittances’ Productivity

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<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances’ development</td>
<td>Maximize remittances’</td>
<td>Encourage group investments in community development projects</td>
<td>Match donations from hometown associations with governmental programmes.</td>
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<td>impact</td>
<td>productivity</td>
<td>Promote income-generating activities</td>
<td>Offer schemes for loans and access to micro-credit to migrant families using remittances as a guarantee.</td>
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<td>Enable people who command remittances to make qualified financial decisions through training.</td>
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<td>Allow temporary exemptions from taxes and state inspections, for enterprises set-up with capital financed from remittances.</td>
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<td>Create business and investment networks involving nationals abroad and home country businesses, chambers of commerce, and financial institutions.</td>
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<td>Provide pre-departure training programmes on how to develop business plans and how to orient remittances towards income-generating activities and productive projects for prospective migrants.</td>
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<td>Provide assistance for enterprise development including vocational training and counselling services.</td>
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<td>Promote saving and investment</td>
<td>Issue bonds denominated in foreign currency.</td>
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<td>Encourage premium interest rate accounts and denominated in a foreign currency.</td>
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<td>Offer tailored saving products such as: savings programme providing overseas workers the opportunity to save and also get a loan for housing; Investment Certificates through which redemption values can be used to finance tuition fees of beneficiaries and cover hospitalization costs, also life insurance coverage equivalent to the value of the certificates purchased.</td>
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<td>Facilitate the acquisition of commercial properties.</td>
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<td>Offer investment products targeting diasporas, such as privileged access to the shares of national companies, participation in the securities market.</td>
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<td>Encourage and direct investments through embassies.</td>
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</table>
| **Improve investments climate (indirect targeting)** | Analyse bottlenecks restricting in particular migrants' investment.  
Create one-stop-desk to facilitate and expedite administrative processes in the creation of Small and Micro Enterprises (SME).  
Provide technical assistance for national and regional level policy-makers, legislators and representatives from trade unions and the private sector. |
| **Stimulate indirect investment of remittances** | Facilitate access to credit for local people when migrants remittances are deposited in financial institutions. |
3.1.3 Increasing Development Impact of Migrants’ Knowledge and Social Remittances: Facilitating Brain Circulation

Knowledge, skills and technology that highly-skilled migrants have acquired during their experience abroad can benefit significantly their country of origin. To facilitate their transfer and application, it is critical to implement measures to encourage brain circulation, namely migrants’ knowledge and skills transfer between sending and receiving countries. These policies are grouped under four pillars linked to migrants’ virtual, temporary and permanent return and to their circular migration. Migrants are adopting more and more transnational identities and virtual return measures, based on new technologies, are nowadays acquiring increasing importance while permanent return is only one of the possible options.

Circular migration is not a new pattern of human mobility but only recently governments are discussing the opportunity to include it in their policy agenda, as in the case of the EU (Newland, 2009). Fargues (2008) identifies the six main criteria that define circular migration:

- Criterion A - Being temporary: periods of stay are limited in duration;
- Criterion B - Being renewable: several periods are possible;
- Criterion C - Being circulatory: freedom of movement between source and host countries is fully-enjoyed during each period of stay;
- Criterion D - Being legal;
- Criterion E - Being respectful of the rights of migrants;
- Criterion F - Being managed in order to match labour demand in one country with supply from another country.

Circular migration can enhance human development as defined by Sen. According to this author, human development is linked to the concept of human capability, namely the people’s ability to lead their life and to amplify their choices. Circular migration may serve as a framework for maximizing individual choice (Newland, 2009) since it offers migrants the opportunity to move abroad without leaving their country of origin indefinitely. Indeed, all policies to encourage circular migration are based on the assumption that migrants do not want to remain illegally in the receiving country if they have the possibility to work there periodically.

As mentioned previously, circular migration is claimed to represent a triple win since: a) receiving countries have additional workforce without necessarily granting long-term
residence; b) migrants have the possibility to work abroad and enhance their experience; c) sending countries have a pressure valve for their high rate of unemployment while remittances are supposed to be higher in case migrants come back periodically. In the case of highly-skilled migrants, circular migration offers an additional advantage: it increases the potential transfer of knowledge, technology and social capital to sending countries since returned professionals can immediately put to use what they have learned abroad. In particular, in the case of South-East Mediterranean countries, the costs of circular migration in terms of brain drain are minimized because of the high unemployment rate among young university graduates there (Fargues, 2008). However, policies are effective if they promote circular migration rather than imposing it (Newland, 2009). Circular mobility of highly-skilled migrants is facilitated because they have the know-how and the economic resource to regularly travel to their country of origin or to conduct transnational activities even in the case that they are permanent residents in the country of destination (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008).

Any policy encouraging brain circulation is effective only if in the country of origin there is an environment able to receive and put to use the highly-skilled migrants’ contributions, such as academic and research institutions or high-tech industries. Otherwise, their good intention will be wasted (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008). Another pre-condition is that highly-skilled migrants are employed abroad in relevant sectors and occupations and that they are able to enhance or at least maintain their qualifications while away. Therefore, destination countries need to ensure migrants’ qualifications and skills are recognised to avoid migrants working below their skill-level, as it often happens (i.e. “brain waste”).
<table>
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<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Example of measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase development impact of migrants’ knowledge and social remittances</td>
<td>Facilitate brain circulation</td>
<td>Virtual return</td>
<td>Facilitate the formation of networks of professionals within the diaspora and in the home country. &lt;br&gt;Seek policy advice from oversees workers. &lt;br&gt;Link scientists abroad with local research groups including technological infrastructure, meeting rooms and videoconferencing systems. &lt;br&gt;Make use of modern telecommunications technologies, particularly the Internet and electronic media to hold virtual fora, seminars and workshops. &lt;br&gt;Encourage research partnerships and joint projects between members of the diaspora with local counterparts.</td>
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<td>Temporary return</td>
<td>Identify and prioritise the sectors where temporary returnees can contribute. &lt;br&gt;Create databases with information on candidates interested in job opportunities abroad to match the local labour supply with demand of foreign employers for temporary workers. &lt;br&gt;Ensure that migrants’ qualifications and skills are recognised by the country of destination to avoid migrants work below their skill-level. &lt;br&gt;Encourage scientist exchange programmes to invite migrants abroad for lectures, workshops and volunteer work as well as exchange visits. &lt;br&gt;Sign bilateral fixed-term migration agreements between sending and receiving countries to introduce short-term professional visas that mandate return to the country of origin or short-term exchange. &lt;br&gt;Facilitate secondment or sabbatical arrangements for members of professional associations – for example, of engineers, doctors or education professionals. &lt;br&gt;Adopt a matching procedure for members of the diaspora who wish to return on a short-term basis with work opportunities in their country of origin. &lt;br&gt;Allow dual nationality and/or citizenship. &lt;br&gt;Provide pre-departure training for potential migrants, including training on their rights and obligations in destination countries, cultural issues and access to services, as well as practical information, such as emergency hotlines.</td>
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| **Permanent return** | Enhance the national system for recognition of qualifications of nationals who have acquired a foreign diploma to enter the national education system and labour market.  
Assess factors encouraging return.  
Sign bilateral arrangements with destination countries to facilitate the permanent return of qualified migrants.  
Run assisted return programmes, including job placement, reintegration assistance and subsidised travel.  
Create high-tech industrial parks where to integrate qualified returned migrants.  
Develop tertiary education sector to attract academicians.  
Run entrepreneurship development programme for return migrants aimed at assisting and guiding return migrants in the establishment and management of business ventures by a project-oriented training session and loan schemes.  
Invest in research and education companies started by returnees. |
| **Circular migration** | Adopt administrative measures to encourage circulation (transfer of pensions, military service exemption, etc.).  
Sign bilateral agreement with countries of destination to allow migrants to retain their residency status in the host country even if they have been away for several years, and to authorise dual citizenship.  
Put in place incentives to return such as: longer contracts that allow migrants to pay off the transaction costs associated with migration and earn sufficient additional income; providing an option for re-entry through preferential visa regimes; guaranteeing portable social security benefits; providing in limited cases the option for permanent immigration rather than return.  
Put in place elements of enforcement: imposing financial security bonds on either migrant workers or their employers; introducing mandatory savings schemes for temporary migrants; and the strict enforcement of employment and immigration laws. |
3.1.4 Increasing Development Impact of Migrants’ Knowledge and Social Remittances: Engaging Diasporas

The term “diaspora” refers to a community of migrants settled permanently in countries other than their own (Global Migration Group, 2010). According to Sheffer (2003), diaspora members maintain regular or occasional contacts with what they regard as their homeland and with individuals and groups of the same background residing in other host countries, which highlights the socio-political dimension of diaspora and its potential role as a collective agent for development (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). As highlighted in a handbook based on a survey among governments during the Global Forum on Migration and Development, engaging diaspora for the country of origin’s development can be considered a cross-cutting issue since it allows enhancing the impact of other policies related to remittances and brain circulation (Agunias and Newland, 2012).

While migrants and their descendants exhibit a continued interest in their countries of origin - exemplified for instance by charity projects and diaspora associations – highly-skilled professionals usually have the necessary motivation and resources to engage in transnational activities in favour of their home country institutions (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008). Especially highly-skilled migrants’ contributions might go beyond the usual migration and development topics such as money and knowledge transfers and include stimulating political debate, strengthening civil society, enabling and encouraging education for non-migrants, and empowering women and minority groups in countries of origin (De Haas, 2006). However, as expressed by De Haas, policies should not teach diaspora members how to best contribute to their country but instead should engage them in a debate to build a common agenda (De Haas, 2006).

Policies aimed at engaging diaspora can be grouped in six clusters: identify how and where diasporas will add value to the development agenda in the country of origin; encourage diasporas’ development initiatives; facilitate political representation of migrants in their country of origin; increase migrants' confidence towards their homeland institutions; maintain migrants' cultural linkage with country of origin; and facilitate transfer of social remittances.
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<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Example of measures</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase development impact of migrants’ knowledge and social remittances</td>
<td>Engage diasporas</td>
<td>Identify diasporas’ potential added value to the development agenda in the country of origin</td>
<td>Map and profile (i.e. through quantitative and qualitative information) emigrant communities in cooperation with destination countries and their respective municipal authorities. Undertake surveys in specific areas of origin and/or destination. Issue identity cards to migrants. Register migrants for out-of-country voting. Target particular segments of the diaspora for specific development interventions. Map out the needs of countries of origin to identify areas where the broad range of resources and expertise of migrant communities could contribute. Explore which aspects of the country of origin context might potentially hinder the success of diaspora contributions. Undertake dialogue and consultations with emigrant communities in order to find out their needs and wishes, so as to elaborate tailor-made policies. Evaluate reasons and conditions behind return highly-skilled migrants. Ensure coherence of government policy on diasporas needs by coordinating the main ministries.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Encourage migrants’ development Initiatives</td>
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<td>Identify partners among diasporas who could potentially promote development in the country of origin and recognise their priorities and agendas. Invite diaspora representatives to identify concrete projects within a common agenda and match diaspora resources and interests with development initiatives. Coordinate with destination countries to initiate projects as part of their own development planning which engage diasporas living in their countries to support development in their country of origin. Ensure inter-ministerial coordination in countries of origin and countries of destination to leverage the development impact of migrant contributions.</td>
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<td>Action</td>
<td>Steps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitate political representation of migrants in their country of origin</td>
<td>Guarantee right to be elected as parliamentary members abroad, council of citizens abroad, etc. Allow nationals abroad to vote. Permit dual citizenship.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase migrants' confidence towards their country of origin</td>
<td>Establish dialogue with emigrant communities/ migrant associations to ensure that policies address their needs. Lobby for improvements in migrants’ rights and conditions, and against repressive or discriminatory measures. Grant property and social rights (e.g. transfer of social security benefits) in the origin country. Enhance relations with migrant associations and civil society groups. Enhance embassies and consular services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain migrants' cultural linkage with country of origin</td>
<td>Organise cultural visits to country of origin. Organise pan-diaspora events. Organise summer youth centres for the children of migrants in the country of origin.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Encourage transfer of social remittances</td>
<td>Facilitate the emergence of networks between country of origin, international organisations and civil society (i.e. professional networks, migrants associations, diaspora excellent representatives, etc.). Establish bilateral cooperation between chambers of commerce in countries of origin and destination.</td>
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3.2 POLICIES TO IMPLEMENT IN RECEIVING COUNTRIES

Receiving countries can play a critical role on the extent to which migrants can contribute to the development of their country of origin. Their policies on foreigners’ entry, stay and integration can facilitate or put obstacles to migrants’ contributions towards their homeland. Conversely, some policies set up by sending countries to support their diaspora’s engagement need the collaboration of receiving countries through bilateral or regional agreements. As seen previously, migrants performing transnational activities that are well incorporated in the receiving society and institutions contribute the most to the development of their country of origin.

This section describes policies that destination countries can adopt to increase the development of sending countries through highly-skilled migrants that have moved to their territory. The study identifies two broad policy categories: first, policies aimed at encouraging highly-skilled migrants’ transnationalism; and second, policies aimed at fostering their integration in the receiving country. However, since these are two interconnected processes that strengthen each other, the distinction between the two categories of policies is blurred and sometimes they overlap.

3.2.1 Policies to Encourage Transnationalism

Migrants’ transnational activities imply back and forth transfers between the country of destination and the country of origin. Over time, these two countries become parts of a common space within which material and incorporeal goods circulate through migrants (Faist, 2008). Transnationalism advantages countries of origin since migrants pour into them remittances, investments, values, knowledge and skills they earned in the country of destination. However, migrants’ transnational activities reward countries of destination as well since they foster economic and social development by increasing international trade, capital flows as well as the transmission of social and political norms. They also stimulate industrial development by propagating knowledge, innovation through diversity and by mitigating labour shortages (Global Economic Symposium, 2011). As Bauböck (2008) underlined, despite these advantages, receiving countries tend to ignore migrants’ transnational orientations, being suspicious that these can be obstacles to their integration. Notwithstanding, studies have been undertaken to support policy-makers to move beyond
traditional dichotomous conceptualisations of home and host countries and reflect the current highly mobile and interconnected world as the foundation of policies and practices (IOM, 2010c; Bauböck and Faist, 2010).

In order to facilitate migrants’ transnational orientations, policy-makers should not just specifically address the linkages between countries arising from migrants’ transnational activities and practices, but as well take into account the transnational dimension of any policy that is able to affect migrants (Lima, 2010). Policies encouraging the creation of contexts that are conducive to active transnationalism can be grouped into four categories in line with the economic, social, political and cultural impact of transnational activities.

3.2.1.1. Economic Transnationalism

One component of economic transnational activities is represented by pecuniary transfers between the country of origin and destination. Destination countries’ policies to foster money transfers are specular to the ones in the country of origin: an inter-state collaboration is wished if not necessary to facilitate capital flows by decreasing their transfer cost and improving access to transfer services.

Pecuniary transfers can be composed of remittances sent to the country of origin for different purposes, such as supporting the family of origin, but they can be linked to cross-border business activities as well (Agunias and Newland, 2012). Therefore, policies aimed at facilitating capital flows between the two countries are interlinked to policies to support establishment of migrants’ cross-border companies. These latter include technical support and fiscal benefits as well as measures aimed at facilitating cross-border mobility of entrepreneurs and investors.

Fostering economic transnationalism implies as well increasing the level of diversity of human resources’ nationality in receiving countries’ companies (Honing, 2012). Recruitment of highly-skilled workers can be incentivised and facilitated while taking into account shortage of domestic supply and the risk of brain drain in the country of origin (European Migration Network, 2013a).
Table 9: Policies to Increase Economic Transnationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase economic transnationalism</td>
<td>Increase cross-border money’s transfer</td>
<td>Decrease money’s transfer costs</td>
<td>Improve financial services regulation. Increase information on the comparative costs of remittances transfer. Sign international agreements with country of origin to ensure that money transfers are taxed only once.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase access to remitting services</td>
<td>Maintain comprehensive and systematic database on remittance flows. Analyse the uses, meanings and politics surrounding remittances. Spread the use of new technology to remit (e.g. the Internet, mobile phone, ATM, etc.). Promote partnerships between banks in destination countries and banks in countries of origin to increase outreach of financial services. Offer technical support to migrant association for collecting collective remittances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate establishment of cross-border businesses</td>
<td>Provide migrants’ businesses with technical support</td>
<td>Facilitate the formation of networks of professionals within the diaspora and in the home country. Create business and investment networks involving migrants and country of origin businesses, chambers of commerce, and financial institutions. Provide assistance for migrants’ enterprise development including vocational training and counselling services. Establish bilateral cooperation between chambers of commerce in countries of origin and destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grant fiscal benefits to cross-border businesses</td>
<td>Grant specific benefits and exemptions to migrant self-employed, entrepreneurs and investors. Grant fiscal advantages in the project set-up period and the exploratory phase of a cross-border enterprise or project. Lower tariffs on raw materials and equipment imported from sending countries. Provide license and fiscal advantages during implementation of cross-border investment projects. Finance businesses/projects managed by migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate cross-</td>
<td>Develop specific conditions and criteria for admission of foreigners self-employed, entrepreneurs and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase diversity of human resources' nationality in local enterprises</td>
<td>border mobility of entrepreneurs and investors</td>
<td>investors.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentivise highly-skilled migration</td>
<td>Promote the adoption by corporations of Diversity Charters. Grant tax incentives to employers for recruiting foreign workers. Introduce law provisions for specific expatriate statuses which offer tax-free allowances and tax exemptions. Provide career counselling for migrant’s partners. Provide language lessons for migrant worker’s family.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate recruitment of highly-skilled foreign workers</td>
<td>Sign agreements with third countries to facilitate labour migration of highly-skilled third-country nationals. Customize labour market practices to ensure that highly-skilled third-country nationals are employed in sectors showing a shortage of domestic supply. Apply principles of ethical recruitment of highly-skilled workers. Involve national institutions in scrutinizing the suitability of applicants. Adapt migration procedures for highly-skilled migrants. Implement an employer-driven system. Fix a salary threshold in order for the salaries to be at an achievable level, or to avoid excessive pressure on some sectors. Implement fast-track admission procedures for highly-skilled migrants already residing in sending countries. Grant multiple entry permits and simplified renewal procedures of residence permits to renew for longer contract. Promote partnership with transnational corporations for recruitment and relocation of individuals and their families across national borders.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.1.2 Social Transnationalism

Transnational activities with a social impact include migrants’ visits to their home countries and any kind of correspondence they may undertake with their country of origin, such as emails, telephone calls and traditional letters. The transnational theory assumes that the expansion of cross-border communication during the last decade due to technology advances is at the basis of migrants’ transnational identities (Levitt, 1998, 926-948). Destination countries can further foster it by facilitating the access to new technologies and increasing competition in the communication sector in order to lower its costs. Additionally, it is crucial migrants have the possibility of going back to the country of origin without losing residence rights in the country of destination (European Migration Network, 2011). Measures promoting migrants’ family unit and supporting their family left behind help destination countries respond to the challenges faced by transnational families (IOM, 2010c).

As migrants move from place to place their social protection needs to be mobile as well. This implies that migrants can carry with them the social benefits earned in both destination and origin countries, such as health and unemployment insurance and pensions (i.e. portability of social benefits) and that these are recognised at both the place of origin and destination (i.e. transferability of social benefits) (Lima, 2010). This requires substantial inter-state cooperation between sending and receiving countries, but these may involve private sector partners such as insurance firms or transnational corporations. Finally, cooperation between sending and receiving countries enables cross-border development initiatives involving migrants. It can be implemented at three levels: inter-state, inter-ministerial cooperation, and at the local level (IOM, 2010c).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase social transnationalism</td>
<td>Support migrants in maintaining relationships across borders</td>
<td>Adopt innovative information and communication technology solutions</td>
<td>Implement programmes to expand telecommunications and Internet coverage. Increase sector competition in order to decrease the cost of related services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple entry and toleration of longer periods of absences</td>
<td>Allow migrants for the absence and re-entry of third-country nationals without losing residence status or paths to naturalisation to study or for serving national interest (e.g. development aid work, or promotion, compulsory military service, or development of business).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of family unity</td>
<td>Make provisions for migrants to be visited by their family members. Make provisions for migrants to be accompanied by or reunified with their family members (e.g. spouses and children). Harmonise the migration status of different members of the same family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support families of migrants that stay behind in the country of origin</td>
<td>Gather data through census statistics or specialised household surveys on diaspora and their families left behind. Develop programmes to target the needs of migrants’ families. Provide with finance and technical support to diaspora organisations and religious communities for helping transnational families. Work with diaspora and religious organisation to foster dialogue and build bridges that will reduce intolerance. Assist migrants and their families in the form of pre- and post-departure orientation, as well as throughout the migration process (e.g. training on their rights and obligations, cultural issues and access to services, as well as practical information, such as emergency hotlines). Make provisions for migrant’s accompaniment through the documentation and immigration formalities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ensure cross-border social protection | Portability and transferability of social rights | Sign agreements with the country of origin to allow migrants who have been subject to the legislations of the two states to enjoy the same rights to social security in both.
Allow migrants to claim benefits earned (e.g. bereavement and widows’ benefits, and employment-related industrial injuries disablement benefit), once they have returned to their country of origin.
Allow migrants to have the income-based pensions they have earned in the country of destination to be paid out in their countries of origin if they decide to return.
Sign bilateral agreements to ensure the portability of certain key benefits such as health and unemployment insurance.
Promote partnership with private sector partners such as insurance firms or transnational corporations. |
| Encourage cross-border development initiatives | Promote international coordination | Coordinate with countries of origin to initiate projects which engage diasporas to support development in their homeland.
Facilitate inter-ministerial coordination in countries of origin and countries of destination to leverage the development impact of emigrant contributions.
Facilitate twinning projects between cities in both country of origin and destination. |
3.2.1.3 Political Transnationalism

Political transnationalism concerns migrants’ involvement in public decision making in both country of origin and destination. The occurrence of globalisation and a growing international migration is creating a clear demand for the full recognition of migrants’ political rights. These have acquired relevance in the academic agenda as well as the international political agenda. Destination countries’ policies aimed at facilitating political engagement of migrants in their homeland requires tolerance of periods of absence without losing residence rights. In this way migrants are enabled to run an office in their country of origin and to vote for their homeland’s elections if migrants are not able to do so by mail or through consulates (Ellis et al., 2007).

Migrants’ participation in destination countries’ politics concerns principally granting political passive rights (i.e. to stand in elections) and active rights in local elections (i.e. to vote) (Geyer, 2007). Migrants’ political rights in destination countries are at the centre of the debate related to their integration there. Arguments in favour of extending political rights in destination countries to non-nationals claim that they support their integration. Opposing arguments claim that in reality political rights weaken the naturalisation process while facilitating the country of origin’s influence in national politics through their migrants. Practices in Europe are quite divergent and range from guaranteed right to stand in municipal elections and right to vote in regional and national elections, to forbidding any political participation. When there are guaranteed voting rights, these are usually restricted according to four dimensions: duration of residence, registration or application, a specific residence status, and reciprocity with the country of origin reached through an international agreement (Groenendijk, 2008). Voting rights at municipal level are considered more meaningful for encouraging migrants’ political participation in the destination country than for national elections. Migrants experience identification with the local community as being more important, more immediate and more relevant for their daily life and for a sense of belonging than national citizenship (IOM, 2010c).

Diaspora organisations can facilitate political participation of migrants and support local and national institutions in the design, implementation and evaluation of policies related to immigration and integration issues (Global Economic Symposium, 2011). Governments can involve them in decision making through the constitution of diaspora councils with consultative functions. However, it is essential that diaspora representatives are carefully selected through transparent and independent mechanisms to ensure that they represent the majority of migrants and not just a restricted group (Rannveig Mendoza and Newland, 2012).
Table 11: Policies to Increase Political Transnationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase Political Transnationalism</td>
<td>Encourage involvement of migrants into public decision making of the destination country</td>
<td>Encourage Political Passive rights</td>
<td>Allow (permanent resident) migrants to be elected in the local (e.g. municipal) elections. Establish citizenship ceremonies. Allow dual or multiple nationalities. Organise information dissemination and awareness raising campaigns. Collaborate with consular missions and embassies for awareness campaigns. Allow retaining residence status even if they have been away several years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage Political Active rights</td>
<td>Allow (permanent resident) migrants to vote in municipal elections. Allow (permanent resident) migrants to subscribe in local political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Involve migrants associations in decision making processes</td>
<td>Provide with technical support to migrant associations on participation to decision making processes. Create constitutional frameworks that accommodate diaspora representation in legislative or executive bodies. Establish transparent, fair and independent mechanisms for selection of migrants’ representatives to be involved in decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage involvement of migrants into public decision making of their homeland</td>
<td>Facilitate periods of absence</td>
<td>Allow for the absence and re-entry of third-country nationals to vote in their country of origin. Allow for long-term absence and re-entry of third-country nationals that run an office in the country of origin.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.1.4 Cultural Transnationalism

Cultural transnational activities facilitate brain circulation between the country of origin and the country of destination. In most of the cases, measures aimed at fostering brain circulation need cooperation between the two countries to set up cross-border programmes such as secondment, exchange, and research partnership programmes. Moreover, brain circulation requires highly-skilled migrants’ mobility between the two countries. This can be done through short-term professional visas, reciprocal recognition of skills and qualifications as well as matching procedures between qualifications of diaspora members wishing to return on a short-term basis and work opportunities in their country of origin (Agunias and Newland, 2012).

Transnationalism facilitates transfer of social remittances between country of origin and destination (Levitt, 1998, 926-948). The impact of social remittances is enhanced between countries with strong cultural ties, which improve mutual tolerance and understanding as well (Levitt, 2005). Therefore, measures include facilitating the emergence of professional and cultural cross-border networks, supporting diaspora organisations in promoting cultural activities, highlighting cultural heritage from migrants’ homeland, and promoting twin cooperation projects between cities or municipalities in the two countries (Agunias and Newland, 2012). As discussed in the first chapter, transnational connections can be particularly strong at the local level through the phenomenon called chain migration (IOM, 2010b).
Table 12: Policies to Increase Cultural Transnationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase cultural</td>
<td></td>
<td>Run programmes to link scientists abroad with local research groups</td>
<td>Run programmes to link scientists abroad with local research groups including technological infrastructure, meeting rooms and videoconferencing systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transnationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>including technological infrastructure, meeting rooms and videoconferencing systems.</td>
<td>Encourage research partnerships and joint projects between members of the diaspora with local counterparts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Run programme for scientist exchange to invite migrants abroad for</td>
<td>Run programme for scientist exchange to invite migrants abroad for lectures, workshops and volunteer work as well as funding exchange visits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lectures, workshops and volunteer work as well as funding exchange visits.</td>
<td>Facilitate secondment or sabbatical arrangements for members of professional associations – for example, of engineers, doctors or education professionals.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Make use of modern telecommunications technologies, particularly the</td>
<td>Make use of modern telecommunications technologies, particularly the Internet and electronic media to hold virtual fora, seminars and workshops.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internet and electronic media to hold virtual fora, seminars and</td>
<td>Invest in research and education companies started by migrants.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>workshops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitate brain</td>
<td>Promote cross-border</td>
<td>Ensure recognition of migrants’ educational qualifications and vocational</td>
<td>Ensure recognition of migrants’ educational qualifications and vocational skills to allow them to enter the national education system and labour market and avoid migrants work below their skill-level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circulation</td>
<td>scientific projects</td>
<td>skills to allow them to enter the national education system and labour</td>
<td>Exempt migrants from having to obtain formal recognition of higher education degrees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>market and avoid migrants work below their skill-level.</td>
<td>Sign bilateral fixed-term migration agreements to introduce short-term professional visas that mandate return to the country of origin or short-term exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide with matching procedures for members of the diaspora who wish to return on a short-term basis with work opportunities in their country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate Social</td>
<td>Facilitate cross-border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>mobility of highly-skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>migrants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance cultural ties between country of origin and destination</td>
<td>Facilitate the emergence of networks between country of origin and destination (i.e. (professional networks, migrants associations, students’ networks, etc.).)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promote direct cooperation and twinning projects between cities or municipalities between the two countries for cultural activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Support diaspora organisations in promoting of cultural activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Highlight cultural heritage from migrants’ countries of origin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2 Policies to Encourage Integration

Since the 1990s, integration policies have been the subject of a resurgent interest in Europe. The focus on restricting immigration from non-EU countries has been accompanied by efforts to improve the integration conditions of third-country nationals residing in Europe. This has popularised the concept of integration among policy-makers and migration scholars. However, there is no consensus among political and academic actors on which integration should be pursued and this term is used with different connotations. As Miera highlighted, integration has mostly become a vague and catch-all concept used mainly to avoid more politically characterised terms such as multiculturalism and assimilation (Miera, 2011).

As seen in the first chapter, integration multiplies migrants’ possibilities to support their country of origin. However, integration policies that aim at assimilating migrants impede and discourage cross-border activities. Therefore, the challenge is to put in place policies that will ensure successful integration while benefitting both destination and origin countries (Lima, 2010). The EU’s definition of integration as “A dynamic, long-term, and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome” (Council of the European Union, 2004) is in line with the transnational paradigm that considers integration as a multipath and nonlinear process, in which a person can be part of two societies at the same time. Moreover, the EU’s approach stresses integration’s nature of continuous mutual adaptation from both migrants and hosting society: migrants should take into account rights and duties in relation to their new country of residence, while the receiving society should guarantee opportunities for the immigrants’ full economic, social, cultural and civic integration.

The project “Integration policies: Who benefits?”, co-funded by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, sets up an important monitoring tool about what national governments are doing to promote the integration of legally resident third-country nationals, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). This tool enables comparing governments’ policies to promote the integration of migrants in all EU member states plus Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the USA. Data has been updated as of 31 May 2010 but, at the time of writing, new country reports were being released. MIPEX policy indicators cover eight areas: labour market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence, and anti-discrimination.10

10 Please see the website: Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), available at: http://www.mipex.eu/ (Last accessed on the 11th January 2014)
3.2.2.1 Economic Integration

Integration in the economic life of receiving countries passes through the local labour market. Therefore, an important component of measures to facilitate economic integration of migrants aims at opening the access to private- and public- sector employment to migrants under equal conditions with nationals. Entrepreneurs should be eligible for the same opportunities as nationals to work in most sectors as well (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2010). For highly-skilled migrants, access to and mobility of the labour market needs procedures and state agencies to promote the recognition of their skills and qualifications acquired in the country of origin in order to avoid brain waste. As an EC’s report on migrant integration in the EU affirmed, highly-skilled migrants are most likely to be overqualified for their job (Huddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden, 2013).

Ensuring migrants’ job security and protecting migrant workers’ rights facilitate their integration but support as well the economy of receiving countries since, in this way, the latter are able to respond quickly to changes in the labour market (Huddleston, 2010). The possibility to access unemployment benefits, training, and to develop language skills critical for the job market reduces unemployment of migrants. However, the flexibility of the work permits is decisive: migrants should be able to change employer, job, industry and work permit in order to pursue their career development, and in case of unemployment they should be able to remain in the receiving country to look for another job (European Migration Network, 2013a). These measures include allowing membership of and participation in trade union associations since these are the institutions with which migrants mostly interact (Huddleston, 2010).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate Labour market Mobility</td>
<td>Facilitate labour market access</td>
<td>Ensure migrants have equal conditions as nationals for private and public sector employment. Ensure migrants residents have equal access to self-employment as nationals. Ensure equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants with nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate recognition of academic and professional qualifications</td>
<td>Establish state agencies/information centres that promote the recognition of skills and qualifications and procedures for assessment of skills and qualifications. Develop national guidelines on fair procedures, timelines and fees for assessments by professional, governmental, and NGOs. Provide information on conversion courses/profession-based language courses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduce unemployment of migrants</td>
<td>Promote vocational training. Providing language acquisition programmes. Support access public employment services. Allow migrants to renew work permits and remain living in the country and look for work in case they lose their job. Allow migrants to change employer, job, industry and work permit categories.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protect migrant Workers’ rights</td>
<td>Allow membership of and participation in trade union associations and work-related negotiation bodies Equal access to social security (e.g. unemployment benefits, old age pension, invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance). Ensure equal working conditions (e.g- safe and healthy working conditions, treatment in case of job termination or dismissal, payment/wages, taxation). Provide information on rights of migrant workers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2.2 Social Integration

Social integration indicates a process where all members of a society participate in dialogue to avoid social fragmentation, exclusion and polarisation (UNDESA, 2015). It implies a set of arrangements to facilitate acceptance of new members into the society. Besides creating the basis for a peaceful and cohesive society, migrants’ social integration is beneficial for the destination country’s economy. As Fouarge points out, an inclusive society in the long term improves productivity and quality of the migrant labour force (Fouarge, 2003).

Migrants’ family reunion plays an important role in achieving social integration since the possibility to rejoin with their family members facilitates migrants’ settlement in the new society. However, in order to avoid dependency and exploitation by the sponsoring migrant, family members eligible for family reunion need to have an autonomous status and equal access as their sponsor to rights and socio-economic opportunities (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2010).

Migrants’ social integration implies their equal treatment and equal access to opportunities as nationals. These are guaranteed by a solid and comprehensive anti-discrimination law that punishes public and private actors for direct and indirect discrimination in all areas of life and provides protection against victimisation. Legal provision should go with a set of equality policies empowering civil society actors and governments to support them to apply anti-discrimination laws (Niessen et al., 2007). Finally, an inclusive society passes through the promotion of migrants’ access to social rights such as right to work, to housing, to health, to social assistance and services of general interest (Eurodiaconia, 2011).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate social integration</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eligibility for family reunion</td>
<td>Allow ordinary legal residents after less of one year to sponsor family members. Grant eligibility for family reunion to family members others than spouses and minor children (e.g. partners other than spouses, dependent adult children, dependent relatives in the ascending line).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conditions for acquisition of status</td>
<td>Establish free, short and transparent conditions. Grant pre-departure requirement exemptions for highly-skilled migrants (e.g. educational qualifications). Minimise the cost of pre-departure requirement. Support to pass pre-departure requirement. Grant language/integration requirement exemptions for highly-skilled migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security of status</td>
<td>Guarantee family members the right to an autonomous status. Allow family members to renew permit and stay as long as the sponsor. Limit grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status to: found guilty of fraud in trying to acquire it or it poses a proven and major public policy or security threat. Establish legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal. Guarantee the right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority. Guarantee equal access as their sponsor to the many areas of life (e.g. education and training, employment and self-employment, social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting equal opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-discrimination</td>
<td>Establish anti-discrimination law punishing discrimination against a migrant in many ways because of her ethnic origin, race, religion or nationality, among other grounds. Apply anti-discrimination law to natural and legal persons including private sector. Restrict freedom of association, assembly and speech when impeding equal treatment. Ensure access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to both judicial civil and criminal procedures and administrative procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement Equality policies</td>
<td>Provide protection against victimisation in employment and education. Treat discriminatory motivation on the grounds of race/religion/nationality as aggravating circumstance.</td>
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<td>Establish specialised equality agency to combat discrimination. Assist victims with independent legal advice and investigation of the facts of the case. Ensure the equality agency has the legal standing to engage in judicial proceedings and administrative proceedings on behalf of the complainant. Develop legal mechanism to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law (e.g. impact assessments, reporting, and research). Ensure obligation for public bodies to promote equality in carrying out their functions and ensure that parties to whom they award contracts, loans, grants or other benefits respect non-discrimination. Establish tools to monitor equality policies’ implementation, including improved statistics, public opinion and victim surveys, and regular reporting on anti-discrimination cases and their outcomes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote migrants’ access to social rights</td>
<td>Ensure the access to social and fundamental rights of all migrants (e.g. the right to work, to housing, to health, to social assistance and services of general interest). Remove barriers that prevent people from accessing their social rights (information on rights to social services and health care, access to identity documents). Incentivise local authorities to support and cooperate closely with civil society and NGO social service providers who work to foster the integration of migrants. Include migrants in the implementation of principles of the active inclusion strategy. Organise awareness campaigns on cost of non-inclusion versus costs of inclusion.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2.3 Cultural Integration

The cultural dimension of integration involves the educational sphere. In a heterogeneous society, culturally sensitive and inclusive educational policies help take into account the needs of an increasingly diverse student population. This requires inter alia information centres, standardized quality criteria to assess prior compulsory migrants’ education and mentoring services supporting migrants and their children’s access to the national education system. The right of education should be guaranteed for migrants and their offspring regardless of the residence status, especially in the case of minors (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2010).

Promoting a multicultural education prevents future conflict within a heterogeneous society. This requires avoiding the emergence of all-migrant schools as well as enabling a multicultural pedagogy and culturally sensitive and inclusive school system. Introducing the language, culture and history of the country of origin among the subjects supports migrants and their children in smoothly integrating in the destination country’s culture. Meanwhile, a flexible education policy that adapts to the cultural and religious diversity of students removes sources of conflict and creates the basis for a society based on mutual respect and dialogue (EMILIE, 2009).

Finally, cultural integration passes through recognition of religious and cultural diversity. Official recognition of migrants’ religion and involvement of religious and cultural institutions in integration initiatives diminishes migrants’ isolation and creates the basis for a partnership for integration (Penninx, 2005, 137-152). This is especially true in the case of Muslim migrants whose religion after the terroristic attacks on the 11th September 2001 is being considered mostly in contrast with the European process of secularization (Casanova, 2006).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate cultural integration</td>
<td>Increase successful participation of migrants to the national educational system</td>
<td>Facilitate access to education</td>
<td>Provide access to education as a legal right for all compulsory-age children in the country, regardless of their residence status (includes undocumented).</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ensure standardized quality criteria to assess compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning obtained abroad.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Provide all categories of migrants regardless of their residence status (includes undocumented) with the same legal access as nationals to vocational training.</td>
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<td>Ensure written information on educational system in migrant languages of origin.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Make provision of resource centres for orientation of migrant pupils.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Make provision of interpretation services for families of migrant pupils for general educational advice and guidance at all levels.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide with intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families about the country and its education system.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure incentives to increase migrants pupils participation at school and parents involvements (e.g. language support, mentoring, campaigns, measures to address drop-outs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote multicultural education</td>
<td>Prevent the emergence of all-migrant pupils schools</td>
<td>Offer incentives (fewer hours, additional pay, recognition of formal qualifications) for educators and teachers who are interested in teaching in schools with large minority groups.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Encourage schools with few migrant pupils to attract more migrant pupils and schools with many to attract more non-migrant pupils.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Link schools with few migrant pupils and many migrant pupils (curricular or extra-curricular).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promote multicultural pedagogy</td>
<td>Ensure teacher training and professional development programmes include intercultural education and the appreciation of cultural diversity for all teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils’ learning needs, teachers’ expectations of migrant pupils, and specific teaching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Organise campaigns and incentives to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce. Provide lifelong training in intercultural/multicultural pedagogy for teachers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Culturally sensitive and inclusive education</td>
<td>Appoint bilingual/bicultural teachers, reduce class sizes and, where necessary, employ a second teacher or cultural mediator in class. Develop school curricula that emphasise elements of citizenship education such as social and moral responsibility, and community involvement. Make provision of option to learn immigrant languages. Make provision of option to learn about migrant pupils’ cultures and their/their parents’ country of origin. Allow the school curricula and teaching materials to be modified to reflect changes in the diversity of the school population. Allow daily life at school to be adapted based on cultural or religious needs in order to avoid exclusion of pupils (e.g. changes to the existing school timetable and religious holidays, educational activities, dress codes and clothing, school menus).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2.4 Civic Integration

The acquisition of long-term residency for migrants is critical for the development of the civic dimension of integration. The associated legal position and rights may influence positively migrants’ behaviour and their efforts to integrate. Meanwhile, for the receiving society inclusion policies can drive to perceive migrants as locals instead of outsiders (Penninx, 2005, 137-152). According to IOM, several countries are requiring migrants to meet integration assessment criteria in order to obtain long-term residence status. These may include language ability, civic knowledge, and cultural knowledge of the receiving country. In some cases, such as in the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, these integration criteria should be met before entering the country of destination. Whether these assessments are promoting or deterring integration is under debate. Arguments in favour see them as incentives to migrants’ integration while detractors consider them as legal deterrents enhancing the discretion of administrative authorities (Huddleston, 2010).

According to Huddleston, acquiring the nationality of the receiving country removes the legal obstacles to migrants’ civic integration (Huddleston, 2009). Through it, migrants have access to the full set of rights and responsibilities linked to it such as access to employment in the public sector, free movement rights, and full formal political rights. There is evidence that it supports integration in the labour market as well: it lowers barriers to public and regulated jobs, decreases administrative costs for employers, and supports investment in human capital especially for highly-skilled migrants (Global Economic Symposium, 2011). However, according to IOM many European countries prefer facilitating long-term residence than the access to nationality (Huddleston, 2010).

Instead, in Europe the trend to allow dual or multiple nationalities has increased since the 1990s. This can be partly explained by the growing mobility of the EU Members’ citizens. Thanks to the double nationality, migrants can acquire the citizenship of the receiving country while maintaining links with family or social networks in their country of origin since they do not face visa and travel restrictions. This is particularly valuable for migrants holding high human capital as well as immigrant entrepreneurs and businessmen, who are more likely to opt for multiple nationalities (Niessen and Huddleston, 2009).

Finally, the possibility of political participation in the public decision making process in the destination country facilitates the acquisition of nationality and the sense of civic responsibility linked to citizenship. Data confirm that in countries where they are involved in the local political life, migrants develop trust in public institutions while migrant associations consulted and supported by governments are active and effective in public life.
(LOCALMULTIDEM, 2008). Measures to increase migrants’ political participation concern political liberties, voting rights, and consultative bodies to foster dialogue with migrants (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2010).
Table 16: Policies to Facilitate Civic Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Examples of measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate civic integration</td>
<td>Facilitate acquisition of long-term residence status</td>
<td>Eligibility and conditions of acquisition</td>
<td>Allow eligibility after five years (or less) of legal residence. Count time as self-employed, student or asylum seekers towards this requirement. Establish fair, transparent, free and short procedures. Allow periods of absence from country previous to granting long-term residence and for renewal. Grant language/integration requirement exemptions for highly-skilled migrants (e.g. educational qualifications). Minimise the cost of integration requirement. Provide support to pass integration requirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security of status</td>
<td>Establish long duration of validity of permit (e.g. 5 years). Renew permit without pretending original requirements. Set as only grounds for withdrawal of permit or refusing application fraud in trying to acquire it or of a serious crime, or threat to public security. Take into account factors for protection against expulsion (e.g. age, duration of residence). Establishing legal guarantees and redress in case of withdrawal or non-renewal of permit or expulsion order. Guarantee residence right after retirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rights associated with long-term residence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Guarantee access to employment (only exception from exercise of public authority), self-employment and other economic activities; Allow access to social security, social assistance, health care and housing. Ensure freedom of movement and residence within the EU. Allow simultaneous holding of a long-term residence permit in more than one EU member state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating</td>
<td>Eligibility and</td>
<td></td>
<td>Require five years of permanent residence for ordinary naturalisation of first generation migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee migrants’ political participation</td>
<td>access to nationality</td>
<td>Security of status</td>
<td>Dual nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>acquisition conditions</strong></td>
<td>Require three years of residence/marriage required for spouses of nationals and of residence for partners of nationals. Allow automatic naturalisation for second generation immigrants (born in country, both parents born abroad). Allow periods of absence from country allowed previous to naturalisation. Grant citizenship/integration requirement exemptions for highly-skilled migrants (e.g. educational qualifications). Minimise the cost of citizenship/integration requirement. Provide support to pass citizenship/integration requirement.</td>
<td>Set as only grounds for withdrawal or refusing application fraud in trying to acquire it or of a serious crime, or threat to public security. Take into account factors for protection against refusal (e.g. age, duration of residence). Establish legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal. Prescribe in law time limits for withdrawal. Establish legal prohibitions against withdrawal that would lead to statelessness.</td>
<td>Allow choosing whether or not to keep original citizenship. Ensure naturalisation does not require to renounce/lose foreign nationality. Allow dual nationality for migrants’ children born in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political liberties</strong></td>
<td>Guarantee right to association, including political, for foreign residents. Guarantee right to join political parties as members. Guarantee right to create media.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting rights</strong></td>
<td>Grant to legal residents right to vote in national elections (any level of government between the lowest local and the highest national/federal). Grant to legal residents right to stand for elections at local level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consultative</strong></td>
<td>Develop procedures of consultation of foreign residents at national and local level.</td>
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</table>
| bodies | Establish consultative bodies that discuss the policies that most affect migrants.  
Guarantee migrants or migrant associations independently elect representatives.  
Guarantee right of initiative to these bodies.  
Provide information on political rights by national and city level.  
Provide funding or support of migrant organisations under the same conditions as other associations. |
3.3 CONCLUSIONS

As noted previously, the debate on migration and development is biased towards receiving countries’ interests that prioritise the economic aspects of development. Notwithstanding this, decision makers in both sending and receiving countries and aid actors have exchanged best practices within international fora - such as regional consultative processes and international dialogues on migration - on different areas related to the migration and development nexus. This study has identified policy practices to foster highly-skilled migrants’ contributions to sending countries’ development to be implemented by both countries of origin and destinations as derived from literature on the subject, implemented programmes, and personal reflection.

The study adopted Sen’s definition of development and so did not focus only on economic development. Therefore, sending countries’ policies cover four broad areas: remittances transfer, remittances productivity, facilitating brain circulation, and engaging diasporas. This allows exploiting the full range of highly-skilled migrants’ contributions. Additionally, policies are in line with the transnational paradigm that does not require migrants to return indefinitely to their homeland. Therefore, contrary to a usual understanding, permanent return is just one of the possible options migrants have in order to be involved in its affairs besides short-term visits and remote involvement. However, to guarantee an effective and long-lasting impact these measures need to be integrated into broad national development planning with a strong inter-ministerial coordination as well as cooperation with receiving countries.

Receiving countries have a critical role on the extent to which migrants can contribute to the development of their country of origin. Most policies set up by sending countries to support their diaspora’s engagement need the collaboration of receiving countries through bilateral or regional agreements. Most important, receiving countries can limit or enhance migrants’ transnational identities and therefore their monetary, cultural, and social transfers towards the country of origin.

Although receiving countries often tend to look suspiciously at migrants’ transnationalism, the study has identified policies that can support migrants’ transnational activities in four major areas: economic, social, political and cultural sectors. However, they should be complemented by policies supporting migrants’ integration in the receiving society, since migrants performing transnational activities that are well incorporated in the receiving society and institutions contribute the most to the development of their country of origin.
Since the 1990s, integration policies have been at the centre of a resurgent interest in Europe. The study has identified policies supporting highly-skilled migrants’ integration in the economic, cultural, social and civic areas. However, since transnationalism and integration are two interconnected processes that strengthen each other, the distinction between the two categories of policies is blurred and sometimes they overlap.
CHAPTER FOUR

A CASE STUDY: EGYPTIAN HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRATION

This chapter focuses on Egyptian highly-skilled migration. First, it analyses Egyptian migration flows since the early 1970s, when the Egyptian government started to facilitate it, until now. Second, it explores the characteristics of the current Egyptian migration and its potential effects on the development of Egypt. Finally, it analyses the features of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria.

4.1 GENERAL CONTEXT AND CHARACTERISTICS OF EGYPTIAN MIGRATION

Egypt is a North African country bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Gaza Strip and Israel to the northeast, the Red Sea to the east, Sudan to the south and Libya to the west. The Human Development Index (HDI)\textsuperscript{11} of Egypt has been constantly increasing since the 1980s: in 1980 it valued 0.482 while in 2013 it was 0.682, positioning the country at 110 out of 187 countries and territories and in the medium human development category (UNPD, 2010). Nevertheless, the country’s economy is affected by a strong inequality: if the HDI value is discounted for inequality it falls to 0.518 with a loss of 24 percent.\textsuperscript{12}

Besides Nigeria and Ethiopia, Egypt is the most populated country on the African continent, and the 15\textsuperscript{th} most populated country in the world. The population of Egypt has increased from 67.7 million in 2000 to 83.61 million people in 2014 (World Population Review, 2015). This population shift is mainly attributed to high fertility and a young population structure (Smith, 2012). Although statistics show a decrease of its fertility rate - from 7.2 children per woman in the early 1960’s to 3.4 children per woman in 1998 – the

\textsuperscript{11} The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living.

\textsuperscript{12} The 2010 Human Development Report introduced the Inequality-Adjusted HDI (IHDI). This takes into account inequality in all three dimensions of the HDI by ‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. The IHDI is basically the HDI discounted for inequalities. The difference between the HDI and the IHDI, expressed as a percentage, represents the ‘loss’ in human development due to inequality. Please see: Klugman, 2010.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) estimates predict Egypt’s population will keep increasing in the future, reaching a total population of 123.5 million people in 2050 (UNDESA, 2013a).

Egypt’s demographics affects the economic performance of the country, in particular its labour market. According to Egypt’s Central Agency for Mobilisation and Statistics (CAPMAS), Egypt’s workforce in the first quarter of 2014 was 27.6 million. The unemployment rate registered a 0.2 percent year’s increase from 13.4 percent in the first quarter of 2014 compared to 13.2 percent in the same period in the previous year (Al-Shuwekhi, 2014). According to CAPMAS, youth constitutes 69 percent of the total unemployed population, with the majority of the unemployed youth in the 20 - 24 year-old tranche (39 percent). Unemployment has been one of the major problems of Egypt over a few decades due mainly to its labour force growing at a faster rate than the labour demand (Economic Watch, 2013). The political instability affecting the country since the fall of President Mubarak’s regime in February 2011 has been deteriorating Egypt’s economy with effects on the unemployment rate. The figure below shows a 4 percent increase of the unemployment rate from 9.4 percent in January 2010, before the political turmoil, to 13.4 percent in 2014.

Figure 5: Egypt Unemployment Rate (Percentage of the Labour Force) 2008-2014


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13 Egypt remains locked in a protracted process of political transition after the resignation of the long-serving leader Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Egypt’s first democratically elected parliament in decades, composed mainly by Islamist parties was dissolved in June 2012 while the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi, who won the presidential elections in mid-2012, was deposed a year later through a combination of mass anti-government protest and a military coup. In January 2014 a referendum adopted a new constitution banning parties based on religion. In May 2014 a former army chief Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi won presidential election.
Migration flows from Egypt have been increasing significantly during the last two decades. According to the UNDESA estimates, Egyptian migrants abroad were about 3.47 million in 2013. This number corresponds to about a 70 percent increase in comparison with the census figure in 1990 of 2.04 million (UNDESA, 2013). Although these data are susceptible to distortions since being based on estimations, they give an idea of the size of the Egyptian migration phenomenon. The government of Egypt started to lift restrictions on Egyptian migration in the early 1970s. Since then, Egyptian migration’s patterns have changed according to the main political and economic events in the Middle East region. Zohry and Debnath (2010) identify five main phases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1974</td>
<td>The early phase of migration</td>
<td>Government restricts labour migration. Restrictions were lifted between 1971 and 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1984</td>
<td>The expansion phase</td>
<td>Oil embargo and subsequent price increase expand job opportunities in Gulf countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-1987</td>
<td>The contraction phase</td>
<td>Iraq-Iran war depress economy and demand of foreign workers in Gulf countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1992</td>
<td>The deterioration phase</td>
<td>Economy in Gulf countries farther depressed by the 1990 Gulf was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 – current</td>
<td>The recent phase</td>
<td>Egyptian migration boosts up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: data extracted from Zohry and Debnath, 2010.

In line with the “pessimist theories”, before the 1970s the government of Egypt was not keen to facilitate the migration of Egyptian workers, considering it an obstacle to the

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14 Migration stocks in countries of destination are only estimations based on the consulates’ register data. Since Egyptian migrants tend not to inform embassies of their presence on receiving countries, for fear of bureaucratic delays and for lack of trust, these estimations cannot be considered reliable. Data on migration flows are instead realistic since they are collected at the borders. However, they only record the travellers’ border crossover but not their motivation. Moreover, it is possible to note the presence of significant differences between Egypt and country of destination’s (i.e. OECD countries) estimates, which usually seem to be smaller. These gaps can be attributed to a) differences in the definition of a migrant, b) the fact that some migrants have been naturalized in their host country, and hence are no longer considered migrants in the census or other types of surveys, and c) the fact that irregular migrants are more likely to register at Egyptian consulates, but usually are not registered with the host country.
development of the country for the risk of brain drain and loss of workforce that it implied. However, the government was forced first to authorise temporary and permanent migration in 1971 and to lift the restrictions on labour migration in 1974 to cope with an increasing population coupled with a low economic growth in the country. This coincided with a period of prosperity in the GCC countries due to the oil embargo that augmented the oil price. As a consequence, their income and their demand of workers increased hugely. This "expansion phase" lasted a decade during which many Egyptians went to work in the Gulf region. Later, the war between Iraq and Iran depressed the economy of the region and the Gulf countries preferred to replace the expatriate workforce with the national labour force. During this “contraction phase” many Egyptian migrants returned home. During the following “deterioration phase”, their number in the region decreased further as a result of the 1990 Gulf War. However, in the last two decades migration from Egypt has been boosting again until reaching the current number of about 3.47 million, registered in 2013. The current financial crisis that is affecting in particular the economies of the USA and European countries do not seem to be disturbing this trend: according to UNDESA, Egyptian migrants stocks augmented 5.26 percent from 3.29 million in 2010 to 3.47 million in 2013 (UNDESA, 2013).

The flows of Egyptian migrants’ remittances to Egypt are quite important. In 2012, Egypt was ranked as the sixth - biggest remittance receiving country in the world, with an estimated remittance inflow of about USD 20 billion, accounting for over 40 percent of total remittance inflows to the Middle East – North Africa region (World Bank, 2013b). In 2014, migrants’ remittances flows accounted for a 7.5 percent share of Egypt’s GDP (World Bank, 2014). Moreover, these data do not include either remittances transferred through informal channels, brought for example by travellers and returnees, or in-kind remittances such as clothes and electronic equipment (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). Therefore, remittances are one of the most important sources of foreign currency for the country, larger than either foreign direct investment or official aid. Moreover, they can be considered one of the most stable sources of income for the country (Jureidini et al., 2010) since they have grown 158 percent during the last decade showing a countermomentum with national and international crises. The current financial crisis started in 2007 and the political instability affecting the country since 2011 have not affected remittances flows to Egypt: instead, these have increased by 121 percent, from USD 8,694 million in 2008 to USD 19,236 million in 2012 (World Bank, 2014).
Egyptian migrants are mainly male and young individuals (Nassar, 2008). If we focus on their level of education it is possible to note that migrants are usually more educated than non-migrants. In 2006, 37 percent of Egyptian returned migrants had a vocational secondary degree and 25 percent had a university degree. Moreover, the percentage of Egyptian migrants with a high educational profile has been increasing over time. During the 1980s, only 20 percent of Egyptian migrants in the GCC countries worked as scientists or technicians whereas this percentage doubled to 41 percent in 2006. Meanwhile, the percentage of Egyptian migrants working in clerical work, sales and services, and production declined considerably.¹⁵ This is mainly due to the general improvement in educational level of young Egyptians, induced by strong governmental efforts, and competition with the South Asian labour force for low-skilled jobs in GCC countries. This trend seems to be confirmed

¹⁵ In 1985, 20 percent of migrants worked as scientists or technicians, 9 percent in clerical work, 19 percent in sales and services, 9 percent in agriculture and 43 percent in production. By 2006, this occupational profile had changed considerably, with the percentage of Egyptian migrants working as scientists or technicians doubling to 41 percent. Meanwhile the percentage of Egyptian migrants working in clerical work, sales and services, and production declined to respectively 2 percent, 13 percent, and 34 percent. Please see: Nassar, 2010.
by the 2009 Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), a nationally representative study of a sample of 15,029 young people aged 10–29 years. The study concludes that migration aspirations increase as wealth and educational attainment level rise, which may be explained by the fact wealthy and educated people have more resources to migrate than others (El-Badawy, 2011).

GCC countries are a traditional destination of the majority of Egyptian migrants. According to the 2006 data, 46 percent of Egyptian migrants had moved to Gulf countries; 41 percent to other Arab states; and only 3 percent to other regions of the world (El-Badawy, 2011). Nevertheless, although the numbers of migrants to the Gulf are still higher the pattern of highly-skilled Egyptian migration is shifting from GCC countries to OECD countries. According to the 2009 Human Development Report, the majority of Egyptian migrants to OECD countries had a higher education degree: 47.3 percent while 30.7 percent had only an upper secondary education degree, and 18.8 percent had less than upper secondary education levels (Sika, 2010). According to an IOM study based on the SYPE data, non-students may be more interested in migrating to Arab countries than students: while the percentage of individuals who aspire to migrate to OECD countries decreased from 7.1 percent of students to 2.6 percent of non-students, interest in moving to an Arab country rose from 7 percent of students to 17.2 percent of non-students (El-Badawy, 2011). This may be explained by the GCC countries’ labour demand focusing more on unskilled workers. There is also the fact that, lately, highly-skilled employment has become financially more rewarding in OECD countries rather than in GCC countries (Sika, 2010). A growing flow of Egyptian migrants to Western destinations is indeed consistent with the stagnation or even reduction of similar migration flow to the Gulf countries (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). Among OECD countries, in 2000 most Egyptian migrants resided in the USA (39 percent of Egyptian migrants in OECD) and Canada (13 percent). In Europe, main countries of destination are Italy (10 percent) and Greece (7 percent) (Galal, 2007). Migration from Egypt to the USA and Canada is highly selective: in 2001, 79.20 percent of Egyptian migrants to Canada had a tertiary education level; in 2000, Egypt had the largest proportion of its emigrants engaged in management and professional occupation in the USA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving Country</th>
<th>Number of Egyptian Migrants</th>
<th>Distribution by Destination (%)</th>
<th>Overall Distribution (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>923,600</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>332,600</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>226,850</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>190,550</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>65,629</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total in Arab Countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,912,729</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>318,000</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total in Non-Arab Countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>824,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,736,729</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CAPMAS, 2001.*
Generally, when analysing the Egyptian migration phenomenon scholars and practitioners refer to migratory movements to Arab countries as “temporary” migration while migration to the West is labelled as “permanent” migration. This distinction is also adopted by CAPMAS (Zohry and Debnath, 2010) and originates from the Egyptian Law no. 11 of 1983 that differentiates migration between temporary and permanent. However, it does not refer to the real duration of migrants’ stay: migrants to Arab countries are considered temporary even if they have been living there for years, while migrants to Western countries are considered permanent already after a few days from their departure. As previously explained, in most OECD countries Egyptians have options to obtain the permanent residency and citizenship after fulfilling certain legal requirements and completing a specified duration of stay, while in Arab countries the kefala or sponsorship system prevails which closes these possibilities to foreigners (Jureidini et al., 2010). Although artificial, this traditional distinction between permanent and temporary migration reflects partly Egyptian reality since the findings of the IOM survey in 2010 show that Egyptian migrants stay in Arab countries an average of only 8.8 years while the mean duration of stay for their counterparts in the West is 15.1 years (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). This confirms that the legal framework in OECD countries facilitating a permanent stay eventually affects the duration of migrants' sojourn. Egyptian migration towards Arab countries follows instead mostly a circular pattern: migrants move there for a few years, come back to their country of origin and then move there again with the main purpose of accumulating savings (Nassar, 2008).

As a consequence, in the case of Egypt there is a correspondence between the educational level of its migrants, their destination and the possible duration of their stay in the country of destination. Data show that although most of Egyptian migration is still direct to Gulf countries, highly-skilled migrants increasingly prefer OECD countries. The local legal framework increases the probability that they indefinitely establish their residence there, with crucial consequences for the development of Egypt.
4.2 POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRATION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF EGYPT

As mentioned previously, when considering the effects of migration on the development of sending countries, scholars are mostly divided into pessimist and optimist. Especially in the case of highly-skilled migrants the debate has been intense over the years. The historical-structural doctrine considers their migration a loss for the countries of origin (i.e. because of brain drain) (Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters, 2004) while recent paradigms, such as the translational theory, have pointed out that the new technologies now facilitate contacts between migrants and their country of origin even many years after their departure. For this reason, recently scholars and politicians tend to highlight the advantages of highly-skilled migration (i.e. brain gain) (Hunger, 2002) since it facilitates the transmission of new ideas and competencies through the brain circulation pattern (Levitt, 2003, 177-194; Brown, 2000).

In the Egyptian case, data supports the transnational theory since migrants do not lose contacts with their country of origin but instead are quite active in maintaining their linkages. This is especially true in the case of migration to OECD countries. Zohry’s survey highlights that respondents in the West, where migrants are mostly highly-skilled and have typically moved permanently, show a stronger fear than migrants to Arab countries of losing their national identity, especially in the case of their children. As a consequence, they are more interested in funding social projects to support community and charitable activities in Egypt (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). While all respondents showed keen interest in maintaining ties and communication channels with Egypt, in the Arab countries they rely more on online communities than on migrants associations. A reason is that in Western countries, migrants have more possibilities to strengthen Egyptian communities abroad through local organisations, whereas Arab countries do not give foreigners the possibility of establishing any kind of societies or NGOs (Zohry and Debnath, 2010).

Although the majority of Egyptians are Muslim, in Egypt there is a traditional Christian community. The Coptic community represents a major ethno-religious group in Egypt and the largest Christian group there. The relationship between Egyptian Copts abroad and their homeland is complex. According to a recent study on the Coptic community in USA, this is strongly connected to the Egyptian Church. However, the relationship is marked by a growing divergence between the Coptic Church in Egypt and the Coptic diaspora organisations, particularly about political views on Egypt’s home affairs and relationship between Copts and
Muslims in Egypt. The study reveals that unlike the church in Egypt, the members of Coptic diaspora organisations see themselves not as part of a united Egypt, but rather as members of a minority persecuted by the Egyptian government and the Muslim population (Haddad and Donovan, 2013). Coptic diaspora’s sense of identity being so strongly linked to their being a minority in Egypt can drive to opposite results in terms of their engagement in the development of their homeland. Being in conflict with the Egyptian Church and government, Coptic migrants may be less interested in maintaining ties and contacts with Egypt. However, Coptic diaspora organisations have demonstrated a strong activism and lobbying towards Western governments to gain support against persecutions of Copts in Egypt, which can contribute to a more democratic and egalitarian society there.

As it refers to the possibility of brain drain, Egyptians’ highly-skilled migration is mainly the consequence of the oversupply of highly educated workers in the Egyptian labour market and of the low returns of educational credentials in terms of income (El-Badawy, 2011). CAPMAS data show that in 2013 within the unemployment rate of 13.2 percent, educated workers faced a high unemployment rate (31.1 percent of overall unemployment), the second largest rate after the technical intermediate unemployment (42.7 percent). However, data are higher if we compare percentages of unemployed workers according to their educational status: 22 percent of the labour force with a university or a higher degree was unemployed compared to 16.9 percent with a secondary school degree (CAPMAS, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Percentage Rate of Unemployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Below Intermediate</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Secondary</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CAPMAS, 2014.

This is due, in part, to past governmental efforts to improve the educational levels of the Egyptian population: this resulted in a growing percentage of university graduates, more than
30 percent of the general population in 2005 in comparison with 20 percent in 1975 (Sika, 2010). The private sector in Egypt is, meanwhile, unable to absorb all highly educated workers. An IOM research piece, based on the results of the Thanawiyyya Amma exam, confirms that the migration aspirations of Egyptian graduate students are inter alia shaped by the possibility of finding a job after obtaining their degree. Mainly agriculture and veterinary school graduates hoped to move abroad, while only a small percentage of graduates from computer studies intend to pursue jobs abroad. This difference is due to the lack of job opportunities for highly educated youth in those specific sectors. The research also compared the average scores of youth who aspire to migrate with the scores of the entire youth. It shows that while university graduates wish more strongly to migrate than others, there is no strong evidence that the best ones are the most motivated (El-Badawy, 2011).

**Figure 7: Migration Intentions of University Graduates by Educational Specialisation (%)**

![Graph showing migration intentions by educational specialisation](image)

*Source: El-Badawy, 2011.*

Therefore, since highly-skilled migrants are mainly not absorbed by the local labour market and the best students are not necessarily included among them, Egypt cannot be considered a clear case of brain drain. In contrast, Sika points out that their migration can be considered to be beneficial since it reduces the labour offer in the Egyptian labour market (Sika, 2010).

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16 The Thanawiyyya Amma Exam is an exam administered to all general secondary students throughout Egypt. The exam is standardized at the national level and is the sole determinant of which university the student will attend and the discipline he/she will study.
Egyptian highly-skilled migrants can instead be considered a case of brain circulation. According to Wahba (2013), evidence suggests that return migrants in Egypt have more possibilities than non-migrants to find a job in technical, scientific, and management occupations since working overseas increases new skills and enhance their human capital. Moreover, as underlined by Portes, usually migrants with high education and occupational status have more probabilities of engaging in different forms of transnational activism - economic, political or socio-cultural - linking them to their home countries. This is most likely due to the fact that migrant professionals commonly have a sense of obligation to the institutions that educated them (Castels and Delgado Wise, 2008). Most respondents to Zohry’s survey showed indeed a willingness to transfer to Egypt their knowledge and skills that they acquired in their destination countries. However, according to this survey, respondents from Western countries feel more than their counterparts in Arab countries to have increased their skills. This can be due to the fact that in Egypt and Arab countries the juridical, political and industrial systems are quite similar so migrants there are less exposed to new technologies and skills (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). Therefore, in the case of highly-skilled migration to OECD countries, we can consider Egyptian migration a brain gain case, as called by the optimist scholars.

Egyptian highly-skilled migrants may offer other advantages to Egypt. Since their income is higher than in the case of low-skilled migrants, the volume of their remittances is supposedly higher. This is in part proved by the collected data on remittances by country of destination. As it is shown in the table below, in the fiscal year 2009/2010 remittances from the United States, where Egyptian migrants are mostly highly-skilled, were disproportionately high (USD 621 million, equal to 33.4 percent of all remittances) compared to the percentage of total Egyptian migrants there. Remittances from Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, the destination of most Egyptian migrants, are relatively low (USD 217.3 million, equal to 11.7 percent of the total share), although these data do not include in-kind remittances (Central Bank of Egypt, 2010). This data can be explained as well by the higher trust highly-educated migrants have towards the formal banking channels for sending remittances. As a survey commissioned by IOM discovered, the larger the volume of remittances and the higher the education level of the migrant, the more likely it is that they will opt for formal channels of remittance transfers (i.e. banks and official money transfer institutions) (Jureidini et al., 2010). In this way, highly-skilled migrants contribute indirectly to reinforce the Egyptian financial system.
Table 20: Remittance Inflows into Egypt by Country of Destination (2009/2010, in USD million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittances</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>621.00</td>
<td>33.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>411.00</td>
<td>22.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>217.30</td>
<td>11.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>199.40</td>
<td>10.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>159.20</td>
<td>8.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>37.70</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>37.20</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>31.60</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>26.00</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,855.70</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Bank of Egypt, 2010

As regards the use of remittances, highly-skilled migrants with their high salary have more possibilities to invest them in productive activities whereas low-skilled migrants hardly are able to save part of their income after covering their household’s daily living expenses (Fargues, 2010). As highlighted by NELM scholars, the more the country is lacking of social
services the more remittances are used by households for nutrition, health care needs and for future unforeseen emergencies (Jureidini et al., 2010). During the last years, Mubarak’s privatization and liberalisation policies have weakened Egypt’s social system and therefore most of the remittances are spent for consumption and as a form of insurance. According to the 2013 Human Development Report (Malik, 2013), in 2008 1.7 percent of the country’s population is living below the national poverty line (measured as income poverty) but 7.2 percent are vulnerable to poverty. The contributions of deprivations in health, education and living standards to overall poverty are respectively 37.3, 48.1, and 14.5 percent.\(^{17}\) Despite that, essential services in education and health care are now mainly provided by the private sector, which increases their cost for households (Jureidini et al., 2010).

Moreover, as McCormick and Wahba (2001) argue in their study of Egyptian migration, literate migrants have more possibilities to invest than uneducated migrants since they can make use of the new skills acquired during work experience abroad, while this advantage is not offered to low-skilled labourers that are barely targeted by the company’s capacity building policies (Jureidini et al., 2010).

Finally, data show that migrants in OECD countries, allegedly more educated, are relatively more gender-balanced than in Arab countries. In 2010, the percentage of Egyptian migrant males in the selected OECD countries was 57.6 percent (Jureidini et al., 2010), while in 2007, men accounted for 96.6 percent of the total of (employed) emigrants in Arab countries (Fargues, 2013). This can strengthen the female work force and ultimately introduce a more gender-sensitive approach in the Egyptian socio-political and economic system.

### 4.3 EGYPTIAN MIGRATION TO AUSTRIA

Austrian statistics do not provide the national origin of Austrian citizens but according to the Egyptian Embassy in Vienna the Egyptian diaspora in Austria, including the second and third generation, amounts to around 30,000 individuals.\(^{18}\) This would make the Egyptian origin community the largest one from the Arab world in Austria (Medien Servicestelle, 2013). During the last decade, the size of Egyptian stock in Austria has not been affected by

\(^{17}\) The 2010 Human Development Report introduced the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which identifies multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health and standard of living. Please see: Klugman, 2010.

\(^{18}\) Interview with Mr. Morsi Abu-Youssef, Cultural Attaché of Egyptian Embassy in Vienna, held on the 16\(^{th}\) August 2013.
significant demographic changes, although it is possible to detect an increase. According to Eurostat, from 2004 to 2013, Egyptian citizen migrants increased by 6.98 percent, reaching 5,226 individuals in 2013, which corresponds to 0.52 percent of the total foreign population. These numbers redouble when looking at Egyptian-born migrants: from 2004 to 2013 they increased by 17 percent, reaching a total number of 12,891 individuals in 2013, which corresponds to 0.95 percent of the total foreign population. Please see tables 22 and 23 below for details. In 2013, more than 40 percent of Egypt-born migrants (7,665 individuals) living in Austria were nationalised. Since Austrian law does not allow dual citizenship and therefore nationalised migrants lose their original citizenship, it is possible to deduce this number from the difference between the Egyptian-born migrants and Egyptian citizen migrants living in Austria. As we can see from the table below, the Austrian state with the highest number of Egyptian migrants is the Vienna state, followed by Styria and Upper Austria.

Table 21: Egyptian Migrants by State in Austria in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Austrian State</th>
<th>By citizenship</th>
<th>By country of birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>8,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>1,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirol</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg province</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,281</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,056</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Statistik Austria, 2012, as of the 1st January 2012.*
Table 22: Population in Austria Born in Egypt (2004-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian males</td>
<td>7,367</td>
<td>7,540</td>
<td>7,769</td>
<td>7,836</td>
<td>7,850</td>
<td>7,898</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>7,986</td>
<td>8,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian females</td>
<td>3,650</td>
<td>4,006</td>
<td>4,370</td>
<td>4,484</td>
<td>4,571</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>4,739</td>
<td>4,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Egyptian people</td>
<td>11,017</td>
<td>11,546</td>
<td>12,139</td>
<td>12,320</td>
<td>12,421</td>
<td>12,533</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>12,725</td>
<td>12,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Egyptian citizens over total foreign population</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
<td>1.00%</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>0.96%</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 23 Population in Austria with Egyptian Citizenship (2004-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian males</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>2,474</td>
<td>2,395</td>
<td>2,292</td>
<td>2,329</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>2,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian females</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>2,295</td>
<td>2,441</td>
<td>2,391</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>2,531</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2,598</td>
<td>2,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Egyptian citizens</td>
<td>4,885</td>
<td>4,769</td>
<td>4,836</td>
<td>4,683</td>
<td>4,819</td>
<td>4,907</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>5,091</td>
<td>5,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Egyptian citizens over total foreign population</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>0.54%</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Egyptian diaspora shows a good level of organisation. In 2004, there were ten organisations in Austria where Egyptian migrants constituted a majority of members and chairpersons (Kraler and Sohler, 2005). The main Egyptian migrant organisations are described below.

The Ägyptische Klub:¹⁹ this is the oldest Egyptian organisation in Austria. It was founded in the 1970s by the Egyptian embassy and still maintains a strong connection and cooperation with it.²⁰ Its members are about 500 and its premises are often used by Egyptian families for weddings and other festivities (Medien Servicestelle, 2013).

The General Union der ÄgypterInnen in Österreich:²¹ this organisation was founded in 2010. Although its members are only 100, it aims at becoming the umbrella organisation of all Egyptian organisations in Austria. It has branches in the cities of Leoben, Klagfodt, Graz and Linz. According to its Financial Officer, Mr Ahmed El Sharkawy, the average age of its members is between 40 and 50 years; 80 percent are men; and between 70 and 75 percent hold a university degree. Its main activities relate in helping Egyptian migrants in establishing in Austria: support in finding a job, providing legal advice, and support in visa applications. They also organise Arabic and religion courses for Egyptian children and promote touristic travels to Egypt. The organisation is well connected with Austrian political authorities whose representatives provide lectures to its members: for instance, it hosted a lecture held by the State Secretary for Integration and one by the Mayors of Vienna. The organisation has strong connections with Egyptian politicians as well, although it aims at maintaining a neutral position: its committee is neutral and among the organisation’s members there are both Muslims and Copts.²²

The Jugend für Ägypten in Österreich (AEOEJ): this organisation gathers second generation Egyptians in Austria.²³ It was founded in 2011 but has been active since 2012. Its mission is to help second generation Egyptians to remain connected with their Arab culture and to promote intercultural knowledge between Egyptians and Austrians. Its activities relate to school support for second generation Egyptian children, in particular German lessons. It

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¹⁹ The club holds a Facebook page, available at: https://www.facebook.com/gyptischerclub.wien (Last accessed on the 11th September 2014)

²⁰ Interview with Mr. Osama El-Halawani, President of the Ägyptische Klub, held on the 18th October 2014.

²¹ The organisation holds a website and a Facebook page, available respectively at: http://www.egyptunion.net/; https://www.facebook.com/groups/union.der.aegypter/ (Last accessed on the 11th September 2014).

²² Interview with Mr. Ahmed El-Sharkawy, Financial Officer of the General Union der ÄgypterInnen in Österreich, held on the 23rd August 2013.

²³ For further information please see the organisation’ website, available at: www.aeoej.at
has organised charity events to collect money for Syrian refugees in Egypt through a partner organisation in Egypt, and a political demonstration in favour of the Egyptian uprising in 2012. Currently the organisation has sixteen members whose age is between 20 and 26 years old that implement its activities on a volunteer basis.\textsuperscript{24}

As regards the religious belief of the Egyptian community in Austria, the 2001 Austrian Census detected 3,541 Muslims of Egyptian origin, which corresponds to around 1 percent of the Muslim population in Austria (338,988 individuals) (ORF.AT, 2004). Furthermore, the Coptic community in Austria counts 5,000 individuals equivalent to the members of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Austria. Both numbers include second and third generation Egyptians.

The Coptic community in Austria is mainly based in Vienna with approximately 4,000 out of the 5,000 members there (Beig, 2010). Copts started to move to Austria in the 1960s as with other Egyptians, but their migratory flows increased in the 1970s in concomitance with the rise of Nasser’s pan-Arabism that was at odds with the Copts’ sense of identity linked to their Egyptian pre-Arab identity.\textsuperscript{25} The church has been present in Austria since 1976 and was officially recognised by the state in 2003. Overall, the diocese has eight churches in Austria, of which four are in Vienna and a monastery, the St. Antonius Kloster in Obersiebenbrunn.\textsuperscript{26} Besides the church, the community is supported by the Integration koptischer und österreichischer Freundschaften, an organisation aiming at facilitating the connection between Copts and Austrians. It supports Coptic migrants just landed in Austria by providing legal and administrative advice, support in finding a job and lodgings, and psychological advice. It was founded in 2006 and since 2013 has been part of a wider organisation called the International Coptic Union.\textsuperscript{27} This aims at safeguarding Copts in Egypt by lobbying with the Egyptian government as well as by organising worldwide demonstrations in the cause of violations of Copts’ rights.\textsuperscript{28}

In line with other Coptic diaporas in Western countries (Haddad and Donovan, 2013), the Coptic community in Austria is actively involved in lobbying activities, in particular towards

\textsuperscript{24} Interview with AEOEJ’s members, held on the 28\textsuperscript{th} September 2013.

\textsuperscript{25} Nasser’s measures against Copts included delays in building churches, closure of Christian religious courts, confiscation of land and church’s properties. Please see: Nisan, 2002.

\textsuperscript{26} For more information please see the website of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Austria, available at: www.kopten.at (Last accessed on the 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2014)

\textsuperscript{27} The organisation holds a Facebook page, available at: https://www.facebook.com/international.coptic.union/timeline (Last accessed on the 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2014)

\textsuperscript{28} Interview with Mr. Kamal Abd El-Nour, founder of the Integration Koptischer und Österreichischer Freundschaften and International Coptic Union, held on the 12\textsuperscript{th} October 2014.
the Austrian government to support rights of Christians in Muslim countries (Akinyosoye, 2011), and in organising demonstrations to raise public attention on persecution of the Copt community in Egypt. However, the Egyptian uprising in 2011 seems to have decreased the reservations of Copts in Austria against the Muslim community and united the Egyptian community there (Akinyosoye, 2011): in 2013, a demonstration in Vienna’s city-centre gathered together Copts, Muslims and secular Egyptians to demand the resignation of the Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (ORF.AT, 2013). According to the President of the Ägyptische Klub, Mr. Osama El Halawani, Egyptian Christians and Muslims cooperate in Austria: for instance, on the 17th October 2014, representatives from Al-Azhar University, one of the most prestigious Sunni Islam’s universities, and the Coptic Church joined together in celebration for the 6th October 1973 victory over Israel at the club’s premises. Joint demonstrations involving Muslims and Copts against terroristic attacks in Egypt took place in Vienna (Cairo Post, 2014).

Remittances of Egyptian migrants in Austria show a positive trend in contrast with the current international financial crisis. According to the World Bank, in 2012 remittances flows from Austria to Egypt amounted to 76.42 million USD, corresponding to 0.372 percent of the total. From 2010 to 2012, they increased by 0.39 percent. According to the Austro-Arab Chamber of Commerce (AACC), in 2014 about 40 companies registered in Austria were running cross-border businesses with Egypt, which may suggest Egyptian migrants’ transnational economic activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 24: Remittances Inflows from Austria to Egypt (in USD millions), 2010-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances Inflows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total inflows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of inflows from Austria over the total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

29 Demonstrations were organized in 2008 and 2010. For further information please see: APA-OTC, 2008.
30 Interview with Mr. Osama El Halawani, President of the Ägyptische Klub, held on the 18th October 2014.
31 Interview with Ms. Leila Kaplan and Mr. Ahmed El-Matbouly, staff members of the Austro-Arab Chamber of Commerce (AACC), held on the 8th January 2015.
Concerning the characteristics of Egyptian migration in Austria, in 2013 the gender of Egyptian migrants holding Austrian nationality, was predominately masculine (i.e. 62 percent of the total were men). However, data of Egyptian citizen migrants are more gender-balanced (i.e. 2,616 females versus 2,610 males). This may suggest that male migration from Egypt has an older history than the female one. Indeed, the trend of female Egyptian citizen migrants show an increase since 2004 when they were 2,195 in number.

As regards the level of education, Egyptian migration to Austria is traditionally academic. According to Marcel Chahrour, this dates back to the 19th century when the Egyptian governor Muhammad Ali promoted Egyptian students’ enrolment in European educational institutions. In the period 1829-1914, approximately 50-80 students from Egypt were studying in Austria. Especially Egyptian medical students moved to Vienna, which was renowned as the "Mecca of medicine" at that time. However, those migratory flows were temporary since only a few students remained in Austria after finalising their studies while the majority returned to Egypt to use the acquired knowledge in their home country (Chahrour, 2007). This trend was confirmed during the post-Second World War period, when Egyptians migrating to Austria were mainly students and academics (Firdaous, 2009; Medien Servicestelle, 2013).

According to Sagun, this academic Egyptian migration was part of a general move of African students to Austria, which increased steadily from the early 1950s to early 1960s. In the winter semester of 1961/62, most of the African students in Austria (i.e. 639) were from Egypt (Sagun, 2013). According to the President of the Muslim Community in Carinthia and Styria the academic migration from Egypt to Europe in the 1950s was mainly due to the numerus clausus at the Egyptian universities. Before 1956, Egyptian students privileged the United Kingdom and France as destinations. Due to the 1956 diplomatic crisis that placed Egypt against France, the United Kingdom and Israel, they started to prefer Central Europe: Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. Migration from Egypt to Austria was mainly academic until the end of the 1960s. This trend slowed down when President Nasser removed the numerus clausus at the Egyptian universities to meet students’ requests expressed during a seven-day conference held in Alexandria in 1966. This traditional academic migration from Egypt to Austria has continued until the present: in 2011, 590 students from Egypt visited a school in Austria while 384 students with Egyptian citizenship were enrolled in Austrian

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32 Interview with Mr. Mohamed Gowaied, President of the Muslim Community in Carinthia and Styria, held on the 17th August 2013.
universities: 374 in public universities and 10 in private universities (Medien Servicestelle, 2013).

Egyptian migrants in Austria have a high level of education. Austria has the fourth largest number of Egyptian citizen migrants with tertiary education in Europe, and the fifth according to the number of those highly-skilled Egyptian-born migrants who acquired an EU country citizenship (International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 5/6).

Table 25: Egyptian Migrants by Level of Education (2014)\textsuperscript{33}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational level</th>
<th>Egyptian migrants</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary level</td>
<td>3,373</td>
<td>40.35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary level</td>
<td>2,427</td>
<td>29.03 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary level</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>30.61 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,359</td>
<td>100.00 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the OECD, around the 2000s the majority of Egyptian migrants in Austria held at least a secondary education (59.64 percent) and almost one-third had a tertiary education level (30.61 percent) (OECD Statistics, 2014).

\textsuperscript{33} The OECD database contains information on several demographic and labour market characteristics of the population of 28 OECD countries around the year 2000, by country of birth. The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997) was used as a baseline. Please see: UNESCO, 2006.
Table 26: Egyptian Migrants in European Countries with Tertiary Education Level (ISCED 5/6) by Egyptian Citizenship and Citizenship of the Country of Destination (2014)\textsuperscript{34}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Country of residence</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,697</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,888</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>6,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,765</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,791</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: OECD Statistics, 2014. Data extracted on the 2\textsuperscript{nd} February 2015.

\textsuperscript{34} Education levels are based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED; cf. UNESCO 1997), according to which level 5 corresponds to a first stage of tertiary education while level 6 to second stage of tertiary education. This latter leads to the award of an advanced research qualification such as a Ph.D.
As regards the field of study of Egyptians with a tertiary education level, the table below shows a strong prevalence of socio-juridical subjects (i.e. social science, business and law) with 32.67 percent, followed by applied sciences (i.e. engineering, manufacturing and construction) with 13.52 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of study</th>
<th>Egyptian migrants</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social science, business and law</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>32.67 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering, manufacturing and construction</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>13.52 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and humanities</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>10.63 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and welfare</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>10.39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>10.28 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>8.83 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>6.76 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>4.85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.88 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General programme</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.20 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ISCED 5/6</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,559</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Additionally, data from the 2001 Austrian census shows a high percentage of highly-skilled professionals among Egyptian workers in Austria (29.77 percent). Please see the table below.

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35 Data on the fields of study only cover the people with a tertiary education. The classification is made according to major fields of study according to ISCED 1997’s definitions.
Table 28: Stock of Egyptian-Born Employed Population in Austria (2001)\textsuperscript{36}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Egyptian employees in Austria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of employees from 1,2,3 categories over the total</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.77 %</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related trades workers</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>1,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,411</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistik Austria, 2001, Austria Census 2001, Stock of foreign-born employed population, aged 15 and over, in Austria, by country of birth and Occupation.

4.4 CONCLUSIONS

Egyptian highly-skilled migrants can be considered a case of brain gain more than brain drain. Their departure does not indeed affect the economy of Egypt since they are mostly working in sectors in which the local labour market is not developed enough to absorb them. They are instead instrumental to the enhancement of brain circulation. As Zohry’s survey highlighted, migrants are eager to be in touch with their country of origin and to be also helpful. Regarding migration to Gulf countries, there is already in place a pattern of circular migration that can facilitate the transfer of the new acquired skills and the employment of their social and financial remittances in productive investments. Even in the case of migration to OECD countries, where migrants may get permanent residency, the new technologies would allow brain circulation.

Compared to the movement of low-skilled workers, highly-skilled migration entails various advantages to the sending countries: highly-skilled migrants usually use more formal channels to transfer remittances thus strengthening the bank system; they are able to save more and therefore invest more in productive activities; their experience abroad is more enriching in terms of skills enhancement and therefore they are a superior source of knowledge and social remittances.

Highly-skilled workers in the OECD countries should be even more beneficial to Egypt’s development than the ones in the GCC countries: they are more exposed to innovative technologies and industrial systems; they are in contact with a different socio-political environment and therefore can be a vehicle to introduce new ideas in the country of origin and to enhance the political and social debate there; being more gender-balanced they can strengthen the female work force and ultimately reinforce the gender-sensitive approach in the Egyptian socio-political and economic system.

As concerns the Egyptian population in Austria, its size is small in comparison with other Egyptian communities in Europe such as in Italy. However, its potential contribution to the development of Egypt is high. The volume of remittance flows from Austria has been increasing steadily in the last years notwithstanding the financial crisis. Moreover, Egyptian migration to Austria is historically highly-skilled and composed of academic scholars and highly educated professionals. Finally, the presence of well-established Egyptian migrant organisations can facilitate the transfer of knowledge and social remittances to Egypt.
CHAPTER FIVE

EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES
TO FOSTER DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRANTS

In this chapter, the study analyses Egypt’s major policies on migration and development with a special focus on those aiming at enhancing highly-skilled migrants’ contribution to the development of the country. In addition, the study explores Egypt’s governmental measures on migration and development adopted towards Egyptian migrants settled in Austria. The analysis takes into account the good policy practices on migration and development for highly-skilled migrants identified in the third chapter. The policies listed in the tables are based on literature quoted in this chapter.

5.1 OVERVIEW OF EGYPTIAN POLICY FRAMEWORK ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

5.1.1 Increasing Remittances’ Development Impact: Improving Transfers’ Monitoring and Promoting Formal Channels for Remittances

In the past decades, Egypt tried repeatedly to encourage migrants to send remittances through formal channels. In the 1960s, the government required Egyptian emigrants to repatriate 25 percent of their income. The specific rate for migrants was reformed in the 1970s. At the beginning of the 1970s the government issued special bonds for emigrants to attract their remittances, while favourable exchange rates were offered in the 1980s (Jureidini et al., 2010; Ghoneim, 2009). Currently, the Egyptian government uses different instruments to support monitoring of remittances sent to Egypt. Article 12 of Law No. 80 of 2002 “Promulgating Anti-Money Laundering Law”, amended by Law No. 78 of 2003, imposes travellers into or from the country to declare the amount they carry if exceeding USD 10,000 or their equivalent in foreign currencies. This measure was reinforced recently by the Law
No. 88/2013 of the Central Bank and the Monetary Authority that forbids bringing in and taking out Egyptian or foreign currency through airmail or mail parcels as well as carrying out an amount exceeding USD 10,000 (Official Gazette, 2013). Meanwhile, in order to facilitate bank transfers, the main Egyptian banks apply low rates for international money transfers and ensure their presence in the main migrants’ destination countries through branches and agreements with local banks. Without officially targeting emigrants, Egyptian banks and the Egyptian Postal Service offer Internet and card services facilitating deposits and transactions from abroad together with business Internet services and account services tailored to SMEs.

However, these measures have proved to be unsuccessful since most migrants keep sending money through informal channels. As an IOM report highlights, part of migrants’ reluctance to use formal channels is related to their fear of delays and bureaucracy as well as to their low trust towards the Egyptian government (Jureidini et al., 2010). The IOM survey found a direct relationship between the education levels of migrants and their preference for formal channels of transfer. According to its finding, the larger the remittances’ volume and the higher the migrants’ education level, the more likely it is that these will prefer formal channels to transfer remittances (Jureidini et al., 2010). Finally, at the time of writing it has not been possible to find initiatives related to mass information campaigns and training courses on financial literacy, targeting migrants to increase their knowledge on the available services and supporting them into selecting the best options. Likewise, no government actions was found aimed at improving financial services regulation or increasing information on comparative costs of transfer of remittance, which would improve transparency of prices and services.
Table 29: Egyptian Policies to Improve Transfers’ Monitoring and Promote the Use of Formal Channels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Remittances’ development impact</strong></td>
<td><strong>Improve transfers’ monitoring</strong></td>
<td>Enhance transparency of money transfers</td>
<td>Under the article 12 of Law No. 80 of 2002 “Promulgating Anti-Money Laundering Law”, amended by Law No. 78 of 2003, travellers are entitled to carry foreign currency into or out of the country, provided that upon arrival they declare amounts exceeding USD 10,000, or their equivalent. Law No. 88/2013 of the Central Bank and the Monetary Authority forbids bringing in and taking out Egyptian or foreign currency through airmail or mail parcels as well as carrying out an amount exceeding USD 10,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decreasing transfer costs by promoting fair competition and pricing</td>
<td>Banks’ fees for transaction of remittances are lower than the ones applied by the Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) such as Western Union, Thomas Cook, and Money Gram. The value for transaction through banks was in 2003 7 percent compared to 12 percent through MTOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Encourage transfer through formal channels</strong></td>
<td>Increase access to remitting services</td>
<td>The two largest public banks in Egypt – the Bank Misr and the National Bank of Egypt - signed agreements with almost fifty-six exchange bureaus in other Arab countries and have a large number of branches in different parts of Egypt and other Arab countries. Bank Misr facilitates remittance transfers by lowering fees recipients of cash transfers. Arab Bank has one branch in Rome, Italy, and twelve in Egypt. Bank Misr has cooperation agreements with Banca di Roma in Italy, with Western Union and Money Gram which are heavily present in Egypt. Bank Misr and the National Bank of Egypt have introduced a new system of cards (similar to ATM cards) whereby migrants abroad can deposit their transfers at the exchange bureaus or cooperating banks using their bank card and the recipients in Egypt can withdraw the money by using another similar card. The Egyptian Postal Service variety of remittance services where migrants can pay government entities when abroad and can have remittances transferred electronically. The Egyptian Postal Service has developed a financial service through which migrants can send money to a specific person using their bank accounts abroad and the beneficiary can cash it in Egyptian Pounds by going to the Egyptian post office against a fee.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A consortium of Bank Misr (the largest public bank), Egypt Post, Commercial International Bank (the largest private bank) and a payment system expert organisation (Inclusion Group) is implementing a payment infrastructure in Egypt called the Giro-Nil. This company has also launched a range of interbank payment products, including salary and pension payments, bill payments, money orders and cash withdrawals.

Around fifteen banks have special programmes for SMEs although only five banks are active. These banks offer different services to SMEs, including business Internet services, tailored account services and call centres catered for the needs of SMEs.
5.1.2 Increasing Remittances’ Development Impact: Maximising Remittances Productivity

Since 2004, the Egyptian government has been reforming the investment environment in the country to make it business friendly. Its actions cover six main areas: legal framework, monetary and banking system, tax regulations, trade policy, investment policy, and the role of the private sector. Examples of established measures are: the establishment of a one-stop shop to expedite the creation of new businesses established by the General Authority for Free Zones and Investment (GAFI), special micro-finance programmes provided by the Social Fund for Development (SFD), and business creation programmes by the Industrial Modernization Center (IMC) to benefit SMEs and therefore small investors such as migrants.

Measures specifically targeting Egyptian migrants were introduced from 1983 through the mentioned Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111. This law grants financial benefits to encourage Egyptian emigrants abroad to invest in Egypt: exemption from all taxes and fees on the return made by Egyptian migrants on their deposits in any one of the Egyptian banks operating in Egypt; and the possibility to enjoy all the incentives and benefits that are provided to non-Egyptian investors in Egypt (ICMPD and IOM, 2010).

However, neither these financial benefits nor the reform of the business climate have succeeded to increase the rate of migrants’ investments in Egypt. In 2010, the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MME) conducted a study in collaboration with the IOM and the Italian Cooperation on the investment opportunities for migrants. This included an empirical survey of 200 households in Cairo and in the governorates of Menofeya, Fayoum and Sharkia on use of remittances (Jureidini et al., 2010). The survey findings show that in 2010 only 20 percent of remittance-receiving households were channelling remittances towards various forms of investment, while the rest (80 percent) was spending them for the daily needs of their families, including health care and education. Among the investors, the largest proportion (39 percent) invested in real estate, followed by 22 percent who invested in small private businesses employing fewer than five people. As per the rest, the main sectors were in an agricultural activity (11 percent), stock market/financial instruments (9 percent), medium private businesses employing fewer than 20 people (6 percent), and retail and transportation activities (4 percent each one). The remaining 5 percent of respondents includes those who reported participation in a group saving scheme as an investment (2 percent) and those investing in industrial activities and services (3 percent) (Jureidini et al., 2010).
In the last years the government has not actively involved Egyptian migrants in its strategy to increase investments in the country, probably to avoid social tensions. The study could not find any programme to promote income-generating activities or savings among migrants such as dedicated savings programmes, training on business creations or group investments. Investment opportunities are open to all Egyptians such as the recent possibility to buy bonds to finance the project for the enlargement of the Suez Canal (Ahram Online, 2014), whose price is much higher for foreign than Egyptian investors (Bouyamourn and Al-Sayegh, 2014).

Nevertheless, specific programmes targeting migrants would not be necessary if the investment climate in Egypt was further improved by eliminating the left bottlenecks for small business creation. In the 2010 survey, migrants’ households declared as main reasons

Table 30: Different Uses of Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uses of Remittances</th>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Percentage of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General household expenses</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family expenses</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property investment</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal items</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital investment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergencies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To finance a marriage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing specific</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insignificant amount</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>213.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jureidini et al., 2010.
for not investing pre-existing financial constraints, limited or no access to formal credit, poor adequate infrastructures in their governorate and high taxes (Jureidini et al., 2010). Another survey conducted by IOM on Egyptian diasporas in Kuwait, USA and the UK37 shows that Egyptians in the West are less interested in investment opportunities in Egypt than their counterparts in the Arab countries, allegedly less educated, (57.1% vs. 79.1% of respondents). According to Zohry, one explanation can be that Egyptians in the West have the opportunity to invest in their countries of destination whereas Arab countries do not offer this option to foreigners. However, in this survey Egyptian migrants allege fear of delays due to bureaucracy and low trust towards the government, especially as regards the Western diaspora. These latter complainants also refer to missing transparency and accountability, while Egyptians working in the Gulf are mostly prevented from investing in Egypt by poor information and infrastructures (Zohry and Debnath, 2010). Indeed, the IOM study confirms that migrants’ households do not know the services provided by GAFI and SFD.

These data suggest that a stronger transparency and accountability framework would address Egyptian nationals’, including migrants, low trust towards the government and their perception of high level of corruption in the country. The climate for small business is still restrained. Although regulations in Egypt do not discriminate explicitly against SMEs, they do not provide either any incentives or special treatment to support them. Many bottlenecks are still present such as cumbersome procedures, high taxes, and bureaucratic delays that prevent a company start-up. Moreover, out of the new industrial cities investors are not supported by adequate infrastructures. There are also overlaps between different institutions, such as GAFI, SFD and the Industrial Development Authority, and IMC (affiliated with the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and between different laws and governmental decrees (Jureidini et al., 2010).

Moreover, the government looks feebly active in promoting the existing investment opportunities among migrants and their offspring. Although there is a section on investment projects in the different Egyptian governorates in the MME’s website,38 this information is only uploaded in the Arabic language and is not available in English, thereby excluding second generation migrants that do not speak Arabic. The MME has hosted conferences to encourage

37 The survey used the Snowball sampling technique, which is used when the particular type of research respondents are difficult to locate. Snowball sampling relies on referrals from initial respondents/subjects to generate contacts for additional potential research subjects. While this technique has cost and other advantages, its use introduces bias because it reduces the likelihood that the sample will represent a good cross section of the research population.

38 For further information please see the website of the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, Arab Republic of Egypt, available at: http://www.emigration.gov.eg/ (Last accessed on the 11th September 2014)
migrants’ investments, but the last one dates back to 2009 (Dawood, 2012). No information campaign has been put in place to inform Egyptian diasporas and returned migrants of the available incentives and programmes for income-generating activities. Likewise, it has not been possible to find training courses for enterprise start-ups and development targeting small investors or specifically migrants abroad or in Egypt.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances’ development impact</td>
<td>Maximize remittances’ productivity</td>
<td>Encourage group investments in community development projects</td>
<td>No measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promote income-generating activities</td>
<td>The website of the MME provides Egyptian emigrants with news on investment opportunities in Egypt. The SFD offers small lines of credit to new investors through twenty-eight branch offices in various governorates. The GAFI has established a one-stop shop to expedite the establishment of new businesses within seventy-two hours (with the exception of those related to health). The IMC established ten business incubation centres, in addition to programmes specially designed for industrial clusters where SMEs have more chances to benefit. Several organisations, including business associations, provide micro-finance with the help of the SFD. Banks and international donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provide specific programmes for SMEs. Since 2007, there is a new stock exchange for SMEs, called NILEX, which is the first of its kind in the Middle East region. It aims primarily to provide access for SMEs to finances which cannot be registered, due to their size, in the normal Egyptian stock exchange. The main investment law in Egypt, Investment Incentives and Guarantees Law 8/1997 and its amendments, allow automatic registration of a company, including SMEs or projects with low capital, upon presenting an application to the Companies Department under the umbrella of GAFI. The Law 111/1983 details a series of incentives designed to encourage the Egyptian diaspora to invest in Egypt, including exemption from all taxes and fees on the return made by Egyptian diasporas on their deposits in any one of the Egyptian banks operating in Egypt. The same law allows the Egyptian diasporas to enjoy all the incentives and benefits that are provided.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to non-Egyptian (foreign) investors in Egypt.
The MME hosted conferences targeting migrants to encourage investments in Egypt (last one in 2009).

| Improve investments climate (indirect targeting) | The capital requirement for starting a new business has been decreased by 80 percent – from EGP 50,000 to 1,000 (28 percent of per capita income). Measures to promote access to the free economic and industrial zones, easing company and tax laws, lowering banking charges and exchange rates to enhance investments. |
| Stimulate indirect investment of remittances | No measures. |
5.1.3 Increasing Development Impact of Migrants’ Knowledge and Social Remittances:  
Facilitating Brain Circulation

The government of Egypt has undertaken limited actions to boost brain circulation. The study could find only one programme taking advantage of the virtual return option: the EC / UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative, which follows the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006. The initiatives aim to sustain community organisations and NGOs to contribute more fully to linking migration and development in sixteen select target countries through a call for proposals in four priority areas: a) migrant remittances; b) migrant communities; c) migrants’ capacities; and d) migrants’ rights. In 2009, the EC financed in Egypt three pilot projects facilitating skills transfer from migrants’ communities abroad\(^39\) described in the table n.32 below.

The government has been more active in facilitating professional networks among diaspora members although mostly those settled in the USA. In 1973, the Egyptian government supported the establishment of the Association of Egyptian American Scholars whose aim is to facilitate the academic cooperation between the diaspora in USA and Egypt.\(^40\) This includes inter alia offering grants and research fellowships, and supplying scientific equipment and material to Egyptian educational and research institutions. Through the Visiting Scholar Program the association assists in matching scholars of Egyptian origin who reside in the USA and Canada with recognised academic or professional status in Egypt to provide services in their area of expertise. Additionally, the Egyptian Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Universities signed two memoranda of understanding with two major partners in the USA. The first agreement builds a partnership between the George Mason University and Cairo University to establish an international branch of the College of Commerce in Cairo University. This agreement should help improve research and exchange of expertise between the two universities. The second agreement is with the American Association of State Colleges and Universities to create cooperation programs between the higher-education institutions in both countries that will promote faculty development through joint research projects and faculty exchanges.

\(^{39}\) For further information, please see Migration4Development’s website, available at: www.migration4development.org/content/Egypt (Last accessed on the 11\(^{th}\) September 2014).

\(^{40}\) Please see the official website available at http://www.aeascholars.org/ (Last accessed on the 11\(^{th}\) September 2014).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Implementing organisation</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Main objectives</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability in Development Projects: Joint Egyptian-Cypriot Initiative</td>
<td>Citizens for Development Foundation Middle East Development Dialogue and Solidarity</td>
<td>Raise the capacity of Local NGOs in Upper Egypt to implement sustainable development projects.</td>
<td>Provide local NGOs in the least developed governorates in Upper Egypt, with needed knowledge and skills to build sustainable development projects. Help both the Arab migrant community in Cyprus and Egyptian community in general understand the development needs and prerequisites in the least developed governorates in Upper Egypt, explore their potential futuristic role in developing these areas and foster future cooperation.</td>
<td>160,710 Euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial “Knowledge”: Towards Arab German-Egyptian Women Development Experience</td>
<td>The Arab Expatriates Department at the League of Arab States in cooperation with the Deutsch-Arab Friendship Association in Berlin</td>
<td>Enhance the level of Egyptian women's participation in the economy through acquiring knowledge, skills and work behaviour on small-scale projects from female Arab migrant entrepreneurs in Germany.</td>
<td>Enhance the knowledge of Egyptian female entrepreneurs on small-scale projects through transferring “entrepreneurial skills” to them from skilled Migrant Arab businesswomen in Germany. Develop networks and partnerships between Arab migrant businesswomen in Germany and their counterparts in the Arab countries, especially in Egypt. Support Arab migrant businesswomen in Germany to get better information about job and investment opportunities, and the current situation in their home countries in general and in Egypt in particular.</td>
<td>198,900 Euro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Skills Transfer in the Aquaculture Industry: The case of Greece and Egypt</td>
<td>Athens Network of Collaborating Experts Egyptian Agribusiness Association, Egypt</td>
<td>Facilitate the staffing and development of the Egyptian aquaculture and fisheries industries.</td>
<td>Facilitate knowledge exchange and transfer from Egyptian expatriates working in the industry in Greece.</td>
<td>200,000 Euro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) is a programme promoting temporary migration to Italy, one of the largest recipients of Egyptian migration flows. Financed by the Italian Cooperation and managed by IOM Egypt with the MME’s endorsement, the project started in 2001 and became self-sustaining in 2004 after the IOM withdrew. The project’s objectives are to improve the social conditions of Egyptian migrants by reinforcing their cultural and economic ties with their country of origin, and to channel human and financial resources resulting from migration in order to benefit the economic development in Egypt. One of the main achievements is a database for the Egyptian community in Italy, which helps the government undertake policy decisions targeting this community, and assist this latter to trace the social and economic developments in Egypt. Another outcome is the MME’s website, already mentioned in the previous section. This website provides Egyptian migrants with news on investment opportunities in Egypt. Additionally, it provides a match-making service between Egyptian workers and job opportunities abroad as well as within foreign companies in Egypt. However, both the website and the database are focusing on low-skilled workers.

Egypt has signed some agreements to promote circular or temporary migration of Egyptian workers. The main one is the Agreement of the Council of Arab Economic Unity that Egypt signed in 1965. Its objective was to achieve the economic integration of the region within the framework of economic and social development. The agreement was meant to provide for freedoms of movement, employment and residence and to abolish some restrictions on movement within the region (Ghoneim, 2009). It was ratified by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and Palestine. As a follow-up to this agreement, the Arab Declaration of Principles on the Movement of Manpower adopted in 1984 stressed the need to give preference to Arab nationals and called for intra-regional cooperation. Additionally, Egypt is part of the World Trade Organisation’s GATS mode 4 for the liberalisation of services, the main international agreement for the enhancement of highly-skilled labour mobility. However, until now the government has not actively promoted its application. Although various Egyptian enterprises have branches in OECD countries, few Egyptian managers work there, mainly because of the private sector’s ignorance of major international treaties concerning trade and labour mobility in particular of the main aspects of the GATS mode 4. Moreover, the government has never included the GATS mode 4 in labour agreements with other countries, such as in the case of Italy. However, lately the government

41 In the case of Gulf countries this service is carried out by private recruitment agencies licensed by the MME. For more information please see: Ghoneim, 2009a.
explored ways to enhance the application of GATS mode 4 within its relationship with the EU. In 2010, the Ministry of Economic Development Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt in collaboration with the World Bank published the report “Arab Republic of Egypt Prospects of Deeper Integration with the European Union through the Movement of Natural Persons”. The objective of the paper is to support the government of Egypt in formulating a negotiation position regarding temporary labour migration within the context of the ENP (Egyptian Ministry of Economic Development Government and World Bank, 2010), including the application of the GATS mode 4. Furthermore, the government is negotiating bilateral agreements with Canada, France and Germany to facilitate highly-skilled temporary and permanent emigration from Egypt (Sika, 2010).

Overall, although the above mentioned measures adopted by Egypt’s government can potentially generate knowledge sharing and brain gain they risk having a limited impact. Instead of being integrated in a comprehensive and holistic governmental plan, they remain single and separate initiatives. Moreover, the government’s fragmented approach is visible in the lack of coordination between some ministries despite the availability of different migration divisions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior (Sika, 2010). As described in more detail in the next section, although since 1997 the Higher Committee for Migration gathers representatives from a large number of ministries that deal with migration issues in order to enhance cooperation, its performance has been considered modest (Ghoneim, 2009).

Egypt especially lacks an industrial and research environment that enables highly-skilled migrants to employ their expertise. This discourages them to come back even temporarily. The future technology park promoted by Ahmed Zewail is a positive step in this direction. However, it is not accompanied by measures supporting the creation of niche enterprises able to employ educated workers (Zewail, 2011).

Additionally, brain circulation risks to be jeopardised also by the mismatch between Egypt’s current education supply and the skills demand in OECD countries where highly-skilled migrants risk to be employed in a post under their qualifications. For instance, although the labour agreement signed with Italy in 2006 foresees a quota of 7,000 Egyptian workers allowed to move to Italy, the number of actual migrants sent from Egypt was quite low due to the difficulties in finding skilled labour matching the requirements of the Italian enterprises: only about 160-200 Egyptian people moved to work in Italy while the rest of the quota was used to regularise Egyptian migrants already in Italy under an illegal status (e.g. about 5,000 individuals) (Ghoneim, 2009).
### Table 33: Egyptian Policies to Facilitate Brain Circulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase development impact of migrants’ knowledge and social remittances</td>
<td>Facilitate brain circulation</td>
<td>Virtual return</td>
<td>Projects within the EC / UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative. Association of Egyptian American Scholars established a Visiting Scholar Program to assist in matching scholars of Egyptian origin who reside in the United States and Canada with recognised academic or professional status in Egypt to provide services in their area of expertise. Memorandum of understanding between George Mason University in the USA and Cairo University in Egypt to build an international branch of the college of Commerce in Cairo University and enhance research and the exchange of expertise between the two universities. Memorandum of understanding between the Supreme Council of Universities and American Association of State Colleges and Universities to create cooperation programs between the higher-education institutions in both countries that will promote faculty development through joint research projects and faculty exchanges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Temporary return</td>
<td>The 1983 Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111 set the migrants’ right to return to their jobs in the public sector within two years of the date of emigration. The MME created a database for the migrant Egyptian community in Italy. The MME website provides match-making job opportunities for Egyptians abroad and in Egypt within foreign companies. The government is negotiating three agreements primarily concerned with highly-skilled temporary and permanent emigration from Egypt: with Canada concerning highly-skilled Egyptian migrants in the fields of Energy and Construction; with Germany and France for the creation of quotas for both temporary and permanent Egyptian technical labour migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent return</td>
<td>The MME created a database for the migrant Egyptian community in Italy. Ahmed Zewail, Nobel laureate in Chemistry, is establishing a technological park in Cairo, the “Zewail City of Science &amp; Technology”. This is an independent non-profit institution of higher learning in science and technology using a merit-based approach that aims to attract highly-skilled Egyptians migrated abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular migration</td>
<td>The EC/UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative: “Migrant Skills Transfer in the Aquaculture Industry: The case of Greece and Egypt” supports the permanent return of Egyptian migrants in Greece through a reception office, a website, and a workshop in Athens informing migrants of job opportunities in Egypt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Circular migration Agreement of the Council of Arab Economic Unity in 1965 meant to provide for freedoms of movement, employment and residence and to abolish some restrictions on movement within the region. Egypt joined the World Trade Organisation’s GATS mode 4, the main international agreement for the enhancement of the highly-skilled labour mobility within the liberalisation of services. Report “Arab Republic of Egypt Prospects of Deeper Integration with the European Union through the Movement of Natural Persons”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1.4 Increasing Development Impact of Migrants’ Knowledge and Social Remittances: Engaging Diasporas

Since the early 1980s, Egypt has developed a legal and institutional framework dedicated to regulate Egyptian migration flows and to protect migrants abroad. The main component is the Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111 issued in 1983 with the goal of supporting the country to maintain strong ties with Egyptians abroad. As noted previously, the law distinguishes between temporary and permanent migration. Its main features are a section dedicated to Egyptian migrant’s rights and providing for care and facilities before their departure from Egypt, after their arrival in host countries, and once they decide to return to their homeland.

The MME has been responsible for regulating migration and supporting Egyptians abroad since 1996 (Ghoneim, 2009). Through bilateral agreements, the Ministry of Migration and Manpower is pursuing a twofold strategy: first, to ensure that migration flows from Egypt are legal and organised; and second, to increase them by boosting the international demand for Egyptian labour migrants. For this reason, the government is trying to open new venues for Egyptian migrants in Africa, and to ensure the legality of migration flows from Egypt to the EU (Sika, 2010). According to the MME, Egypt has signed 12 bilateral agreements with OECD and Arab countries to enhance migration there. Recent agreements were signed with Libya (in 2010), Sudan (in 2004), and Jordan (in 2007) to revitalize regulations on Egyptian migration (Fargues, 2013). Regarding Arab countries, the referent framework is the already mentioned Agreement of the Council of Arab Economic Unity of 1965 and the following Arab Declaration of Principles on the Movement of Manpower. Although most of these agreements with Arab countries were signed a long time ago, between 1974 and 1993, they are still functional to solve problems of integration and to regulate Egyptians’ status and rights there.

Concerning Europe, Egypt signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 2001, which was followed by the Action Plan within the context of the ENP signed in 2007 (Ghoneim, 2009). These documents contain provisions related to the living and working conditions of legally settled migrant communities, the prevention of illegal migration, and the reduction of migratory pressures. However, provisions to enhance highly-skilled migration are missing, although the UE and Egypt are undertaking negotiations for a broad free trade agreement that cover services with Egypt (Egyptian Ministry of Economic Development Government and
However, since the EU member states maintain full discretion to administer, grant and refuse visas for workers, migration flows to Europe are managed through bilateral agreements. Egypt has signed bilateral agreements only with Italy and Greece, although others with France and Cyprus are expected to follow. The agreement with Greece was signed in 1981 and aims to regulate migrant flows with Greece. However, its current status is uncertain since the two governments are negotiating adjustments (Ghoneim, 2009a). As mentioned previously, the government is negotiating agreements with Canada, France and Germany to facilitate highly-skilled migration (Sika, 2010). With Italy, there is a labour agreement that was signed in 2006 to regulate legal migrant flows to Italy, specifying a certain quota of Egyptian labour to migrate to Italy on an annual basis according to the demand of the Italian labour market. Besides this, a joint declaration was signed in 2010 to enhance and regulate seasonal labour migration (2010) and memorandum of understanding in 2011 to establish new modalities of cooperation and establishment of a local coordination office in Egypt to select labour migrants to go to Italy (Fargues, 2013). The quota started in 2007 with 7,000 migrants, and was increased in 2008 up to 8,000. This treaty is accompanied by a readmission agreement, which establishes that migrants have no right to be granted a legal status to ensure that such a deal will not encourage irregular migration. Therefore, as in the case of the association agreement the focus of the entire package, completed by the previously mentioned IMIS project, is rather to fight illegal migration to Italy than to promote temporary migration and to introduce measures to boost development.

Another component of Egypt’s policy framework on migration is the mentioned Higher Committee for Migration. Its establishment was stipulated explicitly in Law 111/1983 but was only set up in 1997. The HCM is headed by the MME and includes representatives from a large number of ministries that deal with migration issues in order to enhance cooperation. Its competences include also maintaining linkages with migrants and protecting them abroad by setting up of professional training centres for potential migrants, providing Egyptians abroad with media and cultural material to maintain ties with their homeland including teaching Arabic to migrants’ children, and supporting efforts by Egyptian religious bodies to maintain the spiritual heritage of Egyptians abroad. However, according to Ghomein (2009) this body does not in reality exercise all its competences and until now its performance has

42 The Egyptian-European association Agreement signed on the 25 June 2001 foresees the establishment of a free trade zone during a transitional period not exceeding twelve years. Please see the website of the Embassy of Egypt in Vienna, Austria: http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Embassies/Egyptian_Embassy_Vienna/BilateralRelations/Pages/Contractualframework.aspx (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015)
been modest, particularly in negotiating agreements protecting legal rights of migrants abroad and finding political solutions to those migrants.

The end of Mubarak’s regime in 2011 started a process to involve more Egyptian migrants in Egypt’s affairs. Their rights and interests have received constitutional guarantee and their contribution to the development of Egypt given official recognition through article 88 of the 2014 Constitution of Egypt: “The State shall safeguard the interests of Egyptians living abroad, protect them and protect their rights and freedoms, enable them to perform their public duties towards the State and society, and encourage their contribution to the development of the nation” (WIPO, 2014).

Voting rights of Egyptian migrants have been reinforced as well. Although in the past Egyptians could not vote while abroad (Zohry and Debnath, 2010), since 2011 this has been allowed through the Law 130: during the parliamentary and presidential elections following the end of Mubarak’s regime, Egyptian migrants could vote through the embassies after registering online. However, in practice the vote was limited to few of them since no campaign was launched to advertise the online voting system and some requirements, such as a valid identity card, excluded Egyptians that could not renew their national identity card in time (Dawood, 2012). Furthermore, the right to run for presidential elections has been restricted in terms of nationality through article 26 of the Constitutional Declaration issued by the Egyptian Supreme Council of Armed Forces on the 30th March 2011 to rule the parliamentary and presidential election processes held respectively in 2011 and 2012. The article states that in order to be eligible for the presidency, the candidate must never have held another citizenship, must be born of two Egyptian parents who have never held another citizenship, and must not be married to a non-Egyptian (Supreme Council of Armed Forces, 2011). This provision has been reiterated by article 141 of the new 2014 Constitution, after passing a referendum held in January 2014: “A presidential candidate must be an Egyptian born to Egyptian parents, and neither he or his parents or his spouse may have held any other nationality” (WIPO, 2014). This excludes de facto most second generation migrants as well as migrants with a foreign spouse.

Before the 2011 uprising, Egyptians abroad could not be elected in the parliament and therefore Egyptian diaspora had no political representation. The 2014 constitution offered this possibility through article 244 which guarantees that Egyptians living abroad can be elected in the first House of Representatives and calls for a law to regulate their participation (WIPO, 2014). A new law regulating parliamentary elections was approved in June 2014. According to it, for the coming parliamentary elections only, each electoral list should include at least
one member from Egypt’s expatriates. However, running elections is restricted to those permanently residing outside Egypt: they should either have a permanent residence or have lived abroad for at least ten years before running for the elections (Taha and Kortam, 2014).

As regards double nationality, under the Egyptian Citizenship Law, Law No. 26 of 1975 as amended by Law No. 154 of 2004, acquiring another citizenship is prohibited unless the Egyptian citizenship is renounced. However, circumstances exist where it is possible to hold dual citizenship, pending approval by the Ministry of Interior.43 Moreover, in 2004 the 1975 Citizenship Law was reformed to guarantee women the right to transmit their nationality to their children. The reform’s implementation regarding children born before the adoption of the law varies, however, according to the citizenship of the foreign father (Fargues, 2013).

A legal issue that hampers especially young migrants to stay close with their country of origin is the compulsory military service. Any Egyptian youth under the age of 30 years, regardless of their place of birth, must go through military service as long as they are holding the Egyptian nationality. The only way to get exemption is through obtaining a document from the Egyptian government exempting them from the service. However, the government mission entrusted to issue this document rarely goes abroad and thus they are not able to timely obtain documents exempting them from this requirement. For this reason, migrants often avoid registering in the embassies and visiting their homeland for fear of legal actions in absence of this exemption document. The Ministry of Defence should either consider sending missions more frequently to the countries with major Egyptian diaspora to help clarify and resolve the issues associated with compulsory military service or to allow embassies to do it (Zohry and Debnath, 2010).

The government has made a few attempts to map Egyptian migrants and determine their potential contribution to Egypt’s development. Various ministries partake in the regular collection of data on migrants: the MME emigration section aims at establishing an integrated database on Egyptians abroad; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collects data on Egyptian migrants in the OECD through its consulates abroad (Dawood, 2012); and the Ministry of Interior maintains a computerised population register (i.e. a national number card) for all Egyptian citizens and is updated whenever a citizen leaves the country legally. The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research plays a role in the collection of data specific to

43 According to the Article 10 of this law, ‘[…] a permission to acquire a foreign nationality may also comprise the permission for him, his wife and minor children to retain the Egyptian nationality. If within a period not exceeding one year from the date he acquires the foreign nationality, he declares his wish to benefit thereby, they shall retain their Egyptian nationality despite their obtaining of the foreign nationality.’ However, Egyptians holding dual citizenship enjoy all civic rights except to be member of the People’s Assembly and to be President of Egypt.
highly-skilled migrants since Egyptians wishing to study abroad have to obtain a permit from the ministry and to re-register on return (Eurostat, 2009). However, until now these data have not been used to map diaspora communities, their needs and potential engagement towards Egypt.

As mentioned previously, the government tries to map and profile migrant communities in Italy as part of the IMIS project but this collects mainly data from low-skilled migrants. An ongoing project in collaboration with the IOM, “Enhancing Existing Bonds between the Egyptian Diaspora and their Homeland”, aims at conducting fact-finding assessments in various countries hosting a significant Egyptian migrant community, and assisting the MME to link emigration policy with economic and social development and enhance existing bonds between Egyptian migrants abroad and their country of origin (IOM, 2010a; Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue, 2012).

Although various Egyptian migrants associations have been established abroad, especially following the 2011 uprising, it has not been possible to find governmental initiatives involving them to promote transfer of social remittances or implement development projects. Moreover, the role of embassies and consulates is limited to provide consular and administrative services and these latter are considered too expensive (Zohry and Debnath, 2010), while it could be enhanced to strengthen ties between migrants and Egypt by offering a space to migrants associations to interact and formulate development initiatives. However, the main obstacle to engage Egyptian diaspora has been until now the prevalent culture of mistrust towards Mubarak’s regime. Migrants are used to avoiding contacting the embassies for fear of being controlled by the government while abroad. This has hampered the collection of data about migrants and any attempt to engage them in the country’s development (Zohry and Debnath, 2010).

To establish a dialogue with Egyptian communities abroad, in 1985 the government established the General Union for Egyptians Abroad, a consultative body composed of three returned Egyptian migrants and twelve migrants still abroad. Although this initiative should support the government in determining needs and wishes of Egyptian communities abroad and so put in place tailor-made policies, migrants’ mistrust towards the government’s interference seems to hamper its effectiveness (Al-Jalia Magazine, 2011). Another initiative

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44 For instance, the Alliance of Egyptian Americans supports the Coalition of the Youths of the 25th January Revolution. Its mission statement is to promote democracy, sustainable development and social justice in Egypt. For further information, please see the Alliance of Egyptian Americans’ website, available at: http://aeamisr.org/ (Last accessed on the 11th September 2014)
in this direction was a series of conferences targeting Egyptians abroad organised by the MME. However, the latest one was held in Cairo in July 2009.\textsuperscript{45} 

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{45} The conference focused on how to facilitate migrants’ contribution to Egypt’s development. Specific topics were: a) enhancing development process in Egypt and the investment environment and conditions, b) enhancing interaction with 2nd and 3\textsuperscript{rd} generation migrants, c) exploring communication sector in Egypt d) exploring political participation and the democracy process in Egypt. For further information please see: Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue, 2012.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase development impact of migrants’ knowledge and social remittances</td>
<td>Engage diasporas</td>
<td>Identify diasporas’ potential added value to the development agenda in the country of origin</td>
<td>The MME created a database for the migrant Egyptian community in Italy; Various ministries collaborate in the collection of emigrants’ data: e.g. the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research maintain of register of Egyptians studying abroad; Since 1985 the General Union for Egyptians Abroad, a consultative body the composed of three returned Egyptian migrants and twelve migrants, facilitates dialogue between the government and the Egyptian migrant communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage migrants’ development Initiatives</td>
<td>No measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate political representation of migrants in their country of origin</td>
<td>Under the Egyptian Citizenship Law, Law No. 26 of 1975 as amended by Law No. 154 of 2004, acquiring another citizenship is prohibited unless the Egyptian citizenship is renounced. Circumstances however exist where it is possible to hold dual citizenship, pending approval by the Ministry of Interior. Under the same law as amended by Law No. 154 of 2004, women can transmit their nationality to their children. Law 130 of 2011: during the following parliamentary and presidential elections Egyptians could vote through the embassies after registering online. The 2014 constitution guarantees the political representation of Egyptians abroad. The 2014 Law regulating parliamentary elections provide a quota of seats for Egyptians abroad. Any Egyptian under the age of 30 years, regardless of their place of birth, must go through military service. There is the possibility to get exemption through obtaining a document from the Egyptian government exempting them from the service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase migrants’ confidence towards their country of origin</td>
<td>The 1983 Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111 contains a chapter dedicated to migrant’s right and one of its main objectives is to outline the provisions for care and facilities to Egyptian emigrants before their departure from Egypt, after their arrival in host countries, and once they decide to return to Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Area</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1974 and 1993</td>
<td>Egypt has signed 12 bilateral agreements with OECD and Arab countries to enhance migration. Concerning Europe, Egypt has signed agreements with Italy and Greece and agreements with France and Cyprus are expected to follow. Agreements with Canada, France and Germany for highly-skilled migration are under negotiations. Egypt signed an Association Agreement with the EC in 2001, which was followed by the Action Plan within the context of the ENP signed in March 2007. These documents contain provisions related to the living and working conditions of legally settled migrant communities, the prevention of illegal migration, and the reduction of migratory pressures. The article 88 of the 2014 Constitution of Egypt introduces rights and protections for Egyptians living abroad and recognise their contribution to the development of Egypt.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain migrants’ cultural linkage with country of origin</td>
<td>Since 1997, the Higher Committee for Migration facilitates inter-ministerial cooperation. Its competences includes maintaining linkages with migrants and protecting them abroad by setting up of professional training centres for potential migrants, providing Egyptians abroad with media and cultural material to maintain ties with their homeland including teaching Arabic to migrants’ children, and supporting efforts by Egyptian religious bodies to maintain the spiritual heritage of Egyptians abroad.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage transfer of social remittances</td>
<td>No measures.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS EGYPTIAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRIA

Egyptian - Austrian relations are regulated by sixteen agreements, including treaties, memoranda of understanding and letters of intent. With the 2001 Egyptian-European Association Agreement as a framework, ratified by Austria in 2004, most of the agreements between Egypt and Austria concern economic and trade topics such as avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion, encouraging and protecting investments, as well as cooperation in agriculture, tourism, and in the field of transport. Besides economic matters, cooperation between the two countries covers as well health care, technical and industrial technology, and culture.46

Various institutions have been established to facilitate economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. The Agreement on Economic, Industrial, Technical and Technological Cooperation signed in 1996 and entered into force in 2000, established a Joint Committee on Technical and Economic Cooperation. Two rounds of the joint committee were held in 2005.47

In 1987, the Austro - Egyptian Chamber of Commerce (AECC) was established in Vienna, following the decision of the Joint Committee of Economic Cooperation. The chamber of commerce represented a group of Egyptian and Austrian companies and businesspersons seeking various forms of cooperation with both countries. Half of its board’s members were based in Egypt and half in Austria. The main purpose of AECC was to enhance and promote the bilateral economic and commercial relations between Austria and Egypt but its activities included a social and cultural component. The AECC offered various services to its members such as legal advice on import and export procedures, information on Egyptian legislation and regulations, and economic data as well as on trade and investment conditions between Austria and Egypt, information about exports and imports opportunities in both countries, organisation of seminars, workshops and social events, market research, fairs and exhibitions assistance, partner, agent and representative research.48 However, in 2011 the AECC was

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46 For a full list please see the website of the Embassy of Egypt in Vienna, Austria: http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Embassies/Egyptian_Embassy_Vienna/BilateralRelations/Pages/Contractualframework.aspx (Last accessed on the 11th September 2014).

47 Please see the above mentioned website of the Embassy of Egypt in Vienna, Austria.

48 It is still possible to see the AECC’s website, available at: http://aecc1.tripod.com/index.html (Last accessed on the 11th September 2014)
incorporated into the AACC that supports business between Austria and the Arab Countries.\textsuperscript{49} Under the umbrella of the General Union of Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for Arab Countries and the League of Arab States, since 1989 the AACC aims at enhancing economic and trade activities between Austria and the Arab region. Among its services it provides members with information and network services and lobbying at official institutions.

For instance, for many years it has organised the Arab-Austrian Economic Forum and Exhibition in Vienna. The event gathers institutional personalities from Austria and Arab countries together with companies, enterprises and international institutions to facilitate networking opportunities and personal introduction to potential future business partners in the Austro-Arab context.\textsuperscript{50} 51

Finally, an agreement signed in 2006 established a Joint Egyptian-Austrian Business Council. The council consists of an Egyptian and an Austrian chapter and its main objectives are: a) promotion of trade between Egypt and Austria; b) development of industrial and technological collaboration between Egyptian and Austrian economic institutions and enterprises; c) collection, analysis, evaluation and diffusion of information relating to trade, industrial and technological cooperation, and investment to the mutual benefit of Egypt and Austria.\textsuperscript{52} The last session was held in 2009.\textsuperscript{53}

Concerning the activities of the Egyptian embassy in Austria on migration and development, the Commercial Office provides information for Austrian companies on establishing offices/exporting in Egypt (and sometimes to Egyptian companies that want to establish offices/export in Austria).\textsuperscript{54} However, it does not offer services specifically to migrants. Instead, the Cultural Office of the Egyptian Embassy in Vienna, Austria, is active in

\textsuperscript{49} For further information, please see AACC’s website, at the following page:\url{http://www.aacc.at/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=16} (Last accessed on the 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2014)

\textsuperscript{50} For further information, please see AACC’s website, at the following page:\url{http://www.aacc.at/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=110&Itemid=119} (Last accessed on the 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2014)

\textsuperscript{51} Interview with Ms. Leila Kaplan and Mr. Ahmed El-Matbouly, staff members of the Austro-Arab Chamber of Commerce (AACC), held on the 8\textsuperscript{th} January 2015.

\textsuperscript{52} For further information please see information provided by Advantage Austria at: \url{http://www.advantageaustria.org/eg/oesterreich-in-egypt/news/local/news_11227.en.html} (Last accessed on the 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2014)

\textsuperscript{53} For further information please see the website of the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Vienna, Austria, available at: \url{http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Embassies/Egyptian_Embassy_Vienna/BilateralRelations/Pages/Contractualframework.aspx} (Last accessed on the 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2014)

\textsuperscript{54} For further information please see the above mentioned website of the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Vienna, Austria.
maintaining cultural ties of Egyptian migrants in Austria with their homeland: it organises every week a cultural event such as concerts, films projections, and lectures on Egyptian culture. It also offers courses of the Egyptian Arabic language, although mainly for Austrians. The Cultural Attaché of the Egyptian Embassy in Vienna between 2012 and 2013 facilitated twenty-eight memoranda of understanding between Austrian and Egyptian universities aimed at supporting exchange of PhD students and researchers. The exchange programme is funded from the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education (75 percent) and the Austrian programme “Österreichischer Akademischer Austauschdienst” (25 percent).55

55 Interview with Mr. Morsí Abu-Youssef, Cultural Attaché of Egyptian Embassy in Vienna, held on the 16th August 2013.
Since the mid-1970s, Egypt has facilitated emigration mostly as a vent valve for the labour market, especially for low-skilled workers, with the purpose to decrease the unemployment rate. Meanwhile, the government strategy on migration and development has been passive, especially towards highly-skilled migrants. The laws to facilitate money transfers and investments as well as the recent reform of the business climate are more oriented to attract big foreign investors than small investors such as migrants. Governmental agencies and banks provide services for SMEs but small business creation is hampered by inadequate infrastructures, cumbersome procedures, high taxes, and bureaucratic delays. Meanwhile, no measures are in place to promote competition among services providers in order to lower their prices, to inform migrants of their existence, and to train them in business and financial subjects to encourage their investments.

The panorama of adopted measures to encourage brain circulation is marked by a fragmented approach. As declared by the MME, the government’s strategy focuses more on protecting migrants’ rights abroad and on promoting their migration than on encouraging their return. Consequently, there are no programmes to facilitate highly-skilled migrants’ reintegration in the labour market and there are only few and isolated initiatives to actively engage highly-skilled migrants through virtual or temporary return. Meanwhile the main international agreement for the enhancement of highly-skilled labour mobility, the GATS mode 4, has not been employed by the private sector or during negotiations for bilateral agreements.

As regards policies to encourage diaspora’s engagement, since the 1980s dedicated bodies have been in charge to establish a dialogue with Egyptian communities abroad, while some attempts have been made to determine their potential contribution to Egypt’s development. However, these bodies have not been able to overcome migrants’ mistrust towards public institutions in Egypt and abroad. Meanwhile, Egyptian migrant organisations abroad are not involved actively in Egypt’s affairs.

However, with the end of Mubarak’s regime in 2011 a new attention towards Egyptian migrants seems to have developed within elected bodies such as the parliament. In the 2014 constitution their rights and interests have received constitutional guarantee and their contribution to the development of Egypt given official recognition. Voting rights of Egyptian migrants have been reinforced as well.
As regards Egyptian migrants in Austria, Egypt has not put in place any measure explicitly aimed at improving the linkages between migration and development. However, some initiatives have the potential to facilitate the engagement of Egyptian migrants such as the memoranda of understandings to facilitate academic exchange between the universities of the two countries as well as the Egyptian-Austrian Business Council that promotes trade, and industrial and technological collaboration between Egyptian and Austrian institutions and enterprises. Additionally, the Cultural Office of the Egyptian Embassy in Vienna, Austria, is active in maintaining cultural ties of Egyptian migrants in Austria with their homeland, for instance through cultural events and Arabic classes.
CHAPTER SIX

AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES
TO FOSTER DEVELOPMENT OF SENDING COUNTRIES
THROUGH HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRANTS

In this chapter the study analyses the Austrian policy and legal frameworks that can influence the development of sending countries through highly-skilled migrants who have moved to its territory. In line with the structure described in the third chapter, these policies are divided into two broad categories: a) policies able to enhance highly-skilled migrants’ transnational activities, and b) policies able to foster their integration in Austria. As mentioned previously, transnationalism and integration are interconnected processes that strengthen each other. Therefore, the distinction between these two categories is blurred and sometimes the related policies overlap. The listed policies in the tables are based on literature quoted in this chapter, unless otherwise stated.

6.1 AUSTRIA’S MIGRATION FRAMEWORK

As in other European countries, since the end of the Second World War immigration flows have progressively acquired a key role in Austria’s demographic and economic structure. Nevertheless, for a long time Austria has treated these flows as temporary. As a consequence, migration policies have been mainly based on labour market needs while migrants’ integration has not been considered a priority (Temesvári, Götzelmann, and Petzl, 2009). Only at the beginning of the 2000s did Austria change its approach towards migration, which is now twofold. First, Austrian entry policies actively aim at facilitating highly-skilled migration, necessary for its knowledge-based economy. The first attempt was a quota system set up in 2002 aimed at encouraging the entry of highly-skilled migrants. However, since this was not considered effective it was replaced by the so-called Red-White-Red (RWR) Card system in 2011, an immigration system based on a set of qualified criteria to evaluate candidates’ possibility to migrate to Austria (Bittman, 2013). Additionally, in May 2013 the
State Secretariat for Integration together with the Federation of Austrian Industries announced the future development of a “strategy for a future migration policy” to attract qualified and highly qualified migrants. This strategy aims to assess the needs of the labour market in Austria and the potential supply in migrants’ countries of origin, while simultaneously creating a “welcome culture” in Austria (Koppenberg, 2013).

Second, since the late 1990s Austria has placed integration at the centre of its migration policies. This is the consequence of the growing perception of unprecedented levels of immigration in the country, mainly from the former communist countries (Bijl and Verweij, 2012). However, only during the last decade has Austria been setting up an overall integration strategy through the following steps: the adoption of the first National Action Plan on Integration in January 2010 (Bijl and Verweij, 2012); the establishment of the State Secretariat for Integration in 2011; and finally the transfer of the integration agenda from the Federal Ministry of Interior to the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs - now called Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs - in 2013 (European Migration Network, 2012). This shift reflects the concept “Integration from the Beginning” announced in 2012 that aims to ensure that migrants are involved in a structured integration process initiated in the country of origin through the work of embassies and consulates (Expert Council for Integration, 2012).

In fact in the new Austrian approach to migration, promotion and integration of qualified migrants should be considered two sides of the same coin. As the Expert Council for Integration pointed out in the 2013 Integration Report, the RWR Card is at the same time a tool for both migration and integration policies since “A migration policy that enables and promotes the immigration of qualified persons who are needed on the job market creates the best conditions for successful integration” (Expert Council for Integration, 2013).

The current legislation on asylum and migration is based on four main laws: the Asylum Act (regulating the application procedure for international protection), the Settlement and Residence Act (concerning residence titles), the Aliens’ Police Act (provisions on entry, issuance of documents and return measures), and the Aliens’ Employment Act (regulating access to the labour market) (Koppenberg, 2013).

As regards the institutional set-up, three ministries are mainly concerned with migration issues: the Federal Ministry of Interior is competent for asylum and immigration policies; the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection is responsible for labour market policies, including with respect to foreigners; and the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs is accountable for visa issuing procedures and development
policies, besides the already mentioned integration agenda. However, Austria’s immigration policy reflects its federal structure in which the governments of the federal provinces have a key role in the policies’ implementation. For instance, within the framework of the Settlement and Residence Act they are involved in setting the annual quotas for specific residence titles for their territory (Koppenberg, 2013).

Concerning particular integration, the main competences in setting the overall legal framework is vested at the federal level. Given the nature of integration policy as a cross-cutting policy field, at federal level competences on matters relating to integration are scattered across a large number of different ministries. Key roles are within the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, and the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, although for certain issues provinces also have legislative powers they play an important role in the implementation of policies. Meanwhile, the Austrian Integration Fund has become an increasingly important institution during the last decade, though mainly for operational purposes (Bijl and Verweij, 2012).

6.2 POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE TRANSNATIONALISM

As seen previously, migrants’ transnational activities can support sending countries’ development. These are not limited to remittances transfer but can cover a wide spectrum of activities within the economic, cultural, social and political sectors. Legal and political conditions in the country of destination play a key role in enhancing migrants’ contributions to their homeland’s development as much as sending countries since they may facilitate or hinder their transnational activities (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2014). Here the study analyses Austria’s policy framework ability to influence migrants’ transnationalism in the economic, social, cultural and political ambits.

6.2.1 Economic Transnationalism

So far the Austrian government has not put in place measures aimed at encouraging remittances transfer either by decreasing its cost or by facilitating access to remitting
services. However, it has promoted studies to assess the existing situation. For instance, in 2013, the Federal Ministry of Finance supported the World Bank Remittances Programme for the execution of studies in the area of remittances in the Europe and Central Asia region (Koppenberg, 2013). As regards the Austrian territory, in 2009 the Development Bank of Austria assessed the status of remitting services in the country. According to this study, in Austria there are few financial services and products related to remittances. Since banks are not interested in remittances-linked services these are mainly offered by MTOs while mobile transfer services are not developed (Becker, Hockenos, and Holmes, 2009). As a consequence, the money transfer’s cost is high and its time is long, which does not encourage migrants to use formal channels to transfer money. A 2013 position paper prepared by the Working Group Migration and Development in the Global Responsibility confirms the need of projects to increase the development impact of remittances in countries of origin such as initiatives to minimize transfers costs, information on favourable transfer options, affordable bank services and targeted development cooperation to support diaspora’s development efforts (Working Group Migration and Development in the Global Responsibility, 2013). However, Austria has eliminated a significant obstacle to money transfer through agreements preventing double taxation with eighty countries (Kratzmann et al., 2011), including Egypt (Deloitte, 2014).

More efforts have been directed to facilitate cross-border businesses. As suggested by the Expert Council for Integration (Expert Council for Integration, 2013), the government has put in place various initiatives to provide information, training and network possibilities to foreign investors and entrepreneurs in order to support the establishment of companies in the Austrian territory. In particular, the Vienna municipality has established the Vienna Business Agency that offers financial support, real estate and consulting services to both national and international companies in order to develop Vienna as a business location. Migrants can have access to funds provided by this agency aimed at supporting enterprises in the province, including start-ups and young companies. The Expat Centre is a department of the Vienna Business Agency and assists international experts and executives in establishing in Vienna to work or to start their businesses in line with the one-stop-shop approach.

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56 Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.

57 For further information, please see the Vienna Business Agency’s website available at: http://www.wirtschaftsagentur.at/en/ (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015)

58 Further information can be found at the following webpage: https://viennabusinessagency.at/consulting/expatriate-in-wien-15/ (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015).
department, the Migrant Enterprises, targets entrepreneurs and the self-employed with a migration background and offers various services such as counselling on paperwork, bilingual workshops, and information on founding and coaching in the main migrant communities’ languages. Additionally, the Austrian Export Credit Agency run a soft loans program under the responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Finance characterised by particularly low interest rates, long repayment tenors with grace periods and full financing thanks to the official support of Austrian public authorities (Fritz and Raza, 2014). They target Austrian companies that aim to export in certain recipient countries in order to support the Austrian export industry as well as the economic development of recipient countries (Bank Austria, 2015). For these characteristics soft loans can support migrants’ enterprises registered in Austria that run a cross-border business between Austria and the country of origin. Although conceived as a tool for export promotion, it includes development components, mainly via the introduction of a questionnaire that aims at assessing the developmental relevance of projects (Fritz and Raza, 2014).

The Vienna municipality also provides facilities to diaspora networks and business networks between Austria and the country of origin. In particular, the Expat Centre focuses on establishing networks between the migrant community and local people and companies. For instance, in February 2015 the Expat Centre organised together with the AACC a matchmaking event to facilitate the establishment of partnerships between Egyptian and Austrian investors.

The EU has officially endorsed policies to support entrepreneurs and investors’ cross-border mobility in its EU Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan that recognises the important role of migrants as potential entrepreneurs, of whom there is a need in Europe (European Migration Network, 2013). In line with this call, Austria put in place a policy to attract foreign investors and entrepreneurs through the previously mentioned RWR Card immigration system. Indeed this system targets self-employed key workers besides highly-skilled foreign professionals. Third-country nationals that pursue a gainful activity which supports overall economic growth - especially in terms of the associated transfer of capital

59 Further information can be found at the following webpage: https://viennabusinessagency.at/consulting/migrant-enterprises-6/ (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015).

60 Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.

investment and/or the creation and maintenance of jobs - can obtain a RWR Card for one year. As explained in detail later, the RWR Card is based on a points system that facilitates migration since it does not foresee quotas and is the first step towards a permanent settlement in Austria. Additionally, in the case of self-employed key workers the points system is not applied (Bittman, 2013).

Since 2002, Austria has been developing policies to facilitate the entry of foreign skilled workers since they are scarce in the existing labour force although they are necessary to maintain its economy’s competitiveness in a global market. These policies complement simultaneous efforts to increase the educational level of its nationals. Indeed, the majority of the Austrian workforce has medium vocational skills and lately the country has been affected by brain drain especially towards Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and the USA (European Migration Network, 2007).

As previously mentioned, the main instrument to facilitate the entry of highly-skilled migrants is the new RWR Card system that has replaced in 2011 the unsuccessful quota system that was in place since 2002. The RWR Card is a single permit that entitles the holder to a one year temporary settlement and employment limited to the employer specified in the application. The card is granted through a points system based on individual criteria such as age, language skills, education level and professional experience. Unlike other migrants from third countries, RWR Card holders are exempted to prove a German level A1 according to the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages before entering the country. Additionally, if the RWR Card holder is employed in accordance with the foreseen criteria for a minimum of ten months during a twelve month period, the holder may apply for a RWR Card Plus that entitles to a year’s settlement with unrestricted access to the labour market.

The RWR Card system targets various qualified third-country nationals, including: very highly qualified workers; skilled workers in shortage occupations; other key workers; graduates of Austrian universities and colleges of higher education and self-employed key workers (Bittman, 2013). The RWR Card foresees a specific regime for each category as

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62 Self-employed key workers can receive a RWR Card in the first year, and after that a settlement permit (Niederlassungsbewilligung). This permit is issued for one year and entitles its holder to fixed-term settlement and the pursuit of the self-employed occupation. Later this can be renewed for other three years. Therefore, this gives them the possibility after five years to apply for a EC Permanent Residence.

63 The RWR Card came into effect on the 1st July 2011 in the framework of the amendments of the Aliens’ Law in 2011. However, the immigration scheme for skilled workers in shortage occupations did not enter into force until the 16th June 2012 with a specific regulation, the so-called ‘Skilled Workers Regulation’ (Fachkräfteverordnung). Please see: Austrian Parliament, 2013.
summarised in the table below. In particular, it is evident that the Austrian government considers migrants with a high level of education a priority (i.e. Master’s and Ph.D degree corresponding to the 1997 ISCED Level 5 and 6) and facilitates their migration. Although the RWR Card maintains aspects related to a demand/employer-driven immigration system for most categories of workers - such as a predetermined list of shortage occupations (cf. tier for skilled workers in shortage occupations) or a labour market test (cf. tier for other key workers) - for particularly highly-skilled migrants (i.e. called “very highly qualified workers”) it foresees a supply/immigrant-driven component: the entry is based only on qualitative criteria without checking the labour market needs (Bittman, 2013). Additionally, in comparison with the other RWR Card’s target groups, very highly-skilled workers and students graduated in Austria can apply for a six months job search visa and apply for the RWR Card directly in Austria. Moreover, these latter do not need to pass a points test to obtain the RWR Card. Additional measures facilitating the employment of young scholars aim at strengthening the academic and scientific level of the Austrian labour force: university assistants can apply for the RWR Card without being fully employed (Koppenberg, 2013); students who have completed the first stage of a diploma programme or a bachelor’s degree programme may receive employment permits for twenty hours per week without applying a labour market test (Bittman, 2013), or even run their own business.64

To be considered a very highly qualified worker and apply for a six-month job-seeker visa, migrants should reach at least 70 out of 100 allowable points. However, from an analysis of the admission criteria it is evident that requirements are very high: the ideal candidate for the RWR Card has an education at Master’s or Ph.D level, younger than thirty-five years but already with work experience in a senior management position (Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, 2013a). Strong preference is given to candidates with a university degree in one of the MINT (i.e. mathematics, informatics, natural sciences and technology) subjects (Bittman, 2013). Finally, there is no difference between German or English skills, for which only an elementary use of the language is required.

64 Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.
## Table 35: RWR Card: Eligibility Criteria for Very Highly Qualified Persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eligibility criteria</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special qualifications and skills</strong></td>
<td>Maximum points: 40 of allowable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduation from an institution of higher education, minimum duration of programme: four years</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduation in the subjects mathematics, informatics, natural sciences or technology (i.e. MINT subjects)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-doctoral qualification (habilitation) or Ph.D</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross salary of previous year earned in a senior management position with a company listed on the stock exchange or a company for which the Austrian foreign trade office in charge issued a positive report about its activities or business segment:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- €50,000 to 60,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- €60,000 to 70,000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- More than €70,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research and innovation activities</strong></td>
<td>Points: 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Patent applications, publications)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Awards (recognised prizes)</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Work experience (adequately reflecting applicant’s qualification or senior management position)</strong></td>
<td>Maximum points: 20 of allowable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work experience (per year)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six months of work experience in Austria</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language skills</strong></td>
<td>Maximum points: 10 of allowable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German or English language skills for the elementary use of the language on a basic level – (A1 level)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German or English language skills for the intensified elementary use of the language – (A2 level)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>Maximum points: 20 of allowable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 35 years of age</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up to 40 years of age</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to 45 years of age</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Studies in Austria</strong></td>
<td>Maximum of allowable points: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second part of diploma programme (Diplomstudium) or half of the required total ECTS points</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed diploma programme (Diplomstudium) or Bachelor’s and Master’s degree programme</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sum total of maximum allowable points:</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Required minimum:</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MIGRATION.GOV.AT, Very Highly Qualified Workers.*

The RWR Card and the EU Blue Card were introduced at the same time (Bittman, 2013). If we compare them they look similar in terms of requirements. However, the RWR Card seems to offer more advantages. Both regimes bind foreign workers to a specific employer but the RWR Card holders are eligible for a RWR Card Plus after one year while the holder of the EU Blue Card has to wait 2 years to have access to the free labour market. Additionally, the EU Blue Card applicants are subject to a labour market test, while RDR Card applicants are not. Unlike the EU Blue Card, the RWR Card does not offer direct eligibility for permanent residence (i.e. the EC Permanent Residence) or allow accumulating periods of residence in different EU member states (Bittman, 2013; Hadj-Abdou, 2013). However, it can authorise, together with the EU Blue Card, a right of settlement that is the pre-condition to obtain the EC Permanent Residence as well as Austrian citizenship (Kratzmann et al., 2011).

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65 The EC Permanent Residence title was introduced within the framework of implementation of the Permanent Residence Directive 2003/109/EC. Please see: Kratzmann et al., 2011.
Table 36: RWR Card - Criteria-Based Immigration System to Austria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Labour migration regime</th>
<th>Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very highly qualified workers</td>
<td>1997 ISCED Level 5 and 6.</td>
<td>Supply-driven system based on points.</td>
<td>They are able to fill their application for the RWR Card at Austrian representations (embassies or consulates) abroad. They can enter Austria on the basis of a six-month job-seeker visa and apply for a RWR Card in Austria, provided that an adequate job offer has been received within this period. University assistants can apply for the RWR Card without being fully employed, but only if they meet the necessary amount of points within the respective criteria (education, research successes, language skills, professional experience, etc.) and they receive minimum wage (around EUR 2,000 gross plus special payments).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers in shortage occupations</td>
<td>The level of education as well as the field of occupation can vary. They should have completed a professional training in a relevant shortage occupation.</td>
<td>Demand-driven system based on the Skilled Workers Regulation, listing the relevant shortage occupations. They are not subject to an individual labour market test. A point system is applied.</td>
<td>Applications for the RWR Card can be filed by the potential employer with the competent settlement and residence authority in Austria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other key workers</td>
<td>Special skills and know-how without formal professional training (No ISCE or ISCO reference). The potential employer pays the statutory monthly gross remuneration.</td>
<td>Individual labour market test (i.e. if no equally qualified person already registered as a job-seeker at the Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS) could be employed). A point system is applied.</td>
<td>Applications for the RWR Card can be filed by the potential employer with the competent settlement and residence authority in Austria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduates of universities and colleges of higher education in Austria</td>
<td>Third-country graduates who have successfully completed (at least) the second part of their course (i.e. Diplomstudium) or successfully completed Master degree studies at a</td>
<td>No point system is applied.</td>
<td>Six months job search visa. Students who have completed the first stage of a diploma programme or a bachelor’s degree programme may receive employment permits for twenty hours per week without</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
university, college of higher education or accredited private university in Austria. 1997 ISCED 5 and 6 with completed at least half of their degree in Austria if they have a job offer which is in line with their qualifications and the employer pays the statutory monthly remuneration.

| Self-employed key workers | A gainful activity supporting overall economic growth. | No point system is applied. | Initial application for a residence permit must be submitted in person at the competent authorities abroad, prior to the entry into Austria. |

Austria has accompanied the new RWR Card criteria-led system with a series of initiatives to further incentivise highly-skilled migration and therefore increase the diversity of human resources’ nationality in local enterprises (Bittman, 2013). These include: online portals, brochures and information campaigns to inform applicants about migration requirements, working and living conditions in Austria, and the recognition of qualifications.

Furthermore, provinces offer various services to support migration of highly-skilled workers with partners. For instance, the Expat Centre offers to these latter career counselling. Additionally, within the framework of the Integration Agreement for certain family members the federal government refunds part of the costs of the German classes. The University of Vienna supports the relocation of academic staff’s partners. In 2010, the Austrian Chamber of Commerce launched the Charta der Vielfalt, a diversity charter, through which Austrian companies, institutions and organisations voluntarily bound themselves to enhance the participation of “all members of society – irrespective of gender, age, origin and skin colour, sexual orientation, religion and ideology, as well as physical and mental skills”. This includes an initiative to increase diversity in representative bodies (Expert Council for Integration, 2013).

However, the Austrian government does not grant any tax incentives to employers for recruiting foreign workers, and has not signed any partnership with transnational corporations for recruitment and relocation of individuals and their families across national borders. Companies may use a relocation agency for high level staff but it is on their own initiative. Tax-free allowances and tax exemptions are foreseen only for specific expatriates with diplomatic status such as embassies and international organisation employees.

66 The federal government has developed an official information website, available at: www.migration.gv.at/en (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015).

67 The Austrian Federal Economic Chamber established a website that provides information on working and living in Austria in 28 different languages. Please see at: www.advantageaustria.org (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015).

68 For instance, the website Validation Nostrifizierung provides information for university graduates from third countries on validation of their qualifications in Austria. Please see the webpage at: www.nostrifizierung.at (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015).

69 Half of the costs of German integration classes up to a maximum amount of €750 if such classes were successfully completed within 18 months of the start of the compliance obligation. Please see at: MIGRATION.GOV.AT, Integration Agreement, available at: http://www.migration.gv.at/en/living-and-working-in-austria/integration-and-citizenship/integration-agreement.html (Last accessed on the 22nd July 2015).

70 Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.

71 Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.
Austria has signed neither bilateral immigration agreements nor MPs with third countries. The main reason is that Austrian migration policy is based on the principle of equal treatment of foreigners that does not allow treating foreigners differently on the basis of their specific nationality. However, at the same time, there is no formal initiative to ensure ethical recruitment. In 2012, the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber made an internal and informal analysis to assess which third countries could be of particular interest regarding qualifications that are in demand in the Austrian labour market, as well as avoiding recruitment from countries with similar demand structures for qualifications (Bittman, 2013).

Notwithstanding the mentioned efforts put in place to attract highly-skilled migrants, according to a preliminary study on the effects of the RWR Card undertaken by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research in 2012, the new regime has only facilitated residence and access to the labour market for some migrant groups (mainly family members and graduates from Austrian universities) but there was no increase in the immigration of highly-skilled foreigners (Austrian Institute of Economic Research, 2012). Although it is early to formulate a definitive evaluation, some adjustments have already been suggested. For instance, the president of the Austrian chamber of economy remarked that the wage requirement is too high, and demanded that also third-country nationals with a bachelor degree from an Austrian university should be granted residence and work permission (Koppenberg, 2013). Moreover, the six-month period granted to search for a job is considered too short since it includes the time the authority needs for processing the application (Expert Council for Integration, 2014). Other major obstacles are the long waiting time to obtain the card and be employed (three months), the pre-condition of a job offer without offering services to find a job, and companies’ poor knowledge of this opportunity. In 2014, another pre-condition was reinforced: the applicant should prove to have an accommodation for one year while previously it was only for three months. These obstructions are mostly the result of the opposition of the Trade Unions to the liberalisation of the entry regime to foreign workers - promoted by the Chamber of Labour - with the aim to protect the local labour market.72

However, mainly structural aspects of the Austrian economy undermine its attractiveness to foreigners: first, the labour market has an insider-outsider structure that builds barriers to entry for new workers while protecting workers who have been active longer in the labour market (European Migration Network, 2007); second, compared to highly-skilled workers in Anglo-Saxon countries, those in Austria get a lower income due to higher tax rates and an

72 Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.
economic structure consisting mainly of SMEs that often cannot afford to remunerate as high as large enterprises; finally, for the majority of SMEs German is still more common as the working language than English and may represent a particular challenge (Bittman, 2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foster economic transnationalism</td>
<td>Increase cross-border money’s transfer</td>
<td>Decrease money’s transfer costs</td>
<td>Signed international agreements preventing double taxation with eighty countries including Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase access to remitting services</td>
<td>Promoted studies to assess the existing situation and disseminating information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate the establishment of cross-border businesses</td>
<td>Provide technical support to migrants’ businesses</td>
<td>The Expat Centre assists international experts and executives in establishing in Vienna to work and to start their businesses. The focal point Migrant Enterprises offers entrepreneurs and self-employed with migration background various services such as counselling on paperwork, bilingual workshops, information on founding and coaching in the main migrant communities’ languages. Vienna municipality provides facilities to diaspora networks and facilitates businesses networks between Austria and the country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grant fiscal benefits to cross-border businesses</td>
<td>The Vienna Business Agency provides grants aimed at supporting enterprises in the province, including the ones with migrant background. The Austrian Export Credit Agency runs Soft loans program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate cross-border mobility of entrepreneurs and investors</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreigners self-employed, entrepreneurs and investors are target groups of the RWR Card. In their case the point system is not applied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incentivise highly-skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td>Applicants are informed about migration requirements, working and living conditions in Austria, and the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Increase diversity of human resources’ nationality in local enterprises | migration | recognition of qualifications through online portals, brochures and information campaigns.  
The University of Vienna supports the relocation of academic staff’s partners.  
The Expat Centre offers career counselling to highly-skilled migrants’ partners.  
The federal government refunds part of the costs of the German classes to migrants’ family members.  
In 2010 the Austrian Chamber of Commerce launched the “Charta der Vielfalt”, a Diversity Charter.  
Tax-free allowances and tax exemptions are foreseen for specific expatriates with diplomatic status such as embassies and international organisations employees. |
|---|---|---|
| Facilitate recruitment of highly-skilled foreign workers | Highly-skilled migrants have a specific entry channel through the RWR Card that applies a supply/immigrant-driven’ component.  
Through the RWR Card highly-skilled migrants are exempted to prove a German level A1 before entering the country.  
The RWR Card includes a tier for skilled workers in shortage occupations.  
Very highly-skilled migrants and students graduated in Austria can apply for a six months job search visa and apply for the RWR Card directly in Austria. |
6.2.2 Social Transnationalism

Support to migrants in maintaining relationships across borders and therefore to their social transnational activities is not well developed. For instance, through this study it has not been possible to find any programme targeting migrant communities to promote communication through the Internet. Concerning cross-border development initiatives engaging diasporas, in 2013 the communication and educational work of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) focused on the topic of migration and development. The ADA also continued to support the transnational Initiative for Migration and Development - CoMiDe, which aims to enhance coherent migration and development policies in Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia and Austria by initiating cooperation between development NGOs, migrant organisations and communities.\(^{73}\) In 2013, it also founded NGO initiatives that raised awareness about the reasons for and the consequences of international migration among the Austrian public (Herold, 2013). However, the previously mentioned “Position Paper on Migration and Development” prepared by the Working Group on Migration and Development (2013) mentions that there are no projects for migration and development in the 2012 Three-Year Programme on Austrian Development Policy. Moreover, it denounces the little involvement of diaspora organisations in the funded development projects. Most of the times diaspora organisations and their umbrella associations are underfunded so that their services are mostly offered on a voluntary basis, which undermines their effectiveness (European Migration Network, 2013b).

Support to migrants’ families left behind takes mainly the form of promotion of family reunion, which is facilitated in the case of highly-skilled migrants. Indeed, unlike other third-country nationals, family members (i.e. spouses, registered partners, children up to the age of 18) of key workers, skilled workers and graduates, who have either already permanently settled in Austria or have received permission to work via the new RWR Card system, do not need to prove German language skills before entering the country or to be subject to the annual quota determined by the government. Moreover, they can get a RWR Card Plus that provides unlimited access to the labour market and equal conditions as nationals for public and private sector employment, including access to unemployment benefits.\(^{74}\) This is granted for twelve months and can be renewed for three years in case the family member has

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\(^{73}\) For further information, please see the website of Comide – Initiative for Migration and Development, available at: [http://www.comide.net/project-description/] (Last accessed on the 24\(^{th}\) June 2015)

\(^{74}\) Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expatriate Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expatriate Centre.
completed the first module of the integration agreement (i.e. they have given evidence of German language skills at A2 level), and has lawfully resided in Austria without interruption during the previous two years (Hadj-Abdou, 2013). Additionally, within the context of the already mentioned Integration from the Beginning concept Austria has put in place a series of measures to escort migrants throughout the migration process from the country of origin: a significant role for Austrian embassies and consulates; an online learning platform offering German and literacy courses; and a RWR Primer that will provide information on Austrian rule of law principles and social values, which is under development (European Migration Network, 2012a). However, it has not been possible to find programs targeting transnational families and migrants’ family members left behind, while census statistics do not collect data on transnational families.

Austria has taken a decisive position against the EC proposal to facilitate circular migration. This is mainly due to its past experience with guest-workers programmes that failed in keeping migration temporary and meanwhile did not allow the integrating of migrants (Kratzmann et al., 2011). Indeed, the Austrian permit system does not allow the carrying out of parallel activities in both the country of origin and destination. According to the Aliens’ Police Act, visas allow short-term stays of up to six months and can be issued for single or multiple entries, but the RWR Card has a relatively short period of validity (i.e. one year) so that the margin for departure and entry to carry out, for instance, a freelance business activity or to perform another job in the country of origin is quite narrow. Short-term residences in the country and abroad, in particular for visit purposes, do not interrupt the residence. However, an absence from the European Economic Area longer than twelve sequential months interrupt the process to obtain the EC Permanent Residence, unless for special reasons such as severe illness, the draft for military service or social obligation (Kratzmann et al., 2011). Instead, for the same reasons an absence from Austria of twenty-four months is allowed. Additionally, the EC Permanent Residence allows absences from the country only for periods shorter than six consecutive months (and not exceeding ten months in total within the five-year period).

As regards the portability and transferability of social rights in the country of origin, Austria has concluded social agreements with sixteen third countries, although not with Egypt, to regulate, among others, the equal treatment of citizens of the contractual parties, the

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consideration of insurance times collected in the other country, the calculation of pensions and also the transfer of payments into other countries (Kratzmann et al., 2011). As mentioned previously, double taxation agreements have been concluded with eight countries including Egypt (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2011).
### Table 38: Austrian Policies to Foster Social Transnationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foster social transnationalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adopt innovative information and communication technology solutions</td>
<td>No measure targeting migrant communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support migrants in maintaining relationships across borders</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple entry and toleration of longer periods of absences</td>
<td>Visas allow short-term stays up to six months and can be issued for a single or multiple entries. An absence from the European Economic Area shorter than twelve sequential months does not interrupt the process to obtain the EC Permanent Residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of family unity</td>
<td>Family members of key workers, skilled workers and graduates, who have either already permanently settled in Austria or have received permission to work via the new RWR Card system do not need to prove German language skills before entering the country or be subject to the annual quota determined by the government. They can apply for a RWR Card Plus that provides unlimited access to the labour market and equal conditions as nationals for public and private sectors employment, including access to unemployment benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support families of migrants that stay behind in the country of origin</td>
<td>In 2013 the ADA founded NGO initiatives, in which awareness was raised about the reasons for and the consequences of international migration among the Austrian public. Through the Integration from the Beginning concept Austria has put in place a series of measures to facilitate a migrants’ accompaniment throughout the migration process from the country of origin, such as: significant role to Austrian embassies and consulates and an online learning platform offering German and literacy courses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure cross-border social protection</td>
<td>Portability and transferability of social rights</td>
<td>Social agreements concluded with sixteen third countries to regulate: the equal treatment of citizens of the contractual parties, the consideration of insurance times collected in the other country, the calculation of pensions and also the transfer of payments into other countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage development initiatives</td>
<td>Promote cross-border coordination</td>
<td>Support to the transnational Initiative for Migration and Development (CoMiDe), which aims to enhance coherent migration and development policies in Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia and Austria by initiating cooperation between development NGOs, migrant organisations and communities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.3 Political Transnationalism

The Austrian legal framework does not provide a friendly environment for migrants that want to undertake transnational political activities. As regards the involvement of third-country nationals in Austrian public decision making through political passive and active rights, even with the EC Permanent Residence they are not allowed to vote or be elected in local elections. After being criticized by the EC, third-country nationals can now stand for elections in works councils and for the statutory interest representative bodies, the Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce. Additionally, political parties are free to recruit foreign nationals residing in Austria as party members, and even spokespersons. However, in practice foreign citizens who are members of political parties are not likely to be elected as party officials, since they are not eligible for political posts (Kraler and Sohler, 2005).

Naturalisation and the option of double or multiple citizenship can promote circular migration and transnational activities not only of a political nature. In this way, migrants can return to their countries of origin to work without any time limitation. However, double or multiple citizenship is not allowed in Austria. In order to acquire Austrian citizenship foreign citizens need to abandon their former citizenship. However, some exceptions are foreseen if this is not possible (e.g. if giving up the previous citizenship entails excessive expenses or if it is made conditional on performing one’s military service) (Kratzmann et al., 2011). In 2013, the Austrian law on citizenship was amended to enable tracking integration successes and envisaging citizenship awarding ceremonies (Expert Council for Integration, 2013). Finally, through this study it has not been possible to find institutional mechanisms that involve diaspora’s representatives in decision making processes such as diaspora councils.

Concerning the possibility for migrants to be involved in the politics of their country of origin, as previously mentioned Austrian laws allow short periods of absence without interrupting the residence or settlement. However, the possibility to exercise an institutional role in the country of origin is quite limited since even third-country nationals that have an EC Permanent Residence cannot leave Austria for more than one year unless for special reasons (Kratzmann et al., 2011). Additionally, since 2005 the process to acquire Austrian citizenship is subject to uninterrupted and legal residence in Austria, which means that applicants must not have been abroad for more than 20 percent of the required waiting period (i.e. two years out of ten) (Stern and Valchars, 2013).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foster political transnationalism</td>
<td>Encourage involvement of migrants into public decision making of the destination country</td>
<td>Encourage political passive rights</td>
<td>The Austrian law on citizenship envisages citizenship awarding ceremonies. Although dual citizenship is not allowed it may be tolerated if renunciation of original citizenship is not possible (e.g. the country of origin refuses expatriation, or it would require payments that are out of proportion).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage political active rights</td>
<td>Political parties are free to recruit foreign nationals residing in Austria as party members and even spokesperson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Involve migrants associations in decision making processes</td>
<td>Third-country nationals can stand for elections in works councils and for the statutory interest representative bodies, the Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage involvement of migrants into public decision making of their homeland</td>
<td>Facilitate periods of absence</td>
<td>Visas allow short-term stays up to six months and can be issued for a single or multiple entries. An absence from the European Economic Area shorter than twelve sequential months does not interrupt the process to obtain the EC Permanent Residence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6.2.4 Cultural Transnationalism

The internationalisation of higher education institutions has become a strategic cornerstone of Austrian universities. Numerous bilateral grant programmes, joint study programmes, and university partnerships have been established as main instruments to enable continual cross-border knowledge exchange. The international mobility of students, graduates, as well as university staff, is especially considered a very important part of the internationalisation of Austrian higher education institutions: it is one of the leading principles of the University Act 2002 and an obligation in the performance agreement between the individual universities and the federal government. Cooperation agreements concluded by universities are a common tool to facilitate the mobility of international students as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements granting scholarships in the field of students’ mobility. For instance, Austrian universities are successfully participating in the Erasmus Mundus programme, the EU’s cooperation and mobility programme that aims to enhance the quality of European higher
education and to promote dialogue and understanding between people and cultures through cooperation with third countries (Musil and Reyhani, 2012).

To facilitate cross-border mobility of students and researchers, as well as of highly qualified workers, since 2012 skills recognition of university graduates coming from third countries has been eased. The waiting period for recognition of degrees has been shortened to a maximum period of six months. Additionally, in case the diploma or the university is not recorded in the classification system that determines the officially recognised university degrees the candidate can apply for the evaluation of the qualification via the National Academic Recognition Information Centre (Bittman, 2013). A five-point programme approved in 2012 foresees online information and contact points in the federal provinces to provide counselling with regards to the validation and occupational reclamation of qualifications acquired abroad. More significant, for highly-skilled third-country nationals holding a RWR Card or an EU Blue Card the formal recognition of studies is not required, instead a certificate providing evidence of the successful completion of the study programme as well as proof of the status of the university is sufficient (Bittman, 2013). As regards Egyptian migrants, currently 114 universities in Egypt are recognised in Austria.

Finally, it has not been possible to find measures aiming to enhance cultural ties between Austria and the country of origin such as projects between cities and municipalities from the two countries. Instead, municipalities financially sustain cultural activities of migrant associations (Kraler and Sohler, 2005). Additionally, as mentioned previously the Vienna municipality provides facilities to encourage the emergence of transnational networks and businesses between Austria and the country of origin.

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76 For further information, please visit the website of the Fund for the Integration of Refugees and Migrants (ÖIF), www.berufsanerkennung.at (Last accessed on the 11th September 2014).

77 For more information on recognised foreign university or college degrees, see the INFORMATIONSPORTAL ZUR ANERKENNUNG AUSLÄNDISCHER BILDUNGSABSchLÜSSE, available at: http://anabin.kmk.org/no_cache/filter/institutionen.html (Last accessed on 22nd October 2014)
Table 40: Austrian Policies to Foster Cultural Transnationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foster cultural transnationalism</td>
<td>Facilitate brain circulation</td>
<td>Promote cross-border scientific projects</td>
<td>Established bilateral grant programmes, joint study programmes, and university partnerships to enable continual cross-border exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International mobility of students and university staff is one of the leading principles of the University Act 2002 and is an obligation in the performance agreement between the individual universities and the federal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Austrian universities have concluded cooperation agreements concerning scholarships in the field of students’ mobility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Facilitate cross-border mobility of highly-skilled migrants</td>
<td>The waiting period for recognition of degrees has been shortened to a maximum period of six months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Online information and contact points in the federal provinces to provide counselling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For highly-skilled third-country nationals that dispose of a job search visa, a RWR Card or an EU Blue Card, the formal recognition of studies is not required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enhance cultural ties between country of origin and destination</td>
<td>Municipalities financially sustain cultural activities of migrant associations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vienna municipality provides facilities to encourage the emergency of transnational networks and businesses between Austria and the country of origin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.3 POLICIES TO ENCOURAGE INTEGRATION

As noted previously, in Austria integration started to be at the centre of a policy debate on migration at the beginning of the 1990s. However, at that time integration was mostly understood as only migrants’ duty and responsibility: for instance applicants had to demonstrate their personal and professional integration in order to obtain Austrian nationality (Bijl and Verweij, 2012). The “integration agreement” in force since 2002 reflects this approach since despite its name it confers on migrants most of the responsibility of their integration: foreigners intending to stay in Austria have to sign it and attend compulsory German language courses. In order to obtain a residence permit later, they have to demonstrate their capacity “to become capable of participating in the social, economic and
cultural life in Austria” by passing a language test. If the requirements of the agreement are not fulfilled, migrants can be sanctioned.

Austria has had no overall national integration strategy until 2010 when this vacuum was filled with the National Action Plan on Integration (NAP). The plan was adopted by the Council of Ministers in January 2010 after a one-year consultation process involving representatives of the federal ministries, federal states, the Austrian Association of Municipalities, the social partners, the Austrian Integration Fund as well as civil society organisations. The NAP marks a turning point in Austria’s approach to integration. Instead of focusing only on language acquisition, the plan covers seven areas: language and education; employment and occupation; rule of law and values; health and social affairs; intercultural dialogue; sports and leisure; housing; and the regional dimension of integration. Additionally, instead of assuming integration as only a migrants’ duty it defines integration as a two-way process and puts emphasis on the dual responsibility of both the migrant and the host society (Bijl and Verweij, 2012). In 2011, the plan was followed by a twenty-point programme prepared by an Expert Council for Integration to implement the integration measures on an operational level.

Since 2013, integration policies are also informed by the previously mentioned paradigm Integration from the Beginning. According to it, integration measures should start as early as possible and be part of a comprehensive and coordinated process. Therefore, integration begins with pre-integration measures in the country of origin and ends with the attainment of citizenship (Expert Council for Integration, 2013).

Three main characteristics can be noted in the current Austrian integration framework:

a) a strong focus on linguistic integration. Although the NAP covers several areas, German language proficiency is still considered a key to social, economic and cultural integration (Krause and Liebig, 2011);

b) the mandatory character of integration measures. This is reflected in the Integration Agreement that migrants are required to sign (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

c) the “expected integration capacity” that informs the policies regulating the entry and stay of foreigners in Austria. In line with this principle, in order to receive the RWR Card professional experience in Austria or German language skills give extra points. As it is

For further information please see: Austrian Agency for International Mobility and Cooperation in Education, Science and Research (OEAD-GMBH), Integration Agreement, available at: https://www.oead.at/welcome_to_austria/legal_practical_issues/entry_to_austria/integration_agreement/EN/ (Last accessed on the 22nd July 2015)

The original German quote is “die zu erwartende Integrationsfähigkeit”. Please see: Austrian Parliament, 2013.
possible to see in table 35, in the case of very highly qualified workers one year of work experience in Austria would score with the maximum of allowable points within the category of work experience (twenty points), while Bachelor’s and Master’s degree programmes completed in Austria would score an extra ten points.\footnote{For further information, please see: MIGRATION.GOV.AT, Very Highly Qualified Workers. http://www.migration.gv.at/en/types-of-immigration/permanent-immigration-red-white-red-card/very-highly-qualified-workers.html (Last accessed on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} July 2015)}

6.3.1 Economic Integration

As said, in Austria skilled foreign workers have a facilitated access to the labour market through the RWR Card. They have equal access as nationals for employment in both the private and public sectors as well as for self-employment. This is restricted only for some professions in official responsibility that require Austrian citizenship (e.g. judges, police officers). Moreover, in contrast with nationals, RWR Card holders are not allowed to change employer although this restriction drops with the acquisition of the RWR Card Plus. This latter also provides equal access to education and vocational training.\footnote{Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27\textsuperscript{th} February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.} Despite the quite open access to the public labour market, migrants working in the public service sector are still few and the Expert Council for Integration considers it appropriate to increase the proportion of employees with a migrant background in public service roles (particularly in teaching and nursing professions) (Expert Council for Integration, 2013).

Concerning the recognition of migrants’ skills and qualifications, although the process in Austria involves various institutions a centralised office has been in place since 30 years ago, namely the ENIC NARIC.\footnote{ENIC NARIC is part of the international networks of ENIC (European Network of Information Centres) and of NARIC (National Academic Recognition Information Centres). For more information please see: Expert Council for Integration, 2014.} Formal proceedings can vary depending on the level of education, industry or country of origin (Bittman, 2013). As mentioned previously, in 2012 the government approved a five-point programme to ease the recognition of skills of university graduates from third countries. The programme foresees improved online information and the establishment of contact points in the federal provinces to provide counselling.\footnote{For further information, please visit the website of the Fund for the Integration of Refugees and Migrants (ÖIF), www.berufsanerkennung.at (Last accessed on the 11\textsuperscript{th} September 2014).} Additionally, the waiting period for recognition of degrees has been shortened to a maximum period of six months (Bittman, 2013). However, there is no competence
accreditation system in place yet to assess migrants’ skills acquired in different contexts (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

As mentioned previously, highly-skilled third-country nationals holding a RWR Card or an EU Blue Card are advantaged since they do not need a formal recognition of studies. In their case, a certificate providing evidence of the successful completion of the study programme as well as proof of the status of the university is sufficient. However, in the case of regulated professions, which require proof of certain qualifications as a condition for being allowed to exercise the respective profession in Austria (e.g. doctors), even for RWR Card holders a formal recognition of studies is still indispensable (Bittman, 2013). In 2014, there were 218 regulated professions in Austria (Expert Council for Integration, 2014).

Various measures to reduce migrants’ unemployment are in place. Any third-country national staying legally in Austria has access to the AMS. The AMS offers three-level German language courses to unemployed migrants. There is also the possibility of language training as vocational-specific training on-the-job. Additionally, in 2008 the government launched the “Skilled Labour Initiative” to enhance migrants’ skills in occupations in which there is a current or expected future demand (Krause and Liebig, 2011). Furthermore, in order to improve migrants’ integration in the Austrian labour market, the AMS started to record the migration background of the registered unemployed and job-seekers for the purpose of developing services targeted to migrants’ needs (European Migration Network, 2012a).

An important support to the insertion of highly-skilled migrants into the Austrian labour market is the possibility offered by the RWR Card Plus to change employer. However, the initial RWR Card allows migrants to remain in Austria until it expires in case they lose their job but they need another job offer to renew it. Furthermore, in 2008 the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber, jointly with the Austrian Integration Fund and the AMS, launched a mentoring project targeting skilled migrants unemployed or overqualified in their job. These are tutored by a person well integrated into the Austrian economy that shares with them their knowledge of the Austrian labour market and recruitment system, as well as their social network (Krause and Liebig, 2011). Regarding the protection of migrant workers’ rights, as previously said, these are equal to nationals as long as migrants work legally in Austria. As mentioned, they can access trade unions but cannot be elected. Instead, they can stand for

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84 Interview with Ms. Dider Can, staff member of the Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen, held on the 11th February 2015.
85 Interview with Ms. Dider Can, staff member of the Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen, held on the 11th February 2015.
elections in works councils and for the statutory interest representative bodies, the Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce.
Table 41: Austrian Policies to Facilitate Economic Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ensure migrants’ job security</td>
<td>Reduce unemployment of migrants</td>
<td>The RWR Card Plus allows changing employer. The AMS offers three-level of German language courses to unemployed migrants. Language training as vocational-specific training on-the-job. Skilled Labour Initiative to enhance migrants’ skills in occupations in which there is a current or expected future demand. The migration background of registered unemployed and job-seekers is recorded to develop services targeted to migrants’ needs. Mentoring project target skilled migrants unemployed or overqualified in their job. The RWR Card allows migrants to remain in Austria until it expires in case they lose their job.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate economic integration</td>
<td>Facilitate labour market access</td>
<td>The RWR Card gives migrants equal access as nationals for private and public sector employment (access is restricted only for some professions in official responsibility). The RWR Card gives migrants equal access to self-employment as nationals. The RWR Card Plus gives equal access to education and vocational training.</td>
<td>The ERIC NARIC centre promotes the recognition of skills and qualifications. The waiting period for recognition of degrees is not longer than six months. Online information on conversion courses/profession-based language courses. Contact points in the federal provinces to provide counselling. Holders of a RWR Card or an EU Blue Card do not need a formal recognition of studies but only a certificate providing evidence of the successful completion of the study programme as well as proof of the status of the university. Formal recognition of studies is only necessary for regulated professions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate Labour market Mobility</td>
<td>Facilitate recognition of academic and professional qualifications</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Migrant workers’ rights are equal to nationals’ as long as they work legally in Austria. Third-country nationals can stand for elections in works councils and for the statutory interest representative.
bodies, the Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce.

Migrants have equal access to social security as nationals as long as they work legally in Austria.

Migrants are subject to equal working conditions as nationals long as they work legally in Austria.
6.3.2 Social Integration

As noted previously, compared to other third-country nationals’ family reunion is facilitated in the case of highly-skilled migrants. Family members of key workers, skilled workers and graduates, who have either already permanently settled in Austria or have received permission to work via the new RWR Card system can get a RWR Card Plus for one year that provides unlimited access to the labour market and equal conditions as nationals for public and private sector employment, including access to unemployment benefits. Additionally, they are exempt of the pre-departure requirement since they do not need to prove German language skills before entering the country or to be subject to the annual quota determined by the government. Only in the case where the family member wants to renew the card - for 3 years – do they have to complete the first module of the integration agreement (i.e. have given evidence of German language skills at A2 level), and have resided lawfully in Austria without interruption during the previous two years (Hadj-Abdou, 2013). Family members include not just spouses and minor children but also registered partners and adopted children and stepchildren (Bittman, 2013).

Concerning the security of status of family members, these can renew the permit and stay in Austria as long as the RWR Card holder. They also have equal access to public services in different areas such as education, social security and healthcare. However, their status is not autonomous and if they want to stay in Austria beyond their sponsor they have to apply again. Moreover, in case of cessation of the family status the persons can only remain in Austria if they continue to meet the granting prerequisites. Only in cases where the cessation happens for reasons such as violence in the family, divorce attributable to the reunifying person’s fault, or death of the reunifying person, are certain granting prerequisites not needed to be met (e.g. income) (Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen, 2014).

Austria’s fight against discrimination based on ethnic origin is quite recent. This issue has received attention only since 2004, when Austria was obliged to implement the EU Racial Equality Directive. This has been done through a scattered legal framework composed of several pieces of legislation at provincial and federal level (Schindlauer, 2013). The main federal acts are the Equal Treatment Act that prohibits discrimination based on race, ethnic

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86 Interview with Mr. Jan Riepl, staff member of the Expat Centre of the Vienna Business Agency, held on the 27th February 2015. Mr Riepl’s statements are to be considered private opinion and do not represent the position of the Expat Centre.

87 Interview with Ms. Dider Can, staff member of the Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen, held on the 11th February 2015.
origin, religion or belief, age and sexual orientation in employment, and the Federal-Equal Treatment Act that covers public employment. Besides the area of employment, ethnic affiliation is further protected in the area of access to and supply with goods and services, as well as including education, health and social protection/security.

The institutional set-up to fight discrimination includes two equality bodies. The first is the Equal Treatment Commission and examines cases put forward by presumed victims and assesses their coverage by the Equal Treatment Act. This service is free of charge and aims at settling disputes before the initiation of actual court proceedings. Employees of the federal public sector who feel discriminated against at work need to address a special commission, the Federal Equal Treatment Commission. The second key body of Austrian anti-discrimination policy is the Ombud for Equal Treatment, which offer counselling as well as representation of potential victims of discrimination against the employer and can attend meetings of the Equal Treatment Commission in an advisory function. Furthermore, the ombudspersons can conduct independent inquiries and surveys and publish independent reports and recommendations, engage in spreading information about the rights of victims through information material, the Internet, as well as by giving workshops, lectures and as speakers in public debates.

The Chamber of Labour provides legal counselling to its members. However, since membership is conditional upon entry into the labour market, family or humanitarian migrants who have not yet been in employment in Austria have generally no access to this facility. Since 2004, the NGO Litigation Association Against Discrimination, funded partly by the Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection offers legal assistance and general information on anti-discrimination legislation and provides training courses and seminars on this topic. It is the only NGO in Austria that is legally entitled to stand in court and to intervene as a third party in cases of discrimination (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

Various aspects of the enforcing mechanisms of these equality policies have been criticized. The examination process through the Equal Treatment Commission is considered very slow - it takes between nine months and one and a half years - and results only in non-binding recommendations. Moreover, the Ombud for Equal Treatment related to discrimination in employment based on other characteristics including ethnicity has an agency only in the capital, which forces migrants living outside of Vienna to displace

Please see the Klagsverband’s website, available at: [http://www.klagsverband.at/english](http://www.klagsverband.at/english) (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015)
themselves to seek advice (Krause and Liebig, 2011). An additional problem is that victims of discrimination have to bear the full risk and cost of the proceedings in case they bring a lawsuit. As a matter of fact, the number of relevant case law is very small. Criticism includes as well the complex legal framework, the lack of awareness in the overall population, and the limited resources of the Equality Bodies at the federal and provincial levels (Schindlauer, 2013).

As regards migrants’ access to social rights, as previously said, any migrant that works legally has equal working conditions and access to social security as nationals.89 Efforts have been made to facilitate migrants’ access to social rights, in particular by improving the image of migrants as target and actor groups within the health and social system: house integration coordinators have been appointed within social insurance institutions and diversity and intercultural dialogue have been embedded in the strategically important guidelines of the Austrian health sector (e.g. framework health goals, health reform 2013). In June 2014, a manual was published to develop allocation guidelines to counteract the discrimination of persons with a migrant background in the housing market (Expert Council for Integration, 2014). The AMS has also tried to increase the share of persons with an immigration background among its staff by encouraging the hiring of persons who speak the main languages of immigrants. Additionally, since 2007 the Vienna AMS has implemented a comprehensive diversity management approach and provides, among other measures, special diversity training to its staff (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

89 Interview with Ms. Dider Can, staff member of the Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen, held on the 11th February 2015.
### Table 42: Austrian Policies to Facilitate Social Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate social integration</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eligibility for family reunion</td>
<td>Family members of key workers, skilled workers and graduates, who have either already permanently settled in Austria or have received permission to work via the new RWR Card system can get a RWR Card Plus for one year. Besides spouses and minor children family members include registered partners and adopted children and stepchildren.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conditions for acquisition of status</td>
<td>Applicants to RWR Card Plus do not need to prove German language skills before entering the country or be subject to the annual quota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security of status</td>
<td>Family members can renew the permit and stay in Austria as long as the RWR Card holder. Equal access to public services in different areas such as education, social security, and healthcare. In case of cessation of the family status for reasons such as violence in the family, divorce attributable to the reunifying person’s fault, death of the reunifying person, certain granting prerequisites (e.g. income) to remain in Austria do not need to be met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-discrimination</td>
<td>The Equal Treatment Act and the Federal-Equal Treatment Act prohibit discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, age and sexual orientation in employment in private and public sector. Ethnic affiliation is further protected in the area of access to and supply with goods and services, as well as including education, health and social protection/security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Implement equality policies</td>
<td>Two specialised Equality Agencies are in place to combat discrimination: the Equal Treatment Commission assesses the cases and settles disputes before the initiation of actual court proceedings. The Ombud for Equal Treatment offers counselling as well as representation of potential victims of discrimination against the employer. The Ombud for Equal Treatment conducts independent inquiries and surveys, publishes independent reports and recommendations, and engages in spreading information about the rights of victims. The Chamber of Labour provides legal counselling to its members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The NGO Litigation Association Against Discrimination offers legal assistance and general information on anti-discrimination legislation and provides training courses and seminars. It can intervene as a third party in cases of discrimination.

| Promote migrants’ access to social rights | House integration coordinators within social insurance institutions.  
Diversity and intercultural dialogue is embedded in the strategic documents of the Austrian health sector.  
Guidelines to counteract the discrimination of migrants on the housing market.  
The AMS encourages hiring persons who speak the main languages of immigrants.  
The AMS adopts a diversity management approach and provides special diversity training to its staff. |
6.3.3 Cultural Integration

In Austria, access to education is a legal right for all children in the country for nine years until the age of fifteen years. Although the law does not specify the children’s residence status, in practice there is no difference between documented and undocumented children younger than fifteen years enrolling in school. Instead, for teenagers older than fifteen years in an irregular status, the school principal usually decides their access to school and vocational training on a case by case basis, whereas some NGOs provide courses for adults (PICUM, 2003).

Initiatives to incentivise the participation of migrants’ pupils’ at school include some pilot projects that aim at fostering cooperation and communication between parents of present students and the school. Furthermore, province school boards have established school counselling centres for immigrants and, if required, counselling on school issues is also offered in languages other than German (OECD, 2009).

However, induction programmes for newcomers’ pupils focus mainly on the acquisition of the German language. In order to enter a school in Austria foreign students need to take placement tests to evaluate whether they have sufficient knowledge for the grade they wish to enter. If their German skills are not sufficient to attend the classes they can be admitted for one year, renewable, as extra-matricular students in order to give them the possibility to improve their language skills. Remedial teaching in German is foreseen in primary schools and lower secondary schools (OECD, 2009) while teaching in the mother tongue is offered as an optional exercise at primary schools and special schools. Training courses in German as a second language are offered also to regular students (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

Through the study it has not been possible to find significant initiatives to facilitate an equal distribution of students with migrant background in order to prevent the emergence of all-migrant pupils schools. According to the law, schools cannot bar students from admission but in principle admission should take into consideration the proximity of residence, in particular for secondary schools. Additionally, there is no system to monitor segregation in the educational system besides a statistical overview of school attendance of different national groups that the Federal Ministry of Education regularly publishes. Measures to promote societal integration at school differ from school to school and depend mainly on the school director (Migrant Integration Policy Index, 2010a). At the same time, schools with

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90 Interview with Ms. Dider Can, staff member of the Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen, held on the 11th February 2015.
high proportions of migrant students are not encouraged to create synergies with other agencies to facilitate migrant students’ access to social services in order to enhance their well-being and education outcomes (OECD, 2009).

The main initiative to promote appreciation of cultural diversity among students is the project Zusammen: Österreich, initiated in 2011 by the current minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, Mr Sebastian Kurz, when he was State Secretary for Integration. The project aims to reduce prejudices and to encourage pupils to create their own success stories. It is supported on a voluntary basis by more than 300 personalities from sport, business and culture with a migration background, the so-called “integration ambassadors”, that present their successful stories of integration in Austria. The project especially targets high schools but also private companies and not-for-profit organisations.91 92

Concerning policies to promote a sensitive and inclusive education, since the early 1970s Austria established the so-called “mother-tongue” instruction. At the beginning it was meant to prepare guest-workers’ children for the eventual return to their countries of origin, rather than for long-term integration into Austrian society. However, in 1992 this concept was integrated in a more global commitment to diversity in the education system. Since then the mother-tongue instruction in Austria is still extensively adopted and courses are provided in eighteen different languages (Krause and Liebig, 2011).

Also in the 1990s the “intercultural learning” paradigm was integrated as an educational principle in compulsory schools and academic secondary schools. In line with it, curricula and textbooks should recognise diverse cultural backgrounds, besides language. Teachers are obliged to take this educational principle into account although in a discretionary way (Huddleston et al., 2011). Additionally, the Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts and Culture has supported school projects that aim at integrating students with a migrant background, or their parents, in everyday school life and at increasing intercultural dialogue. Some municipalities founded some kindergartens that focus especially on the integration of migrant students or the intercultural learning of children (OECD, 2009).

However, a multicultural pedagogy is not really facilitated. Schools and states retain wide discretion about whether or how to train teachers, teach mother tongues and cultures, and implement intercultural education. In most states, school councils have integration and intercultural education departments and inspectors but staffing and support varies

91 For further information, please see the official website available at: www.zusammen-oesterreich.at (Last accessed on the 21st March 2015).

92 Interview with Ms. Shanti D’Sa, staff member of the Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, held on the 17th September 2014.
significantly (Huddleston et al., 2011). Additionally, since there is no obligation for the University Colleges of Teacher Training to offer specific courses in intercultural learning, the individual institution decides if and how to offer something specific. Finally, there is no policy to recruit and attract teachers or teaching support staff with the immigrant students’ cultural backgrounds in schools with high proportions of immigrant students (OECD, 2009).

In Austria there is a long tradition of promoting religious dialogue and religious institutions have an active role in integration. Since 1867, the Basic Law grants recognised religious communities a special legal standing as corporations under public law and guarantees their internal autonomy. Recognised religious societies enjoy other privileges such as the right to organise religious tuitions for children with financial support from the government; and the right to the ministry of community members in an institutionalized context such as hospitals, prisons and the army. Furthermore, if their authorities consent, their ministers that are third-country nationals are not subject to immigration quotas and to work permit requirements in order to enter Austria (Janda and Vogl, 2010).

The Islamic community in Austria and the Coptic Church enjoy the status of recognised religious societies. In particular, the Islamic community has obtained recognition under a separate law passed in 1912 after Austria’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Initially the recognition pertained only to the Hanefitic rite as practised in Bosnia but in 1979 it was extended to all variants of Islam. In the same year the Constitution of the Islamic Religious Community entered into vigour (Janda and Vogl, 2010). This is an umbrella organisation of Muslim associations in the whole of Austria and represents officially Austrian Muslims. Its main responsibility is the state-funded supply of Islamic religious education at Austrian public and private schools.93

In 2012, the government set up the Dialogforum Islam, an official platform for dialogue with the Muslim community. The dialogue has touched different topics, including a handbook for issues related to the construction of mosques, and measures against radicalization and Islamophobia, Islam and the Media (APA-OTS, 2015). A first result is the university degree on Islamic theology to be established in 2015 (Expert Council for Integration, 2013). The degree will qualify graduates to work as an imam, pastor or scholar of Islam. The dialogue has also discussed the updates of the 1912 law on Islam. This was finally updated in March 2015. As the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs declared, the main purpose of the updates is to minimize the influence of other countries on the Islam in Austria.

93 For further information please see the website of the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, available at: http://www.derislam.at/ (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015).
To this aim, the new provisions include a ban of foreign funding for Islamic organisations. The law also requires any group claiming to represent Austrian Muslims to submit and use a standardized German translation of the Koran. However, the law also strengthens Muslims’ legal status for example by guaranteeing Islamic pastoral care in hospitals and the army, and protecting Muslims’ rights to eat and produce food according to Islamic rules (Nasralla, 2015).

Although religion has a predominant role in the intercultural dialogue in Austria there are initiatives that cover other topics. Additional initiatives include the Journalism Award for Integration, established since 2012 by the Experts Council, the Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Integration Fund. The prize is awarded to journalists who have made a special contribution to rendering the integration debate more objective (Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs, 2014). Additionally, targeted programmes and internships in media companies have succeeded in attracting young people with a migrant background into media-related professions (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2014). Public funds are directed to migrant associations’ cultural activities as part of municipalities’ integration programs (Kraler and Sohler, 2005). They have also received support to professionalise their structure and to provide services to facilitate migrants’ integration (Krause and Liebig, 2011).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase successful participation of migrants to the national educational system</td>
<td>Facilitate access to education</td>
<td>All compulsory-age (until 15 years old) children in the country, regardless of their residence status (includes undocumented) have access to education. Pilot projects to foster cooperation and communication between parents of present students and the school. School counselling centres for immigrants. Placement tests for foreign students to evaluate whether they have sufficient knowledge for the grade they wish to enter. Remedial teaching in German is foreseen in primary schools and lower secondary schools. Teaching in the mother tongue is offered as an optional exercise at primary schools and special schools.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate cultural integration</td>
<td>Prevent the emergence of all-migrant pupils schools</td>
<td></td>
<td>Schools cannot ban students from admission although in principle admission should take into consideration the proximity of residence. The project Zusammen: Österreich presents migrants’ successful stories of integration in Austria in high schools but also private companies and no-profit organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote multicultural education</td>
<td>Promote multicultural pedagogy</td>
<td>Under request of the individual institution the University Colleges of Teacher Training can offer specific courses in intercultural learning. In most states school councils have integration and intercultural education departments and inspectors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culturally sensitive and inclusive education</td>
<td></td>
<td>Schools provide mother-tongue instruction in eighteen different languages. Intercultural Learning was integrated as an educational principle in compulsory schools and academic secondary schools. The Federal Ministry for Education, the Arts and Culture has supported school projects that aim at integrating students with a migrant background, or their parents, in everyday school life and at increasing intercultural dialogue.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Promote recognition of religious and cultural diversity** | Promote the role of cultural and religious institutions in integration | Since 1867 the Basic Law grants recognised religious communities a special legal standing as corporations under public law and their internal autonomy as well as various privileges.  
The Dialogforum Islam provides an institutional platform for dialogue with the Muslim community.  
The Journalism Award for Integration is awarded to journalists who have made a special contribution to rendering the integration debate more objective.  
Public funds target migrant associations’ cultural activities as part of municipalities’ integration programs. |
6.3.4 Civic Integration

The EC Permanent Residence permit gives right to the long-term residence status and free access to the Austrian labour market for third-country nationals for five years (Wien.at, 2015). This permit complies with the 2003 EU Council Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. According to it, third-country nationals who have legally and continuously resided for a period of five years within the territory of an EU country can apply for the EU resident status (Council of the European Union, 2003). The Settlement and Residence Act in force in Austria specifies that absences from the country for periods of less than six consecutive months (and not exceeding ten months in total within the five-year period) or for specific reasons provided for by the country of origin’s law (e.g. military service, serious illness or social obligation) will be regarded as not interrupting the period of continuous residence. For the EU Blue Card holders, the period abroad is increased to less than twelve consecutive months (and not exceeding eighteen months in total within the five-year period) (Austrian Parliament, 2015).

The Austrian law differentiates residence permits between the ones allowing settlement and the ones that do not. This distinction aims at forcing third-country nationals to declare the intention to settle in Austria before entering the country to prevent them switching from temporary to long-term residence once in Austria (UNODC, 1997). Indeed, only after a period of five years in Austria with a residence permit allowing settlement is it possible to apply for an EC Permanent Residence. The acquisition of the Austrian citizenship is also bound to holding a settlement permit (Kratzmann et al., 2011). Currently, the only possibility for third-country nationals to settle in Austria for work is offered to highly-skilled workers: through the RWR Card, the RWR Card Plus, and the EU Blue Card these are granted a right of settlement and can apply after five years for the EC Permanent Residence. For instance, a highly-skilled migrant can enter Austria through the RWR Card (valid for one year), and later stay with the RWR Card Plus (for one year then renewed for 3 years). However, there are no exceptions for highly-skilled migrants as regards the integration requirements required to obtain long-term residence or citizenship: the Austrian law requires proving German skills at the level B1 as per the second module of the integration agreement (Beratungszentrum für

Please see at the website of the Federal Ministry of Interior, Republic of Austria, Residence Titles Providing Time-Limited Right of Settlement.

http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Niederlassung/english/start.aspx#_Residence%20titles%20providing%20time-limited%20right%20of%20settlement (Last accessed on the 24th June 2015)
Migranten und Migrantinnen, 2014).95 However, as mentioned previously, support is provided to complete the integration agreement through online platforms for German learning and the Austrian rule of law principles and social values (European Migration Network, 2012a).

All original granting conditions must exist for a renewal of a permit: especially, maintenance, accommodation, no conviction by court, or employment in the event of a settlement permit or evidence of study in case of students. If these conditions are not met, no permit will be granted, and the person must leave the country (Kratzmann et al., 2011). According to the Austrian Aliens Police Act, holders of an EC Permanent Residence may only be expelled if their further stay may pose a serious threat to public order or security. Factors such as duration of residence or age are not taken into account for protection against expulsion (UNODC, 1997).

Concerning the rights associated with the EC Permanent Residence, as mentioned above holders have free access to the Austrian labour market. Additionally, they are eligible for family benefits and children allowance (Kraler and Sohler, 2005). Simultaneous holding of an EC Permanent Residence is not allowed in more than one EU member state and the third-country national should apply again if they want to move and reside in Austria from another EU country. Additionally, holders can leave Austria without losing their long-term residence but the length of the period can vary according to the purpose (work or pleasure) and destination (another EU member state or not): for instance, for work, migrants can go to another EU country for one year.96

Citizenship is usually considered as the primary measure of migrants’ integration in democratic societies, since once naturalised, migrants enjoy the same legal protection and political rights as nationals (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2013). Austrian citizenship legislation is based on the 1985 Law that is adopted at a federal level, whereas provincial governments are responsible for the implementation of legal provisions. The law has been modified several times and the last amendment dates to 2013. A significant amendment was introduced in 2005 when, following a rise in the number of naturalisations, the government decided to make more difficult the general conditions for naturalisation and, in particular, family-based modes of acquisition. Therefore, the 2005 amendment harmonises naturalisation policies and in doing so it restricts the possibility of naturalisations by limiting the provincial authorities’

95 For further information please see: MIGRATION.GOV.AUT, Integration Agreement.
96 Interview with Ms. Dider Can, staff member of the Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen, held on the 11th February 2015.
discretion in implementing the law. Currently, three principles represent the basis of the legislation on citizenship: the principle of “ius sanguinis”, the ban on dual nationality, and the belief that naturalisation should be the consequence of a successful integration (ÇINAR, 2009).

According to the first principle, Austrian citizenship is acquired at birth by having one or both parents with Austrian citizenship. Instead, the fact of being born in Austria independently to the nationality of the parents – the so-called “jus soli” – does not entail Austrian citizenship but only gives the right to faster naturalisation after six years of residence (Stern and Valchars, 2013a). However, the principle of jus sanguinis is not applied fully since if a foreign child of an Austrian national was not born in wedlock, the legal entitlement to be granted Austrian citizenship is dependent on the mother holding Austrian citizenship. In contrast, if the Austrian parent is the father, the legal entitlement is not automatic.97

Dual nationality supports migrants in participating in multiple polities thereby recognising that people can have multiple ties and transnational lives (Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2014). Austria does not allow dual citizenship and requires renunciation of the previous citizenship in order to acquire the Austrian one. A two year period is granted as the time-window to renounce the previous citizenship.98 The law includes as modes to lose citizenship the deliberate acquisition of a foreign citizenship and retaining his or her prior citizenship for more than two years since acquisition of the Austrian one.99 As mentioned previously, dual nationality may be tolerated if renunciation of original citizenship is not possible (e.g. the country of origin refuses expatriation, or it would require payments that are out of proportion) (Koppenberg, 2013).

Concerning naturalisation, since 2005 some categories of people are “entitled to naturalisation” (Stern and Valchars, 2013a). These are people born in Austria, citizens of the European Economic Area, spouses and minor children of Austrians or of applicants for Austrian citizenship, recognised refugees, stateless persons born in Austria, former Austrian nationals and long-term residents after thirty years. In contrast, the ordinary naturalisation

97 If the Austrian parent is the father, this latter should recognises the child before birth or within eight weeks thereafter otherwise either s/he has to be naturalised under the age of 14 or is left to the regular residency requirements. Please see: Stern and Valchars, 2013a.

98 However, Austrian authorities can grant citizenship under the condition that the renunciation of the previous citizenship must be proven within two years if a person cannot give up his or her previous citizenship without having first acquired another citizenship. For more information please see: Çinar, 2009.

99 The Citizenship Law includes as well ‘voluntarily enter the military service of a foreign country’ as a reason to lose Austrian nationality.
procedure implies a discretionary decision by Austrian authorities. In this case, non-national residents in Austria have to meet all requirements but citizenship can still be refused.

However, Austrian authorities enjoy a wide margin of interpretation not only in discretionary naturalisations, but also with regard to the many vague terms and conditions to be fulfilled by any person applying for naturalisation. Yet, the decision should be reasoned and can be challenged before the Administrative Court (Stern and Valchars, 2013a). As a main requirement for discretionary naturalisations foreign nationals must have had their principal residence and legally settled in Austria without interruption for at least ten years. With the 2005 amendment, legal settlement implies that applicants must have been permanent residents for at least five out of ten years while previously applicants had only to prove that they had registered with the police for at least ten years. Moreover, the current condition of uninterrupted residence entails that applicants must not have been abroad for more than 20 percent of the required waiting period (i.e. two years) and requires a so-called “uninterrupted chain of residence permits” (Stern and Valchars, 2013a). Other requirements are a regular income, to have received social assistance benefits for three years within the last six years preceding the application, evidence of knowledge of German at the level of B1, and since 2005 passing a test on legal and social norms in Austria. To support applicants to pass the test, the government has provided a website and brochures providing general information about the new citizenship exam and study materials and describing the Austrian principles and core values (Koppenberg, 2013).

No requirement exemptions are provided for highly-skilled foreigners. Instead, the 2013 amendment has reintroduced a provision - abolished in 2005 - allowing naturalisation of foreigners after six years if they can provide evidence of “sustainable personal integration”, that is adaptation to social, economic and cultural life in Austria and to the basic values of a democratic European country and its society (Stern and Valchars, 2013a). Applicants to this fast-track naturalisation should have certified German skills at level B2 (instead of level B1 required for ordinary naturalisation), as well as been engaged for at least three years in professional or voluntary activities considered as evidence of sustainable personal integration. Sustainable personal and professional integration also entitles foreign nationals who have had their principal residence in Austria for at least fifteen years to acquire Austrian citizenship, although sustainable integration is not defined (Stern and Valchars, 2013a). Finally, citizenship is denied to persons convicted of any crime (Bevelander and Spång, 2014).

As mentioned, spouses and minor children of Austrians are entitled to naturalisation. However, the 2005 amendment increased the waiting period in terms of residence in the
country (from four to five years) as well as the duration of the marriage (from one to six years). The couple must live in the same household (Koppenberg, 2013). Additionally, with the 2005 amendment homosexual couples have the same requirements as married heterosexual couples. Austrian citizenship acquired by a foreign national can be extended to their spouse and children upon application only if they fulfil the same requirements as foreign family members of Austrian nationals. Besides that, they must have a permanent residence permit at the time of application.

Citizenship awarding ceremonies have been introduced with the 2013 amendment. According to it, naturalisations will have to be held ‘in an appropriate, festive frame, as expressed through a common recital of the federal anthem and the visible display of the flags of the Republic, the respective province and the European Union’ (Expert Council for Integration, 2013).

As noted previously, besides access to naturalisation other dynamics pertaining to the political structure of the country of destination influence migrants’ political participation there (Zapata-Barrero et al., 2013). This chapter examines in particular electoral rights, political liberties, and support to consultative bodies on migration issues. In Austria, political liberties such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly are constitutionally guaranteed: the provisions contained in the 1867 Basic Law and in the European Convention on Human Rights, which together with its protocols form part of the constitution, do not contain explicit references to citizens and therefore guarantee to all persons resident in Austria most political rights. However, freedom of assembly is limited: though third-country nationals may freely participate in public assemblies and demonstrations, they cannot organise assemblies or demonstrations nor can they lead public assemblies dealing with public issues (Kraler and Sohler, 2005).

Conversely, third-country nationals have no formal political rights. As mentioned previously, political parties are free to recruit foreign nationals residing in Austria as members, but they are not likely to be elected as party officials, since they are not eligible for political posts (Kraler and Sohler, 2005). Indeed, even if they hold an EC Permanent Residence, they do not enjoy any electoral rights either at federal or provincial level. An attempt was made in 2002 by the Vienna Provincial Parliament that enacted a law allowing third-country nationals after five years of residence in the city to vote and be elected at district level for the so-called urban district councils. However, the Constitutional Court

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100 However, spouses of Austrian citizens residing permanently abroad could be naturalized after five years of marriage. Please see: Stern Joachim and Valchars, 2013a.
found the law to be in conflict with the Austrian constitution and it was abolished (Stern and Valchars, 2013).

Instead, as mentioned previously the passive vote in works councils and in the Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce, key representatives of employees’ and employers’ interests, has been finally introduced following the call of the European Court of Justice (Kraler and Sohler, 2005).

Concerning other forms of migrants’ participation in the Austrian decision making process, migrants’ representatives have never been called to participate in consultative bodies on migration and integration issues. In the 1990s, an advisory council on migration and asylum charged with advising the government on all matters concerning migration and asylum including integration, saw the participation of representatives from relevant ministries, the social partners (i.e. trade unions, the Chamber of Labour, the Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Austrian Industries), and representatives of provinces and municipalities. In 2010, this was replaced by the Federal Minister of the Interior with a specific expert committee on integration charged with advising the government in relation to the NAP (Bijl and Verweij, 2012). However, its members are experts that work in each of the seven fields of action of the NAP and it does not foresee the participation of diaspora members (Expert Council for Integration, 2013). Finally, according to the 1951 Law on association, diaspora organisations can be eligible for public subsidies, as with other associations, as long as they have the status of association, which entails specific procedures and minimum membership (Kraler and Sohler, 2005).
### Table 44: Austrian Policies to Facilitate Civic Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Intermediate objective</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate civic integration</td>
<td></td>
<td>Eligibility and conditions of acquisition</td>
<td>Eligibility is allowed after five years of legal residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Long-term residence is facilitated for third-country highly-skilled workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Allowed absences from country previous to granting long-term residence for periods of less than six consecutive months (and not exceeding ten months in total within the five-year period) or for specific reasons provided for by the country of origin’s law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For the EU Blue Card holders, the period abroad is increased to less than twelve consecutive months (and not exceeding eighteen months in total within the five-year period).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Through the RWR Card system time as self-employed and student is counted into five years of legal residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Provided support to pass integration requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Security of status</td>
<td>The EC Permanent Residence is valid for five years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Holders of a EC Permanent Residence permit may only be expelled if their further stay may pose a serious threat to public order or security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rights associated with long-term residence</td>
<td>Free access to the Austrian labour market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Access to family benefits and children allowance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Granted possibility to leave Austria without losing the long-term residence but the length of the period can vary according to the purpose and destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eligibility and acquisition conditions</td>
<td>Citizenship awarding ceremonies are established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support provided to pass citizenship requirement (i.e. website and brochures providing general information about the new citizenship exam and study materials and describing the Austrian principles and core values).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>However, conditions for acquisition of citizenship are quite restrictive:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-People born in Austria, citizens of a country part of the European Economic Area, spouses and minor children of Austrians or of applicants for Austrian citizenship, recognised refugees, stateless persons born in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Austria, former Austrian nationals and long-term residents after 30 years are entitled to naturalisation.

- For ordinary naturalisation first generation migrants are required to have had principal residence and have had legally settled in Austria without interruption for at least ten years.

- The requirement of uninterrupted residence entails that applicants must not have been abroad for more than 20 percent of the required waiting period (i.e. two years) and requires an uninterrupted chain of residence permits.

- Fast-track naturalisation after six years for foreigners that can provide evidence of sustainable personal integration, namely adaptation to social, economic and cultural life in Austria and to the basic values of a democratic European country and its society.

- Required six years of residence and six years of marriage for spouses of nationals.

- Austrian citizenship acquired by a foreign national can be extended to his or her spouse and children upon application only if they fulfil the same requirements as foreign family members of Austrian nationals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security of status</th>
<th>Grounds for withdrawal include: voluntarily enter the military service of a foreign country, deliberate acquisition of a foreign citizenship and retaining his or her prior citizenship for more than two years since acquisition of the Austrian one.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dual nationality</td>
<td>Dual citizenship is not allowed but it may be tolerated if renunciation of original citizenship is not possible (e.g. the country of origin refuses expatriation, or it would require payments that are our out of proportion).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Guarantee migrants’ political participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political liberties</th>
<th>Freedom of association and freedom of assembly are constitutionally guaranteed. However, although third-country nationals may freely participate in public assemblies and demonstrations, they cannot organise assemblies or demonstrations nor can they lead public assemblies dealing with public issues. Political parties are free to recruit foreign nationals residing in Austria as party members and even spokesperson.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral rights</td>
<td>Guaranteed passive vote in works councils and in the Chamber of Labour and the Chamber of Commerce. However, legal residents do not enjoy any electoral rights either at federal or provincial level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultative bodies</td>
<td>Established an expert committee on integration charged with advising the government in relation to the NAP. Public funding for migrants associations under the same conditions as other associations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After having refused to consider itself as a country of immigration for decades, in the last years Austria has dramatically shifted its approach to migration. This is now directed towards two directions simultaneously. First, unlike in the past, migration policies are not informed on annual labour needs but on the long-term goal of maintaining the Austrian economy’s competitiveness on a global scale: the past demand-driven migration systems such as the guest-workers programmes and the quota system have been replaced by the RWR Card system that offers an entry channel to the local labour market based on qualitative criteria to ensure a basin of workers necessary for its knowledge-based economy in case of shortage. Second, integration has been put at the centre of Austrian migration policies. These are informed by the principle Integration from the Beginning according to which integration measures accompany migrants in a structured process starting in the country of origin.

Highly-skilled migration plays a key role linking the two components of the new Austrian approach to migration: compared to other migrants, the entry and stay of highly-skilled migrants is facilitated through the RWR Card as well as through various services offered to support their settlement in different areas of life including counselling and networking facilitation. At the same time, integration of highly-skilled migrants is encouraged through a system of permits that supports their permanent residence in the country as well as the possibility to acquire the Austrian nationality.

In line with these efforts to attract highly-skilled workers for its knowledge-based economy, the Austrian legal and policy framework favours migrants’ transnationalism to the extent in which it supports its own development. As regards the economic area, the government has put in place measures to attract highly-skilled workers and entrepreneurs and to help them establish cross-border businesses. However, there are still barriers partially limiting the entry regime of highly-skilled workers in the Austrian labour market (e.g. the need of a job offer to apply for the RWR Card, and the high level of requirements to obtain it), probably as result of trade unions’ resistance. Conversely, until now measures to facilitate small-scale transnational economic activities for personal purposes such as remittances transfer have not been implemented.

Cultural transnationalism is encouraged mainly in terms of facilitating brain circulation, which is considered functional to the internationalisation of Austrian higher-education institutions. To this aim, cooperation agreements between universities support the mobility of
students and scholars. At the same time the government is trying to speed up the recognition of degrees acquired abroad, although for highly-skilled third-country nationals this is not necessary. Instead, the government facilitates transfer of social remittances mainly through support to diaspora associations’ cultural activities and to transnational professional networks.

On the contrary, migrants’ social transnational activities face various obstacles. In line with the government’s declared position against circular migration, the residence permit system does not allow long absences without interrupting the process for acquisition of permanent residence and nationality. Furthermore, public funding for cross-border initiatives engaging diaspora has been discontinuous while support to migrants’ families left behind takes mainly the form of promotion of family reunion. This latter is facilitated in the case of highly-skilled migrants through the RWR Card Plus that gives unlimited access to the labour market and equal conditions as nationals for employment in both private and public sectors. In addition, the impossibility of being absent for long periods affects negatively migrants’ political activities in the country of origin, while Austrian law does not give political rights to third-country nationals either at federal or local level.

The other component of the Austrian paradigm to migration, the focus on migrants’ integration, has not been promoted uniformly in all aspects of life. Some areas are more developed (i.e. the economic and social dimensions) than others (i.e. educational and political dimensions). Additionally, the possibility to integrate in Austria is not equally granted to all third-country nationals: because highly-skilled migrants are considered necessary to the country’s economy the government has provided them with a privileged access to long-term settlement in Austria.

As regards the economic dimension of integration, the Austrian legal framework guarantees migrants’ rights as workers and they enjoy the same working conditions as nationals. Furthermore, the AMS offers various services to reduce unemployment among migrants and to avoid brain waste. However, through the RWR Card highly-skilled migrants have a facilitated access to the labour market in both private and public sectors.

Regarding the social dimension, several initiatives are in place to fight discrimination based on ethnic origin and to ensure third-country nationals’ access to social rights (e.g. through guidelines to include diversity and intercultural dialogues in the welfare state institutions). However, family reunion is facilitated for highly-skilled workers: through the RWR Card Plus their family members do not need to comply with the integration agreement’s requirements and have unlimited access to the labour market.
Interreligious dialogue occupies a central place in Austrian policies for cultural integration: since the 19th century Austrian law provides recognised religious communities internal autonomy and special legal standing, while Islam has a dedicated channel of communication through the Dialogforum Islam. However, the integration of third-country nationals’ pupils in the Austrian educational system is mainly focused on German language acquisition while there are no comprehensive induction programmes. Although there is a long tradition of multicultural education - centred mainly on mother-tongue instruction – since the time of guest-worker programmes, most of the activities are not implemented homogenously throughout the territory but at the province’s or school’s discretion. Additionally, it has not been possible to find significant initiatives aimed to prevent all-immigrant demographic at school.

Migrants’ civic participation is the integration area that faces most obstacles. During the last decade the acquisition of long-term residency and Austrian nationality has been restricted: long absences interrupt the continuous residence to obtain the EC Permanent Residence permit; norms on nationality apply the jus sanguinis principle and do not allow dual nationality while naturalisation requires an uninterrupted chain of residence permits. However, also in this case highly-skilled migrants have a privileged channel to both long-term residency and Austrian nationality through the RWR Card that grants settlement rights. Finally, political participation for third-country nationals is quite limited: voting rights for political elections are not granted while committees on migration do not foresee the participation of diaspora representatives.
CHAPTER SEVEN

EGYPTIAN HIGHLY-SKILLED MIGRANTS IN AUSTRIA:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

This chapter analyses the findings of a qualitative study on highly-skilled Egyptian migrants in Austria. The rationale of this investigation is based on the conclusions deducted in the previous chapters on the key characteristics of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants. These can be summarised as follows:

- they cannot be considered a clear case of brain drain since the labour market in Egypt cannot absorb them (Sika, 2010). Meanwhile, the conditions of their migration suggest that they may facilitate brain circulation (Wahba, 2003);
- they usually transfer remittances through formal channels. Therefore, they strengthen the bank system in Egypt (Jureidini et al., 2010);
- their savings are higher compared to low-skilled migrants. Therefore, they can invest more in productive activities after covering their household’s daily living expenses (Fargues, 2010);
- in terms of skills enhancement their experience abroad is more enriching compared to low-skilled migrants. Therefore, they represent a superior source of knowledge and social remittances;
- associates of Coptic diaspora organisations see themselves as members of a minority persecuted by the Egyptian government rather than part of a united Egypt (Haddad and Donovan, 2013).

Regarding highly-skilled Egyptians moving to OECD countries, the study has highlighted the following advantages they bring to the development of Egypt compared to those moving to GCC countries:

- they are more eager to be in touch with their country of origin and contribute to its development since they move mostly permanently and are more scared to lose their identity (Zohry and Debnath, 2010);
• they are more gender-balanced. Therefore, they can strengthen the female work force and ultimately introduce a more gender-sensitive approach in the Egyptian socio-political and economic system (Jureidini et al., 2010);

• they are more exposed to technologies and industrial systems that differ from those in Egypt (Zohry and Debnath, 2010);

• they are in contact with a socio-political environment that differs from the one in Egypt. Therefore, they can be a better vehicle for the introduction of new ideas in Egypt and for the enhancement of the political and social debate there.

Concerning Egyptian migration in Austria, this study has highlighted the following characteristics:

• it is well-established since more than 40 percent of Egyptian-born migrants have Austrian citizenship (Eurostat Database, 2014). At the same time the Egyptian community in Austria is well connected with Austrian political authorities and shows a good level of organisation (Kraler and Sohler, 2005);

• Austria has a long tradition of academic Egyptian migration that dates back to the 19th century. Egyptian migrants in Austria show a high level of education (OECD STATISTICS, 2015);

• remittances of Egyptian migrants in Austria show a positive trend in contrast with the current international financial crisis begun in 2007. Therefore, they represent a stable source of foreign currency for Egypt;\textsuperscript{101}

• the Egyptian community in Austria is quite balanced in terms of religious belief (i.e. Muslims and Copts). Additionally, the Coptic community in Austria is actively involved in lobbying activities, in particular towards the Austrian government to support the rights of Christians in Muslim countries. However, the Egyptian uprising in 2011 seems to have united the Coptic and Muslim members of the Egyptian community in Austria (ORF.AT, 2004; Beig, 2010).

This investigation aims at exploring prevalent trends among Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria, the nature of their contributions to Egypt and of their sense of belonging towards their homeland. In particular, the research aims to find out whether their length of stay in Austria has been affecting the intensity and the nature of their engagement to their home country. To meet this goal, the study addresses the following points:

\textsuperscript{101} Interview with Ms. Leila Kaplan and Mr. Ahmed El-Matbouly, staff members of the Austro-Arab Chamber of Commerce (AACC), held on the 8th January 2015.
1. whether the Egyptian highly-skilled migration to Austria can generate an effective brain circulation between Austria and Egypt;
2. the overall potential contribution of Egyptian HSMs in Austria to the development of their homeland;
3. the level and the nature of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants’ engagement towards their homeland.

The study takes into account the transnational paradigm that highlights how the current global economy together with the new technologies in the communication and transport sectors allow migrants to adopt transnational identities. This makes obsolete the distinction between permanent, temporary and return migrant and allows migrants to help their country of origin without coming physically back. In analysing the contribution of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants to their homeland the study adopts Sen’s definition of development as “the process of expanding the substantive freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, 1999), that broadens the scope of migrants’ contributions, beyond economic growth, to include social and cultural capital.

Concerning brain circulation, the debate on the impact of highly-skilled migrants on the development of countries of origin usually orbits around the potential loss or gain of knowledge that their departure results in. As seen in the previous chapters, under the influence of the historical-structural paradigm highly-skilled migration has been mainly considered negative as a definitive loss of human capital for the country of origin (i.e. brain drain) (Lucas, 2008). However, in the 1990s a new literature emerged pointing out that it can result instead in a brain gain, namely a final resource profit in the long term benefitting those left at home (Graeme, 1996) since migrants can transfer knowledge and skills acquired abroad to the country of origin (i.e. brain circulation) (Saxenian, 2002, 183-202). According to the transnational theory, the current global economy and the new technologies in the transport and communication sectors have increased the probability of brain gain as it has put into question the common assumption that the physical return of migrants is a prerequisite for contributing to the development of the country of origin (Saxenian, 2006).

Three main conditions usually characterise brain drain: a) migrants have obtained their high-level skills (e.g. university degree) in the country of origin. This implies for the country of origin a loss of return from its investment in education (Schiff and Özden, 2006); b) highly-skilled migrants are able to obtain employment commensurate with their educational qualifications in their homeland. The opposite situation, called brain waste, makes useless the presence of highly-skilled professionals in the country of origin since they would not be able
to apply their skills (Docquier and Rapaport, 2012, 681-730); and c) highly-skilled migrants are not willing to transfer their knowledge and skills to the country of origin physically or remotely. In this case, the loss of knowledge that their move produces would be definitive.

Instead, opposite conditions facilitate the emergence of an effective brain circulation and therefore a brain gain: a) the experience abroad brings an additional value to highly-skilled migrants’ initial professional skills thereby creating the conditions for an advance of knowledge and skills for sending countries (Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay, 2003); b) the skills acquired abroad can be applied in their homeland thanks to an environment able to receive and use the new expertise and skills, such as academic and research institutions or high-tech industries (De Haas, 2007); and c) highly-skilled migrants are willing and have the capacity to detect new approaches/values/practices abroad and to apply them in the country of origin. Highly-skilled migrants can be beneficial if they contribute to the knowledge diffusion.\textsuperscript{102} The table below lists the factors determining brain drain versus brain circulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brain drain</th>
<th>Brain circulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) High-level skills (e.g. university degree) obtained in the country of origin.</td>
<td>d) Experience abroad brings an additional value to migrants’ initial professional skills (e.g. new professional skills, language skills).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Possibility of obtaining employment commensurate with their educational qualifications in their homeland.</td>
<td>e) The skills acquired abroad can be applied in the country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) HSMs are not willing to transfer their knowledge and skills to the country of origin physically or remotely.</td>
<td>f) HSMs are willing and have the capacity to detect new approaches/values/practices abroad and to apply them in the country of origin.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study has an exploratory nature and applies a qualitative approach based on in-depth interviews with Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria. The interviews were based on a questionnaire with open-ended questions in order to explore in detail respondents’

\textsuperscript{102} Docquier and Rapaport referred to temporary migration but the same consideration is relevant if we take into account migrants’ possibility to undertake transnational activities. For more information please see: Docquier and Rapaport 2012, 681-730.
contributions and understand their sense of belonging towards their homeland while allowing comparison across topics. The interviews focused on three topics: a) biographical data and migration history; b) sense of belonging towards Egypt and Austria; and c) transnational activities in terms of brain circulation, monetary remittances and social remittances.

The study took place between November 2012 and January 2015. Respondents were reached through social networks and snowball techniques. All respondents had to meet two specific criteria: a) at the time of the study they were living in Austria; and b) they should hold at least a university level degree.

This study presents three kinds of limitations. First, the size of the sample is small since only twenty-six Egyptian highly-skilled migrants could be interviewed. Although the interviews were anonymous, potential respondents were reluctant to take part due to being highly suspicious about the real purpose of the study. Second, the sample is not gender-balanced and only two women were interviewed. Egyptian women were more indisposed to take part in the study. Moreover, according to the information gathered from stakeholders and migrants, Egyptian women are usually inactive in Austria and arrive mainly as spouses of former migrants. Finally, the survey relies on the snowball technique rather than on a random probability sample. Although these limitations do not allow us to generalise the findings, the information provided offers a preliminary understanding of the profile of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants living in Austria, of their ties with their homeland, and of their contributions to its development.

The findings are divided into five sections. The first one contains respondents’ background characteristics. The other four are related to migration and development policies areas: a) brain circulation; b) remittances transfer; c) remittances’ productivity; and d) migrants’ other forms of engagement with their country of origin.

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103 Snowball sampling technique is used when the particular type of research respondents are difficult to locate. Snowball sampling relies on referrals from initial respondents/subjects to generate contacts for additional potential research respondents. This technique introduces bias in the findings because it reduces the likelihood that the sample will represent a good cross section of the research population.
7.1 FINDINGS

7.1.1 Background Characteristics

The total number of respondents is 26. They mainly live in the Vienna state (22), while two reside in Graz (Styria), one in Linz (Upper Austria), and one in Brunn am Gebirge (Lower Austria). Their mean age is 46.38 years with most respondents falling either in the group between 25 and 40 years old (11) or in the one between 41 and 60 years old (10). The rest are older than 61 years (5). There is a high predominance of males (24). As explained above, Egyptian women were especially reluctant to take part in the study because of their suspicions on its real purpose.

Concerning their level of education one of the criteria for participants’ selection was holding a university degree. However, almost half of the respondents hold or are attempting to obtain a higher degree: while some respondents are either master’s students (1 case) or hold a master’s degree (5), others hold a Ph.D degree (3) or are doctoral candidates (1). The main area of study is “Engineering/Computer Science” (9) followed by “Humanities/Law” (8) and “Natural Science” (5). A small group studied “Economics/Business Administration” (4).

Respondents’ duration of staying in Austria at the time of their interview varies: the majority falls almost equally in the slots “from less than one year and 4 years” and “from 26 onwards” (8 for each one). The rest is equally distributed between the slots “from 5 to 15 years” and “from 16 to 25 years” (5 for each one). A few respondents were in another OECD country before arriving to Austria (3). This allows dividing respondents into two major groups to analyse how their relationship with the country of origin and destination is changing according to the duration of their stay: recent migrants, with less than 16 years of stay (Group A), and long-term migrants, from 16 years onwards (Group B).
Table 46: Qualitative Study Respondents’ Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between 25 and 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 41 and 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Duration of staying in Austria (years)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From less than 1 to 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 5 to 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal (Group A-Recent Migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 16 to 25</td>
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<tr>
<td>From 26 onwards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subtotal (Group B-Long-Term Migrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<th>Reason behind migration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working opportunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family ties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<th>Occupation in Austria</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Student</td>
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The vast majority of respondents work in Austria (23), one is unemployed, while the remainder are studying (2). As regards the reasons behind their migration to Austria, most of them came either to study (10) or for a working opportunity (8). Some followed a family member, either their spouse or their parents (4). It seems that most of the times Austria was not a primary choice but they went there because of family ties/acquaintances being there (4) or for the possibility to get a visa more easily than in other countries (7). Some respondents already had a family member residing in Austria before their arrival (9).

### 7.1.2 Brain Circulation

Most respondents obtained the university degree in Egypt, save a few that graduated in Austria (4). Instead, the survey shows that master’s and Ph.D studies are mostly undertaken abroad: most of the respondents that hold a master’s degree obtained it either in Austria or in another OECD country (i.e. Germany or USA) (4), while one is studying for it in Austria. Instead, only one respondent obtained the master’s degree in Egypt. This trend is confirmed for doctoral studies: only one respondent obtained the Ph.D degree in Egypt while the remaining two obtained it abroad, either in Austria or in the USA. Moreover, one respondent is a doctoral candidate in Austria.

More than half work in the field they have studied (14) while a few are students (2). Most respondents whose occupation does not match their studies are working in a position below their educational level (6), while one is unemployed for lack of opportunities in her field of work. This latter declared:
“I am unemployed because the labour market in Austria is closed since 2009. My friends in Egypt are achieving more than me here” (interview with 9F on 1 July 2014).

The majority of respondents think that their skills level has increased as a result of staying and working in Austria (18) because of either the university or professional courses they undertook, or their working experience there, or their improved level of German. About this point it is possible to note that elderly respondents have more difficulties in understanding the value of their experience abroad, as in the following two examples. A 65-years old journalist declared:

“Young professionals in Egypt do not need my knowledge because nowadays they have access to everything through the Internet” (interview with 2M on 7 January 2013);

A 67-years old musician stated:

“I would be interested in teaching through the Internet but I wonder what to teach” (interview with 12M on 3 September 2013).

A majority believe that their new skills can be applied in Egypt and they can transfer knowledge/skills in Egypt through training courses or workshops (14). Some already have given lectures or taken part in remote workshops to transfer knowledge or build awareness about different topics such as new technology and social values. However, respondents denounced various obstacles such as low market demand for the new acquired skills, lack of connections, poor infrastructures, and corruption. A good illustration of how respondents perceive the working environment in Egypt is given by a Ph.D holder in engineering who was assistant professor at the Asyut University in Egypt before getting a post-doctoral position at the Graz University in Austria. He described how a cooperation project between the two universities he proposed failed for lack of interest by the decision makers in Egypt:

“When I arrived to Graz University I tried to establish some cooperation between it and the Assiut University but unfortunately the reaction in Egypt was not positive and I stopped. Initially I facilitated study visits for some graduates from Assiut to Austria. Then I proposed a project to transfer knowledge about new technologies from Graz to Assiut University. The main activity concerned providing training courses to graduates from Assiut University to support their career and indirectly the Egyptian industry. However, the decision makers in the Assiut University, namely the department heads and other executives, reacted very

104 Since the interviews were anonymous respondents are named by an alphanumeric code in which the number indicates the chronological order of the interview and the letter the sex (the letter M stays for “male” and F for “female”).
slowly. This is because the project was not generating direct benefit to them in terms of financial support or trips to Austria” (interview with 16M on 23 August 2014).

Most respondents are convinced that there are elements in their current working environment in Austria worth introducing to Egypt (17). Less than one-third indicated specific and practical items related to their field of expertise (7) such as: Systems Applications and Product or Customer Relationship Management system, water canalization system, passports control method, technique for drugs preparation, and method of clinical diagnosis. The rest indicated factors related to general working processes and governance issues such as results-based management, open-office policy, horizontal versus vertical organisational structure, more attention to the quality rather than the length of working experience, use of online resources and computers at university, synergy between university and the private sector, and promotion of start-up companies. For instance, the following respondents stated:

“Various elements could be useful in Egypt, for instance an open-office policy, a flexible time policy, or result-based working methods. Moreover, human resources are better in Austria in assigning roles: the role is function-based, not based on hierarchy. They look at the quality of your experience, not at the years of experience” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

“In the private sector they give more responsibilities to junior staff. They facilitate personal ideas from any staff member. They push you to have new ideas. You conduct a lot of research. You are encouraged to be a part of the company. You can change position, field, country” (interview with 5M on 13 April 2013).

However, other respondents denied that there was something worth transferring to Egypt (7) for different reasons: wide access to any kind of knowledge through the Internet, in Austria they work under their skills level, in Egypt their profession is more developed than in Austria or not developed at all. For instance, a pharmacist that owns various pharmacies in Vienna and has been living in Austria for more than 30 years explained how the labour markets in Egypt and Austria are different for his profession:

“In 1984 there was a meeting of pharmacists in Austria and I invited some from Egypt to show them the possibilities offered by Austrian methods. Later they asked me to go to Egypt to give lectures but I did not go. It would have been useless since in Egypt pharmacists do not manufacture drugs as in Austria but only sell them. I prefer to send medicine to Egypt as an act of charity if there is a crisis” (interview with 15M on 18 August 2014).
A vast majority are convinced that there are social/economic/legal elements in Austria worth introducing to Egypt (20). Less than one-third indicated specific items such as: a centralised pipeline system for hot water, a refuse recycling system, annual transport tickets, and public music festivals. However, most answers are more related to both socio-political values such as: a practical approach in politics, a long-term political planning, accountability, respect of rules; and governance issues such as: an economy based on manufacturing industry, a less mnemonic education system, computer literacy, welfare state, transportation system, workers’ protection, and urban plans. For instance, the following respondents declared:

“It is about economy. In Egypt the economy is more based on services such as mobile networks and tourism, and therefore it is not stable. They need manufacturing industries, such as cars and ships industries, as well as an electronic industry” (interview with 7M on 24 April 2013).

“Austrians do not learn by heart like they do in Egypt. In Egypt students do not use their brain, do not criticize, and are not creative. Moreover, they do not use computers” (interview with 3M on 14 April 2013).

In these cases, respondents gave the impression that the two countries are actually too different to transfer any element successfully. For instance, the following respondents declared:

“Everything is totally different, better: social system, educational system” (interview with 6M on 15 April 2013).

“Here there is too much difference in technology and culture. I feel hopeless” (interview with 8M on 18 August 2013).

“The entire Austrian lifestyle should be introduced: respecting the rules, the people” (interview with 19F on 25 August 2014).

Almost all respondents did not know any program for knowledge transfer. Only a few (4), whose ages are from 25 to 29 years, mentioned some programs to transfer knowledge to Egypt but were not aware of their details. More than half of respondents would be interested in participating to programmes allowing them to work temporarily in local companies in Egypt to transfer their know-how there (16), although some specified a time limit (i.e. no more than 2-3 months) or refused to do so on a voluntary basis. More than one-third refused (9) while one respondent was not sure. Almost the same number of respondents would participate in a virtual workshop: 15 respondents answered positively while 11 were not interested. The length of stay in Austria does not seem to influence respondents’ interest in
these programmes for knowledge transfer, either virtual or not: both groups answered equally over than a preference by Group A for working temporarily in Egypt. Lack of time is the main reason for not participating in these activities, online or not, which suggests respondents’ difficulties in integrating these activities for knowledge transfer to Egypt with their daily obligations in Austria. Additionally, there is a general belief that these projects would not succeed because of low support by the current Egyptian political class, as the following quote testifies:

“Because of corruption in Egypt nothing really can work out. They are only looking for money but not knowledge” (interview with 16M on 23 August 2014).

Instead a young doctor arrived a few months previously to Austria who wanted to contact the embassy to initiate a program to send Austrians to Egypt for knowledge transfer (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

7.1.3 Remittances Transfer

Most respondents send money to Egypt (14). The length of stay in Austria does not seem to have any significant effect since these are equally distributed between the two groups. However, some respondents from Group A (i.e. recent migrants) pointed out that they are not enough settled to be able to send money. For instance, a young student declared:

“I cannot send money home because I do not have enough. Instead, my family is supporting me sometimes” (interview with 6M on 15 April 2013).

As means to transfer money, respondents prefer to use MTOs such as Western Union or to ask a friend or a relative travelling to Egypt. Bank transfer collects less preference. Indeed, some respondents pointed out that bank’s fees are very high. Therefore, for small amounts of money personal contacts are more convenient. For instance, a civil engineer living in Austria for more than 30 years pointed out that banks ask for high fees:

“Bank transfer is convenient only for large sums while for small amounts it is better to use personal contacts” (interview with 22M on 18 October 2014)

A bank account manager confirmed:

“I send money to Egypt through my sister because transfer’s cost is expensive” (interview with 19F on 25 August 2014).
7.1.4 Remittances’ Productivity

When specified, remittances are mainly sent for personal/family responsibilities or charity purposes. Only a minority invest in Egypt or are willing to do so in the future (5). Prevalent sectors are either stocks and other financial instruments or real estate. Main obstacles to invest in Egypt are: the unstable political and economic situation, corruption, and personal reasons such as age and lack of interest. Other respondents pointed out the legal framework, bureaucracy, and the poor knowledge of the current market. In this case respondents stressed that by living abroad they are not able to build relations with the local political and market actors, which are necessary to target the best sectors for investment. For instance, the following respondent declares:

“Right now investments in Egypt are not safe, unless you have contacts with people that have insight on the economic situation. Economic data in Egypt are secret but there are people that know where it is worth investing. For instance, the ruling politicians always have access to information. The army is a competitor in the market. Before the revolution I had the right contacts because my father was an important person in the NDP party. However, now I do not have any relevant contact” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

Instead, one respondent is acting as intermediary between Egyptian and Austrian companies:

“I do not run my own business but I facilitate contacts between Egyptian and Austrian companies to support exports from Egypt” (14M on 7 July 2014).

Some respondents declared to know programs encouraging investments, business start-up, or micro-finance in Egypt (7). A few mentioned the bonds of the project for the enlargement of the Suez Canal that Egypt’s government is promoting but only one purchased them. However, apart from the one that bought these bonds, all of them were not aware of the details of these programs and only two declared to be interested in participating. A 29 year old electronic engineer declared:

“In the future I want to mentor academic institutions. Research is less than 1 percent of GDP in Egypt. I want to create a platform to fund academic research in Egypt. It will also connect universities in Egypt and abroad. Funds would arrive from different sources and its implementation will be cheaper in Egypt than in Europe” (interview with 4M on 14 April 2013).
However, respondents do not seem to have a particular inclination towards business and investing in Austria is not considered much more attractive than in Egypt: only some respondents declared undertaking a form of investment there or to be intentioned to do so (9). The main reason to invest in Austria is the low level of risk there. The prevalent form of investment is running a business, followed by buying state bonds or other financial tools, and buying real estate.

7.1.5 Other Forms of Migrant Engagement

The majority of respondents visit their homeland more than once a year (9) or at least once a year (8), an indicator of an important engagement. Some respondents less than once a year (6) and only a small group have never returned since they have left Egypt (3). Other than these latter who arrived in Austria less than four years ago, the duration of stay in Austria does not seem to affect the frequency of their visits to the country of origin and the two groups’ answers are quite similar. Instead, the security situation in Egypt has stopped some respondents, mostly Copts, from returning. These stopped their visits to Egypt since the beginning of the 2011 uprising as the following quotes from Coptic participants testify:

“I have never gone back for security reasons” (interview with 6M on 15 April 2013).

“I have not come back since I arrived to Austria. Maybe when Al-Sisi leaves power I will” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

“Before the revolution I went back to Egypt 3 or 4 times per year but since January 2011 never. Luxor is quiet but people still do not go out after 8.00 pm since there are no police around. I do not want to go back to Egypt now for fear of being blocked at the border” (3M on 14 February 2013).

The experience of one respondent living in Austria for more than 30 years highlights bureaucratic problems preventing migrants visiting Egypt:

“The first time I went back to Egypt was only 16 years after I left it because I wanted to escape the Egyptian military service. I could return to Egypt when I obtained the Austrian citizenship. Since then I go back every one and half year” (interview with 12M on 3 September 2013).

All respondents except one have social connections in Egypt, mainly family members and friends, with whom most of them keep in contact. The majority of respondents declared that the Internet facilitates contacts with Egypt (23), although two declared to be too old to use it
and to prefer telephone calls (one 57- and one 65- year old). The following experiences express the changes the Internet made to migrants’ contacts with Egypt. One respondent living in Austria since 1989 stated:


Another respondent said:

“20 years ago I felt more detached to Egypt. Now with the Internet and the cheap flights I feel as I have never left” (interview with 18M on 23 August 2014).

The vast majority of respondents declared to keep themselves informed about Egypt’s state of affairs (25), although two irregularly. Main means of information are social networks and online publications, followed by personal contacts. Television and newspapers are less used. Some respondents underlined that personal contacts are more reliable sources of information than media such as newspapers and TV news, as reported here below:

“I get informed through the Internet, newspapers, personal contacts with journalists. Being a journalist I can recognise fake news” (interview with 2M on 7 January 2013).

“I do not read Egyptian online news since they are not reliable. Calls to family members are better to have an insight” (interview with 8M on 18 August 2013).

As regards respondents’ sense of belonging to both Egypt and Austria, less than half feel more at home in Egypt (12) while about one-third feel more at home in Austria (8). Some declared to feel equally at home in both countries (4), while a few in neither of them (2). Respondents from Group A seem more at ease in Egypt while the ones from Group B feel more at home in Austria or in both countries. When asked about their predominant feelings towards Egypt, most expressed attachment as to their homeland. A few even said that they feel more attached to Egypt since they left. Others said they were sad about the current political and economic situation. However, almost one-third said they feel uneasy when they go back, that they feel like a stranger, and are not in line with people’s mentality there. These belong especially to Group B. For instance, one respondent living in Austria since 1992 declared:

“I felt like a stranger in Egypt when I returned this August. Actually I feel like a stranger since five years. This is because I have lived in Austria for twenty years and I am used to the system in Austria. I do not have problems with colleagues or friends but with my family I feel lonely” (interview with 2M on 7 January 2013).
Another one in Austria since 1988 stated:

“I do not feel at home anymore in Egypt. It is not me that has changed but Egyptian people have changed. They look for money, they treat me like a foreigner and they are greedy” (interview with 8M on 18 August 2013).

A respondent in Austria since 1989 stated:

“I feel more at home in Austria since 1998. I had a very difficult discussion with myself once I was in Egypt and when I came back to Austria I said to myself in German: ‘Finally at home’. The reason was the experience I had in Egypt at that time. I was shocked by the situation of Egypt and how the government was treating people. At that time I started to compare Egypt with Austria. Before, I was busy with the university and did not think about it” (interview with 20M on 25 August 2014).

Young Copts showed recrimination towards their homeland, as the two following quotes testify:

“I left Egypt for good. I do not even visit it. I do not miss Egypt since I am completely fed-up. I feel Egyptian but I can give up my nationality to get another one” (interview with 6M on 15 April 2013).

“I feel more gratitude towards Austria than Egypt. Austria has given me more than Egypt. Austria is like a white paper where you can draw what you want while Egypt is more rigid” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

Concerning their relationship with Austria, a strong majority consider themselves at ease there (19), with a clearer prevalence in Group B (12). According to respondents, the main obstacles to integration are: discrimination, especially at work, and the language barrier. A few consider their religion or traditions as an obstacle, Austrians’ introvert character, while one reckoned that the long process required to get a residency permit does not facilitate integration in Austria. A respondent recalls his experience as follows:

“At the beginning I felt discriminated because of my lack of German. I got impolite reactions. But with good German Austrians are more polite and welcoming” (interview with 4M on 7 July 2014).

A young Copt declared:

“I love Austria and Vienna. But I do not feel at home since traditions are a barrier and there is some discrimination” (interview with 6M on 15 April 2013).
Women seem to experience more difficulties in integrating because of language barriers: according to respondents, Egyptian women in Austria are usually inactive and do not speak German or another language, but only Arabic. Additionally, most Egyptian women do not migrate by themselves, for instance for study or work purposes, but arrive mainly as spouses of former migrants, as in the case of the two women that participated in this study. The following respondents declared:

"In Austria Egyptian women are less than half of Egyptian men. They come to Austria together with their family. Middle-class Egyptian women do not migrate because they are not allowed to. They focus on marrying instead of building a career. However, middle-class in Egypt is in decline since the time of Sadat and as a consequence the number of marriages has diminished. Women are psychologically affected by this” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

“Most Egyptian women in Austria do not know the language, they do not work. Most of them are housewives” (interview with 19F on 25 August 2014).

As regards the possibility of a permanent return to Egypt, half of the respondents, in particular from Group B, answered negatively (13), while some positively (8), especially from Group A. Instead, a few, almost equally distributed between the two groups, were not sure (5). The prevalent preconditions are improvement of the security and economic conditions; employment with a decent income; retirement; and improvement of professional skills. Instead, reasons for refusing this possibility include: lack of opportunities, poor social system, no attachment to Egypt, lack of decent health system and unavailability of necessary medicine. This particular point represents an objective obstacle that can create problems for the ones that reckon to come back after retiring. A 75 year old pharmacist recalls his experience:

“My wife had a stroke and needs medicines that are not available in Egypt. For me it is the same. Once we were in Egypt and ran out of medicines for my wife. We had to check twelve pharmacies before finding the right medicines. Pharmacists do not have enough knowledge in Egypt” (interview with 15M on 18 August 2014).

Some respondents from Group B prefer to share their time between the two countries without making a definitive decision, as the following quotes testify:

“I would like to come back even before retiring. However, I cannot think of staying in Egypt for long time, maybe 50 percent of the year. But later, near my retirement” (interview with 19F on 25 August 2014).
“My future can be between here and Egypt. I am ready to give more according to my possibilities. I can come back for some time, like in winter, but not definitely” (interview with 12M on 3 September 2013).

More than one-third (9) are in contact with associations in Egypt, either religious, political or philanthropic. As regards their connection with some forms of diaspora associations in Austria, most are connected to one of them. Some respondents have an active role in a migrant association or had in the past (7). However, it is possible to note that respondents’ length of stay in Austria, combined with their age, the interest in participating in these organisations: all respondents that frequent them belong to Group B and are over 50 years old. Instead, although some of the younger respondents are familiar with the major organisations (4) they are not members. They claim that these diaspora organisations are highly politicised and do not organise any activities other than offering space for events. Two respondents had a particularly strong opinion about them:

“There is no organisation that speaks in the name of Egyptians in Europe. The word ‘organisation’ itself scares Egyptians. The leaders of Egyptian political parties visit the Egyptian community abroad through these diaspora clubs. However, young Egyptians do not frequent them and most participants are the embassy’s staff families’ members. These do not have my same class of mentality since they are not open-minded and do not really integrate in Austria. Moreover, these organisations do not create opportunities for migrants to support their homeland: I made a trip to Egypt with one of them but it was only a touristic trip with no other aim such as facilitating business partnerships” (4M on 12 April 2013).

“These Egyptian organisations are established and controlled by the Egyptian government” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

Some of the younger respondents said that they took part in political activity during the 2011 uprising. However, the following quotes testify that they stopped being active once in Austria:

“During the revolution I was very active on Twitter, Facebook, etc. Now I am connected with Egypt through social networks but I am not a member of any group. After the elections I was mentally too tired to follow anymore. News on Twitter is always bad and I am stressed. (...) In Austria the news affects me more. I need to stay away from political life now” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

“I left Egypt for political reasons when Morsi was still in power. My family pushed me to leave Egypt. I was the general coordinator of the rebellion in Austria. I thought people
were very passive towards Morsi. (...) Now I want to have a break. There is too much tension in Egypt” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

A vast majority believe that they contribute to the development of their country of origin while in Austria (20). When asked to specify, respondents referred mainly to transfer of remittances or charity, promotion of tourism or Egyptian products, transfer of knowledge through lectures or YouTube videos, and promotion of Egypt’s image. Less often, respondents mentioned business activities and taking advantage of their experience once back. However, almost one-third (7) declared to undertake transnational activities or had done so in the past. These include: charity activities, a project to transfer knowledge, business development and political activity.

Transfer of remittances or charity was mentioned only by members of Group B, those who have been in Austria for at least 15 years, while only members of Group A referred to their value of experience once back. This seems to confirm that long-term migrants (i.e. Group B) have more difficulties in understanding the significance of their experience abroad for the development of their homeland, but it may also suggest that they do not look forward to going back to Egypt as in the case of more recent migrants. For instance, a 29-year-old respondent stated:

“Since one day I will return to Egypt and my experience will support Egypt. I will be able to help drive the country” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

A recurrent expression to refer to themselves as migrants was “Egypt’s ambassador”, as in the following quote:

“I am an ambassador of Egypt here in Austria and I improve the image of Egypt abroad. Like Romanians are associated to gypsies, in Europe people think Arabs are all the same. I have changed some impressions” (interview with M7 on 24 April 2013).

When specified, respondents indicated as main obstacles to their support bureaucracy and lack of programs. Some claimed that Egypt’s political establishment and society are not interested in migrants, as the following quotes testify:

“I would like representatives of migrants in the Egyptian parliament. But Egyptians have a problem with migrants: for instance al-Baradei lived in Vienna and when he came back to Egypt people claimed he did not know the country. Migrants have a weak position because people think they do not know Egypt” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).
“Until now the government has not modified its attitude towards migrants while these hoped to see some changes with the revolution. Since migrants give money to Egypt in exchange they want to vote” (interview with 11M on 23 August 2014).

“Like others I thought that the end of Mubarak’s regime would have resulted in a government looking for taking advantage from Egyptian professionals abroad. But now I do not think there is any chance” (interview with 16M on 23 August 2014).

However, some respondents consider their influence on Egypt limited since every time they go back there they behave as if they have never left:

“Abroad Egyptians adopt a new mentality but back to Egypt they still behave the same. In a way they are forced to follow the Egyptian way” (19F on 25 August 2014).

“In Egypt I have more privileges than in Austria, which nourish my ego. In the EU I am like everybody. In the EU everybody is equal and has to look after himself. Therefore, in Austria I am in a way but in Egypt I come back to my old mentality” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

Concerning their opinion on services provided by Egyptian embassies, the majority claim a lack of activities towards migrants (15), while almost one-third have a positive opinion (7) and the rest declared that they do not know. However, the general respondents’ impression is that the services provided are mostly administrative and protection activities. Instead, as activities to connect the Egyptian community they only organise a yearly dinner or charity events. One respondent denounced a lack of communication between Egyptian authorities with Egyptians abroad:

“There is a lack of trust. Egyptians abroad think that the government spies them. The embassy thinks you contact them because you are in trouble with the local police” (interview with 5M on 14 April 2013).

When asked for suggestions for the Egyptian government to strengthen migrants’ connection with their homeland, respondents suggested: sport facilities to connect diaspora members, cultural events, an online website connecting Egyptian migrants in different countries, activities for second generation of migrants such as visits to Egypt, and voting rights. Additionally, they demanded more attention to their integration in Austria, through: more information about administrative requirements in Arabic, surveys to know diaspora’s needs, facilitation in getting visa and work permits, and financial support to study in Austria. For instance, the following respondents declared:
“They should think of migrants as more than a money machine. They should have plans on how to integrate them more, for instance with contacts, opportunities” (Interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

“They should reach out to Egyptians and get information about their needs and life. If migrants are successful it would also mean success for Egypt. There is also the problem of the second generation; I have two children but they do not speak Arabic” (interview with 20M on 25 August 2014).

Regarding institutional organisations and incentives to facilitate Egyptian migrants’ engagement in the development of Egypt, respondents’ suggestions included: a database of competences of Egyptian diaspora, invite Egyptians abroad to conferences about the potential of Egypt to discuss together the future of the country, scholarships to study abroad to increase Egyptians’ know-how, a programme to support reintegration of migrants in Egypt, investment programmes for migrants for private business creation, programmes to support transfer of knowledge, and employ migrants to promote tourism to Egypt and Egyptian products in Austria. For instance:

“Egyptian migrants always think that they will be here in Austria temporarily and that they will come back one day. Migrants could help maybe by asking colleagues to visit Egypt or to buy products from Egypt. The government should use migrants for marketing programs or to help tourism” (interview with 20M on 25 August 2014).

“The government should focus more on education, for instance through scholarships to study abroad. Also on policies to incentivise migrants’ investments in Egypt: migrants know the needs of both Egypt and their country they live in now and would help increase exports to Europe” (interview with 7M on 2 April 2013).

Some respondents expressed scepticism as the following quote testifies:

“I don’t have any suggestions because the government does not want people in Egypt but pushes to migrate. Any suggestion would be against the interest of the government and therefore not accepted. Millions of migrants are ready to go back to help, for example to establish a research facility. But the one that was started has been undersized due to corruption. Egypt has the human resources. For instance, an IT company in Austria, a big one, is headed by an Egyptian” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

However, it was difficult for respondents, in particular from Group B, to understand this question, which had to be repeated more than once in different ways. This suggests that they
do not conceive an active role of the government in facilitating their support to Egypt’s development, apart from charity projects.

Concerning their vision of the current political scene in Egypt, except one that misses Mubarak, respondents’ general opinion is that the uprising was positive although has created a high degree of instability and an economic downturn. When asked to specify, respondents indicated that the revolt generated profound positive effects in people’s approach to politics, as the following respondents declared:

“After the revolution the system was shocked and the fear of change disappeared. The amount of entrepreneurs in Egypt increased. People now are more brave, at least a portion of young people” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

“The revolution is a starting point for a change. It broke the concept of fear and hopeless. It inspired young people to do something. They started to believe that they can do something” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).

“After the end of Mubarak people are more involved, more interested about politics” (interview with 2M on 7 January 2013).

Nobody welcomed the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the election of their candidate Morsi as president. Particularly there were worries from the Coptic side:

“I think the current situation is very bad because of the Muslim Brotherhood at power. Many Egyptians migrate, especially Christians” (interview with M6 on 15 April 2013).

Finally, most respondents concluded that the situation is still too fluid to foresee an outcome now. However, many from Group B show trust in the new president Al-Sisi while most from Group A consider his presidency a new version of the old regime. Some respondents accused Egyptian decision makers of being inadequate. These are considered too old, not interested in the general well-being, and aiming at polarising the public opinion:

“The generation that is ruling the country is old (i.e. army, administration, schools, etc.). These people waited for 20 years to go to power and now they do not want to leave. In Egypt you need to have a certain age to reach power, or to have connections (...) Their mentality is old, not innovative. For instance, they do not accept new technologies” (interview with 4M on 12 April 2013).

“There is a polarization in the country created by the current military government. People think that everyone against the military regime is against the country. Media are describing rebels abroad as betrayers” (interview with 14M on 7 July 2014).
7.2 CONCLUSIONS

Regarding the first point that this paper addresses, the study findings indicate that the characteristics of Egyptian highly-skilled migration to Austria can facilitate the emergence of an effective brain circulation. The experience abroad brings an additional value to respondents’ initial professional skills: a vast majority of respondents think that their skill-level has increased as a result of staying and working in Austria and their master’s and doctoral studies are mostly undertaken abroad. Moreover, most believe that these new skills can be applied in Egypt and they can transfer knowledge/skills there, while some have already participated in lectures or remote workshops to transfer knowledge or build awareness about different topics such as new technology and social values.

With a few exceptions respondents’ answers about elements in the socio-economic and legal settings in Austria and in their current working environment there worth introducing to Egypt are rather vague. Nevertheless, they indicate that they can both detect and appreciate new methodologies, ideas, values to be introduced to their country of origin. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that most respondents have been living in Austria for a long time, it is possible to conclude that their wish to be helpful to Egypt has not fallen away although they are not ready to renounce what they have built in their new home: only one-third answered positively as to coming back to Egypt indefinitely and most of them were recent migrants; some long-term migrants prefer to share their time between the two countries without making a definitive decision.

However, more than half the respondents would be interested in returning temporarily to Egypt through programs for knowledge transfer and almost the same number would participate in virtual workshops. At the same time, respondents do not see distance as an obstacle to their further involvement in Egypt’s affairs, as indicated by the vast majority believing that they contribute to Egypt’s development from abroad. Their suggestions on how to strengthen their homeland connection and their engagement with Egypt’s development show a demand for programmes facilitating their involvement, from policy development to skills transfer and investment.

At the same time, the study findings indicate that the features of their migration can mitigate a brain drain from Egypt. As noted, the study shows that master’s and doctoral studies are mostly undertaken abroad. Moreover, a vast majority moved to Austria for either a
study or work opportunity, which suggests a wish for career advancement that cannot be satisfied in Egypt. However, the study shows a risk of brain waste in Austria: although the majority work in the field in which they graduated, most respondents whose occupation does not match their studies are working in a position below their educational level and one is unemployed due to poor working opportunities in Austria in her sector.

As regards the second point, the study findings show that the overall contribution of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants to the development of their homeland covers human, financial and social capital. Almost one-third declared to undertake transnational activities or have done so in the past. These include: charity activities, a project to transfer knowledge, business development and political activity. At the same time, more than one-third are in contact with associations in Egypt: either religious, political or philanthropic. Concerning respondents’ economic contributions, these are commonly not directly productive since respondents do not seem inclined to investments or business activities: remittances are mainly sent for personal/family responsibilities or charity purposes and only a minority invests or are willing to do so in Egypt or in Austria. Prevalent sectors are either stocks or real estate. Only a few declared to be interested in participating in programs encouraging investments, business start-ups, or micro-finance in Egypt. Although the majority send money to Egypt the survey highlights that the high cost of transfer thrusts them to use informal channels. The duration of staying in Austria does not seem to affect remittances flows to Egypt since respondents sending them are equally distributed between recent and long-term migrants.

The last point concerns the level and the nature of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants’ engagement towards their homeland. According to the study findings, respondents show a good level of engagement with Egypt. Except for one, all respondents still have connections with Egypt, mostly family members and friends. Moreover, the majority visit their homeland more than once a year or at least once a year and keep themselves informed about Egypt’s state of affairs. The Internet is considered quite useful to maintain contact with the country of origin and some respondents underlined that their connection with Egypt has definitely improved with it. More important, their engagement does not seem to decrease over time. The respondents’ duration of stay in Austria does not affect the frequency of their visits to the country of origin or their interest in programmes for knowledge transfer, whether virtual or not. Instead, the majority of respondents demand that the embassy and consulates provide more activities to connect the Egyptian community and to involve them in Egypt’s development.
However, the duration of stay affects the sense of belonging of migrants to their country of origin. Although almost half feel at home more in Egypt than in Austria, most of these are recent migrants. Additionally, most of the respondents that have been living in Austria for some time said they feel uneasy when they go back to Egypt, they feel like a stranger and are not in line with people’s mentality there.

The length of stay affects the type of engagement as well. Respondents who have been in Austria more than 15 years are more involved in charity activities and are more active in diaspora organisations. At the same time they do not see an active role of the Egyptian government in facilitating their support to Egypt’s development and show difficulties in understanding the value of their experience abroad for Egypt in terms of skills and contacts acquired. Instead, Egyptian migrants arrived more recently to Austria seem more conscious of the possible value of their professional experience in Egypt’s development as well as more critical towards the Egyptian political establishment and diaspora organisations in Austria. Although the respondents’ general opinion is that the uprising in Egypt was positive because it generated profound positive changes in people’s approach to politics, this seems to have influenced negatively the relationship between Copts and their homeland: some Copt respondents have stopped their visits to Egypt since the beginning of the uprising for security reasons and showed recrimination towards Egypt.

The study findings show that respondents’ engagement with Egypt does not compromise their relationship with Austria. Instead, respondents generally have a positive relationship with it and this seems to improve over time. Most of the respondents that feel at home more in Austria than in Egypt are long-term migrants. However, discrimination and a language barrier are considered the main obstacles to integration.

However, the study detected various elements that can frustrate migrants’ engagement with Egypt. There is a diffused scepticism among respondents towards the political and economic environment in Egypt perceived usually as not open to new ideas and personal initiatives. In some cases they show the impression that the two countries are actually too different to transfer any element successfully. Additionally, the findings indicate that there is no social or institutional structure to channel their relationships with the homeland: almost no respondent knew of programs to facilitate knowledge transfer to Egypt or to facilitate transnational economic activities. Respondents expressed a sense of neglect by the government and the staff in the embassy and consulates, complaining that these do not meet their demand for activities to facilitate their integration in Austria or their involvement with Egypt. As said above, young migrants do not have a positive opinion of Egyptian or Arab migrant
associations in Austria, but instead claim they are highly politicised and do not organise any activities, which prevent them to support their country via their community. Finally, two categories of respondents appear to have more difficulties in being active in terms of brain circulation. As said, elderly respondents do not value their experience abroad in terms of acquired professional skills or contacts. Meanwhile, Egyptian women are less engaged with Austrian society than men, which can prevent them having the possibility to acquire new knowledge, skills and information from their experience abroad.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

This study had three purposes. First, it aimed to analyse the current policies on migration and development adopted by the government of Egypt about Egyptian highly-skilled migrants. Second, it intended to analyse the Austrian legal and policy framework’s ability to influence highly-skilled third-country nationals’ integration in its territory and their transnationalism. Finally, it aimed to explore the nature and the characteristics of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria, in particular their sense of belonging and their contributions towards Egypt. A research question corresponded to each purpose:

a) Is the government of Egypt implementing effective policies aimed to increase the contribution of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants to their homeland’s development?

b) Is the legal and policy framework in Austria able to foster highly-skilled migrants’ integration and transnational activities?

c) Are Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria interested and able to play the role of “agent of development” for their country of origin?

This chapter describes the main study findings and presents the main conclusions in order to address the study’s research questions. By answering these questions this study aspires to contribute to the accumulation of academic knowledge on the migration and development nexus, as well as to help design informed policies intended to increase the contributions of migrants on the development of countries of origin.

8.1 MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The first chapter analyses the academic thinking on the migration and development nexus. The study concludes that this has been subject to a deep evolution over time due to the occurred changes in both migration studies and development literature. On one side, while initially the migration phenomenon was studied exclusively under an economic point of view,
later sociology and anthropology sciences introduced important contributions. This has helped pass from objective, static and deterministic studies to subjective, dynamic and less predictable models. On the other side, during the last decade the concept of countries’ development expanded beyond economic growth to become a wider process expanding people’s substantive freedoms, in line with Sen’s thinking, and therefore linked to people’s self-determination instead of their income. Human capability, namely the people’s ability to lead their life and to amplify their possibilities of choice, has become the main indicator of development ahead of income and material growth. Consequent empirical researches have demonstrated that the effects of migration on the development of sending countries are more complex and less predictable that previously thought, especially because of a reinterpretation of migrants’ contributions, whose scope has been expanded beyond monetary remittances to include social remittances, skills and knowledge, as well as consumptive investments (e.g. for education and health care). Finally, the transnational paradigm highlights how the advances in the communication and transport technologies drive a perspective shift on migration, from a definitive move to a continuous and multi-dimensional process linking two countries. Eventually migrants adopt transnational identities and develop loyalties towards both countries while the distinction between permanent, temporary and return migrant becomes obsolete. This puts into question the usual assumption that migrants’ engagement to their homeland is inversely proportional to the length of stay and their integration in the receiving country; on the contrary, transnational engagement and integration in the receiving country are simultaneous processes that reinforce each other. Moreover, thanks to the new technologies, migrants’ physical return to their homeland is not anymore a necessary prerequisite to support its development.

As a consequence of this evolution of literature on both development and migration studies, currently the prevalent thinking refuses to adopt a Manichean vision towards migration, which was prevalent among scholars and decision makers until the 1980s. These judged migration as either absolutely positive or negative for sending countries. Instead, the actual impact of migration on the country of origin depends on too many variables to be predicted. However, scholars stress the importance of the decision makers’ role in ensuring a friendly environment that can downsize the negative consequences of migration and amplify its benefits. To this aim, sending countries’ migration and development policies need to be part of a broad national development plan with a strong inter-ministerial coordination. This would guarantee their effective and long-lasting impact and ensure a fertile environment for the entire spectrum of migrants’ contributions.
Additionally, countries of origin’s policies may not be sufficient to foster the development impact of migrants’ communities abroad. A transnational perspective demands a holistic approach towards the migration and development nexus that goes beyond the relation between migrants and sending countries and includes receiving countries as well. These latter play an important role in enhancing migrants’ development impact in sending countries both through cooperation with these latter to promote transnational activities and by facilitating migrants’ integration in their territory.

The **second chapter** presents a historical overview of sending and receiving countries’ policy approaches towards the migration and development nexus since the end of the Second World War, especially as it concerns migration flows from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe. It is possible to detect several phases, influenced by the main academic conclusions on the impact of migration on development as well as major geopolitical events. From an initial optimism policy-makers in both receiving and sending countries have passed to a pessimist phase, then to a readjustment stage until the current resurgence of interest. This was mainly activated by the 2003 World Bank report that has generated an international debate involving academics and politicians on the contribution of migration on sending countries’ development. However, this debate has been initiated and driven by receiving countries and the international organisations led by them. As a consequence, it presents three biases: a strong focus on sending countries’ security and stability; more attention to the impact of development on migration than the reverse; a preference for the economic aspects of development that neglects the moral aspects linked to Sen’s definition of development.

Looking closely at the highly-skilled migration from the southern countries of the Mediterranean Sea, this is mainly grounded on sending countries’ economic characteristics as well as external factors. First, the current globalisation and the prevalent liberal economic doctrine have widened the economic and social gap between northern and southern countries that pushes highly-skilled workers to migrate in search of better working and life conditions. Second, the sending countries’ past investments on tertiary education combined with their labour intensive economy have generated a high unemployment rate among university graduates that the local labour market cannot absorb. Finally, industrialised countries compete to attract highly-skilled workers to maintain their central position in the prevalent knowledge-based economy thereby generating a high labour demand.

Although migration management in a globalised world would require a strong coordination between sending and receiving countries, the mobility regime is still regulated by national
laws. OECD countries and in particular the EU member states have put in place instruments to facilitate the admission and circulation of highly-skilled workers while they are less keen to open their borders to low-skilled migrants. However, the EU framework offers narrow migration possibilities to highly-skilled workers as well, since it is based on the internal market balance principle for which admission for working purposes is subject to the unavailability of the required skills in the local market. Although migrants would address the EU member states’ structural labour shortage and support their welfare state’s sustainability, since the 1990s the EU has been setting up a system that facilitates internal mobility while erecting barriers to migrants from third countries. This is based on the more-for-more approach that offers third countries visa facilitation upon conclusion of a readmission agreement. The EC proposal to enhance circular migration prefigures an approach following the GCC countries’ model that offers multiple entrance visas without residency rights. In this way the EU would address the lack of labourers and maintain the welfare state’s sustainability while avoiding integration challenges. Yet, a circular migration system needs a strong coordination with sending countries, which may not be interested since they would renounce migration as unemployment valve.

The third chapter is concerned with policy practices to foster highly-skilled migrants’ contributions to sending countries’ development. As noted previously, the debate on migration and development is biased towards receiving countries’ interests that prioritises the economic aspects of development. Notwithstanding this, decision makers in both sending and receiving countries and aid actors have exchanged best practices within international fora - such as regional consultative processes and international dialogues on migration - on different areas related to the migration and development nexus. This study identified good policy practices to foster highly-skilled migrants’ contributions to sending countries’ development to be implemented by both countries of origin and destination as derived from literature on the subject, implemented programmes, and personal reflection.

In line with Sen’s development paradigm, this study did not only focus on economic development but identified sending countries’ policies covering four broad areas: remittances transfer, remittances productivities, facilitating brain circulation, and engaging diasporas. This allows exploiting the full range of highly-skilled migrants’ contributions. Additionally, identified policies are in line with the transnational theory that does not require migrants to return indefinitely to their homeland. Therefore, contrary to a usual understanding, permanent return is just one of the possible options migrants have in order to be involved in their origin country’s affairs besides short-term visits and remote involvement.
As mentioned previously, receiving countries have a critical role on the extent to which migrants can contribute to the development of their country of origin. Most policies set up by sending countries to support their diaspora’s engagement need the collaboration of receiving countries through bilateral or regional agreements. Additionally, receiving countries can limit or enhance migrants’ transnational identities and therefore their monetary, cultural and social transfers towards the country of origin. In line with the transnational theory, transnationalism and integration are considered simultaneous processes that reinforce each other: integration facilitates migrants’ transnational activities while these latter create the basis for successful integration. Therefore, migrants well incorporated in the receiving society and institutions that perform transnational activities contribute the most to the development of their country of origin.

Although receiving countries usually tend to look suspiciously at migrants’ transnationalism the study identified good policy practices to support migrants’ transnational activities in four major areas: economic, social, political and cultural sectors. As regards integration policies, since the 1990s these have instead been the subject of a resurgent interest in Europe. The study identified good policy practices supporting highly-skilled migrants’ integration in the economic, cultural, social and civic areas. However, since transnationalism and integration are two interconnected processes that strengthen each other the distinction between the two categories of policies is blurred and sometimes they overlap.

The fourth chapter analyses the Egyptian highly-skilled migration. After a historical overview of since the 1970s, it explores the characteristics of the current Egyptian migration and its potential effects on the development of Egypt. Particular focus was on the features of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria.

Migration flows from Egypt have increased significantly during the last two decades. Migrants’ remittances have grown as well showing a counterrtrend with national and international crises and can be considered one of the most important and stable sources of foreign currency for the country. The percentage of highly-skilled migrants, especially scientists and technicians, has augmented in the past decade, while the share of unskilled labourers has decreased. Although the main destinations of Egyptian migrants are still the GCC countries, Egyptian highly-skilled migration flows are shifting towards the OECD area. Among OECD countries, most Egyptian migrants reside in the USA and Canada but their flows to Europe have been recently growing.

The study highlighted that Egyptian highly-skilled migrants can be considered a case of brain gain more than brain drain. Their departure does not affect the economy of Egypt since
they are mostly working in sectors in which the local labour market is not enough developed to absorb them. Instead they are instrumental to the enhancement of brain circulation. As an IOM survey shows, migrants are eager to be in touch with their country of origin and to be also helpful. Regarding migration to GCC countries, there is already in place a pattern of circular migration that can facilitate the transfer of the new acquired skills and the employment of their social and financial remittances in productive investments. Even in the case of migration to OECD countries, where migrants may get permanent residency, the new technologies would allow brain circulation.

Compared to the movement of low-skilled workers highly-skilled migration entails various advantages to sending countries: highly-skilled migrants usually use more formal channels to transfer remittances thus strengthening the bank system; they are able to save more and therefore invest more in productive activities; their experience abroad is more enriching in terms of skills enhancement and therefore they are a superior source of knowledge and social remittances.

Highly-skilled workers in the OECD countries are potentially more beneficial to Egypt’s development than the ones in the GCC countries: they are more exposed to innovative technologies and industrial systems; they are in contact with a different socio-political environment and therefore can be a vehicle to introduce new ideas in the country of origin and to enhance the political and social debate there; being more gender-balanced they can strengthen the female work force and ultimately reinforce the gender-sensitive approach in the Egyptian socio-political and economic system.

As concerns the Egyptian population in Austria, its size is small in comparison with other Egyptian communities in Europe such as in Italy. However, its features suggest a high potential contribution to the development of Egypt. The volume of remittance flows from Austria has been increasing steadily in the last years notwithstanding the financial crisis. Moreover, Egyptian migration to Austria is historically highly-skilled and composed of academic scholars and highly educated professionals. Although in the past Egyptian migration was mainly a male phenomenon, data show that in the last decade it has been subject to a feminization process and the current stock of Egyptian migrants is gender-balanced. Finally, the presence of Egyptian migrant organisations that are well established and well connected with Austrian political authorities can facilitate the transfer of knowledge and social remittances to Egypt. In terms of religious belief the Egyptian community in Austria is balanced between Muslims and Copts. However, the Egyptian uprising in 2011 seems to have
united the migrant community in Austria where demonstrations against the Muslim Brotherhood’s political rise in Egypt gathered together Copts, Muslims and secular Egyptians.

The *fifth chapter* addressed the first research question concerning whether the government of Egypt implements effective policies to increase the contribution of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants to their homeland’s development, taking into account the good practices identified in the third chapter.

The study concludes that although since the early 1970s Egypt has facilitated emigration flows, the government has always adopted a passive strategy on migration and development and in particular towards highly-skilled migrants. Over the years the Egyptian government has treated migration mostly as a vent valve for the labour market and promoted it, especially for low-skill workers, with the purpose to decrease the unemployment rate. Therefore, migrants, especially the highly-skilled ones, have never been considered an opportunity and consequently the system shows a strong delay in creating the conditions to use their potential for the benefit of the country, which results in a waste of money and talent.

In Egypt, none of the four migration and development areas identified from programmes and practices to exploit the full range of highly-skilled migrants’ contributions have been fully developed until now. Concerning remittances transfer and productivity, the laws to facilitate money transfers and investments have not been accompanied by concrete steps to encourage migrants’ investments and business start-ups. The reform of the business climate is more oriented to attract big foreign investors than small investors such as migrants. Therefore, small business creation is hampered by poor adequate infrastructures, cumbersome procedures, high taxes, and bureaucratic delays. Although governmental agencies and banks provide services for SMEs there are no measures to promote competition among services providers in order to lower their prices, to inform migrants of their existence, and to train them in business and financial subjects to encourage their investments.

The panorama of adopted measures to encourage brain circulation is limited and marked by a fragmented approach. The declared government strategy focuses on protecting migrants’ rights abroad and on promoting their migration rather than on encouraging their return or using their contributions to Egypt’s benefit. Currently, there are no programmes to facilitate highly-skilled migrants’ reintegration in the labour market and there are only few and isolated initiatives to actively engage highly-skilled migrants through virtual or temporary return. Meanwhile, the main international agreement for the enhancement of the highly-skilled labour mobility, the GATS mode 4, has not been actively promoted within the private sector and during negotiations for bilateral agreements.
As regards policies to encourage diaspora’s engagement, since the 1980s dedicated bodies have been in charge to establish a dialogue with Egyptian communities abroad while some attempts have been made to determine their potential contribution to Egypt’s development. However, these bodies have not been able to overcome migrants’ mistrust towards public institutions in Egypt and abroad. Meanwhile, Egyptian migrant organisations abroad have not been involved actively in Egypt’s affairs.

This approach towards Egyptian migrants is being reproduced in Austria where the main initiatives towards migrants concern their protection and a memorandum of understanding promoting their study in Austria while there are no measures explicitly aimed at improving the linkages between migration and development. However, some initiatives have the potential to facilitate the engagement of Egyptian migrants such as the memoranda of understandings to facilitate academic exchange between the universities of the two countries as well as the Egyptian-Austrian Business Council that promotes trade, and industrial and technological collaboration between Egyptian and Austrian institutions and enterprises. Additionally, the Cultural Office of the Egyptian Embassy in Vienna is active in maintaining cultural ties of Egyptian migrants in Austria with their homeland through cultural events and Arabic classes.

However, with the end of Mubarak’s regime in 2011 a new attention towards Egyptian migrants seems to have developed within elected bodies such as the parliament. In the 2014 constitution their rights and interests have received constitutional guarantee and their contribution to the development of Egypt given official recognition. Active and passive political rights of Egyptian migrants have been introduced as well, although their exercise presents some limits.

The sixth chapter addressed the second research question regarding whether the legal and policy framework in Austria is able to foster highly-skilled migrants’ integration and transnational activities. The analysis took into account the good practices identified in the third chapter.

After having refused to consider itself as a country of immigration for decades, in the last years Austria has dramatically shifted its approach to migration. This is now pursuing two directions simultaneously. First, unlike in the past, migration policies are not informed on annual labour needs but on the long-term goal of maintaining the Austrian economy’s competitiveness on the global scale: the past demand-driven migration systems such as the guest-workers programmes and the quota system have been replaced by the RWR Card system that offers an entry channel to the local labour market, based on qualitative criteria to
ensure a basin of workers necessary for its knowledge-based economy in case of shortage. Second, integration has been put at the centre of Austrian migration policies. These are informed by the principle Integration from the Beginning according to which integration measures accompany migrants in a structured process starting in the country of origin.

The study concludes that in Austria, highly-skilled migration plays a key role linking the integration and transnationalism processes. Since highly-skilled migrants are considered necessary for the country’s economy they are at the centre of the new Austrian approach to migration. Compared to other migrants, highly-skilled migrants’ entry and stay is facilitated through the RWR Card system as well as through various services offered to support their settlement in different areas of life including counselling and networking facilitation. At the same time, their integration is encouraged through a system of permits that supports their permanent residence in the country as well as the possibility to acquire the Austrian nationality.

Looking closely at migrants’ transnationalism, the Austrian legal and policy framework favours it to the extent in which it supports its own development. As regards economic transnationalism, the government has put in place measures to attract highly-skilled workers and entrepreneurs and to help them establish cross-border businesses. However, there are still barriers partially limiting the entry regime of highly-skilled workers in the Austrian labour market (e.g. the need of a job offer to apply for the RWR Card, and the high level of requirements to obtain it), probably as a result of trade unions’ resistance. Conversely, until now measures to facilitate small-scale transnational economic activities for personal purposes such as remittances transfer have not been implemented.

Cultural transnationalism is encouraged mainly in terms of facilitating brain circulation, which is considered functional to the internationalisation of Austrian higher education institutions. To this aim, cooperation agreements between universities support the mobility of students and scholars. At the same time the government is trying to speed up the recognition of degrees acquired abroad although for highly-skilled third-country nationals this is not necessary. Instead, the government facilitates transfer of social remittances mainly through support to diaspora associations’ cultural activities and to transnational professional networks.

On the contrary, migrants’ social transnational activities face various obstacles. In line with the government’s declared position against circular migration, the residence permit system does not allow long absences without interrupting the process for acquisition of permanent residence and nationality. Furthermore, public funding for cross-border initiatives engaging diaspora has been discontinuous while support to migrants’ families left behind takes mainly
the form of promotion of family reunion. This latter is facilitated in the case of highly-skilled migrants through the RWR Card Plus that gives unlimited access to the labour market and equal conditions to nationals for employment in both private and public sectors. In addition, the impossibility of being absent for long periods affects negatively migrants’ political activities in the country of origin while Austrian law does not give political rights to third-country nationals either at federal or local level.

As regards the integration process, notwithstanding that during the last decade Austria spent particular efforts on pursuing successful migrants’ integration in its territory, this has not been promoted uniformly in all aspects of life. While the economic and social dimensions are quite developed, the cultural and civic dimensions present various limits. Furthermore, the possibility to integrate in Austria is not equally granted to all third-country nationals but highly-skilled migrants enjoy a privileged access to long-term settlement in Austria.

As regards the economic dimension of integration, the Austrian legal framework guarantees migrants’ rights as workers and they enjoy the same working conditions as nationals. Furthermore, the AMS offers various services to reduce unemployment among migrants and to avoid brain waste. However, through the RWR Card highly-skilled migrants have a facilitated access to the labour market in both private and public sectors.

Regarding the social dimension, several initiatives are in place to fight discrimination based on ethnic origin and to ensure third-country nationals’ access to social rights (e.g. through guidelines to include diversity and intercultural dialogues in the welfare state institutions). However, family reunion is facilitated for highly-skilled workers: through the RWR Card Plus their family members do not need to comply with the integration agreement’s requirements and have unlimited access to the labour market.

Interreligious dialogue occupies a central place in Austrian policies for cultural integration: since the 19th century Austrian law provides recognised religious communities internal autonomy and special legal standing, while Islam has a specific channel of communication through the Dialogforum Islam. However, the integration of third-country nationals’ pupils in the Austrian educational system is mainly focused on German language acquisition while there are no comprehensive induction programmes. Although there is a long tradition of multicultural education - centred mainly on mother-tongue instruction – since the time of guest-worker programmes, most of the activities are not implemented homogenously throughout the territory but are at the province’s or school’s discretion. Additionally, it has not been possible to find significant initiatives to facilitate an equal distribution of students with migrant backgrounds in order to prevent the emergence of all-migrant pupils schools.
Migrants’ civic participation is the integration area that faces most obstacles. During the last decade the acquisition of long-term residency and Austrian nationality has been restricted: long absences interrupt the continuous residence needed to obtain the EC Permanent Residence permit; norms on nationality apply the jus sanguinis principle and do not allow dual nationality while naturalisation requires an uninterrupted chain of residence permits. However, also in this case highly-skilled migrants have a privileged channel to both long-term residency and Austrian nationality through the RWR Card that grants settlement rights. Finally, political participation for third-country nationals is quite limited: voting rights for political elections are not granted while advisory councils that have been established to support migrants’ stay and integration in Austria do not foresee the participation of diaspora representatives.

The seventh chapter addressed the third research question concerning whether Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria are interested and able to play the role of “development agent” for their country of origin. It analysed the findings of a qualitative study conducted on highly-skilled Egyptian migrants in Austria. The research provided an overview of the nature of their contributions to Egypt and of their sense of belonging towards their homeland. In particular, the research aimed to find out whether their length of stay in Austria has been affecting the intensity and the nature of their engagement with their home country. The study applied a qualitative approach based on in-depth interviews with Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria. Although it is a preliminary research and the small size of the sample does not allow generalising of its findings, the information provided offers a preliminary understanding of the profile of Egyptian highly-skilled migrants living in Austria, the quality and strength of their ties with their homeland, and of their contributions to it.

The study concludes that Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria are able to contribute substantially to Egypt’s development, especially in terms of brain circulation. The analysis highlights that the characteristics of Egyptian highly-skilled migration to Austria can facilitate the emergence of an effective brain circulation. The study findings show that respondents’ experience abroad brings an additional value to their initial professional skills. For instance, master’s and doctoral studies are mostly undertaken abroad while a vast majority moved to Austria for either a study or work opportunity. This indicates a wish for career advancement that cannot be satisfied in Egypt, which mitigates the risk of brain drain there. Moreover, although most respondents’ answers about elements in Austria and specifically in their current working environment there worth introducing to Egypt were generic, they indicate that respondents can both detect and appreciate new methodologies, ideas and values to be
introduced to the country of origin. With a few exceptions, most believe that their new skills can be applied there.

Additionally, the study findings detected among respondents forms of transnationalism towards their homeland covering human, financial and social capital. Almost one-third declared to undertake transnational activities or to have done so in the past, while more than one-third is in contact with associations in Egypt. However, most transnational activities relate to social and cultural dimensions while respondents’ economic contributions are commonly not directly productive since respondents do not seem inclined to investments or business activities. Although the majority send money to Egypt the survey highlights that the high cost of transfer pushes them to use informal channels. The duration of stay in Austria does not seem to affect remittances flows to Egypt since respondents sending them are equally distributed between recent and long-term migrants.

The study concludes as well that Egyptian highly-skilled migrants in Austria are willing to contribute to Egypt’s development. Respondents show a good level of engagement with Egypt: the majority of respondents still have connections with Egypt, visit their homeland at least once a year and keep themselves informed about Egypt’s state of affairs. More important, their engagement does not seem to decrease over time. Notwithstanding the fact that most respondents have been living in Austria for a long time, the findings show that their wish to be helpful to Egypt has not fallen away although they are not ready to renounce what they have built in their new home. At the same time, respondents do not see distance as an obstacle to their further involvement in Egypt’s affairs but expressed a demand for programmes facilitating their involvement, from policy development to skills transfer and investment.

However, the duration of stay affects the sense of belonging of migrants to their country of origin. Recent migrants feel more at home in Egypt while most of the respondents that have been living in Austria for some time said they feel uneasy when they go back to Egypt. The length of stay affects the type of engagement as well. Long-term migrants are more involved in charity activities and are more active in diaspora organisations than recent migrants, while these latter seem more conscious of the value of their experience abroad for Egypt as well as more critical towards the Egyptian political establishment and diaspora organisations in Austria. However, the study findings show that respondents’ engagement with Egypt does not compromise their relationship with Austria: a strong majority consider themselves at ease in Austria and many respondents that are long-term migrants feel more at home there than in
Egypt. However, the study detected some obstacles to integration such as discrimination at work, brain waste and a language barrier.

However, the study detected various elements that can frustrate migrants’ engagement with Egypt. First, the study shows a risk of brain waste in Austria with some respondents working in a position below their educational level. Second, there is a diffused scepticism among respondents towards the political and economic environment in Egypt perceived usually as not being open to new ideas and personal initiatives. Third, the findings indicate that there is no social or institutional structure to channel their relationships with the homeland. Respondents expressed a sense of neglect by the government and the staff in the embassies and consulates, claiming that the main provided services concern administrative and protection activities, while activities to connect the Egyptian community are limited and communication between Egyptian authorities and Egyptians abroad is problematic. Almost no respondent knew programs to facilitate knowledge transfer to Egypt or to facilitate transnational economic activities, which suggests that the government does not advertise them among migrants. As said above, young migrants do not have a positive opinion of Egyptian or Arab migrant associations in Austria, which prevent them to support their country via the community. However, the qualitative study confirmed that the 2011 uprising had raised hopes on future political developments in Egypt. Although at the time of the interviews the situation was still too fluid to foresee an outcome, for respondents the uprising had generated profound positive effects in people's approach to politics.

Finally, two categories of respondents appear to have more difficulties in being active in terms of brain circulation. As said, elderly respondents do not value their experience abroad in terms of acquired professional skills or contacts. Meanwhile, Egyptian women are less engaged with Austrian society than men, which can prevent them having the possibility to acquire new knowledge, skills and information from their experience abroad.

From the above findings it is possible to draw some conclusions aimed at informing the current debate on the migration and development nexus and in particular on the role of highly-skilled migrants as agents of development for their homeland.

The qualitative study confirms the transnational theory’s hypothesis that migrants tend to adopt transnational identities and develop loyalties towards both origin and destination countries. It is possible to note respondents’ engagement with both countries especially among long-term migrants as well as transnational activities between Austria and Egypt. However, while respondents’ involvement with Egypt does not seem to compromise their
relationship with Austria, their duration of stay there affects their sense of belonging towards their country of origin. Long-term migrants say they feel uneasy when they go back to Egypt.

The study highlights that the current transport and communication technology supports migrants adopting transnational identities. Respondents confirmed that their connection with the country of origin has improved since the emergence of the Internet. Furthermore, they do not have problems to help remotely and do not see distance as a limit to their involvement in the origin country’s affairs. What is influencing migrants’ engagement with their origin country is mostly their opinion and trust towards the political, economic and cultural establishment in the origin country. In this case, some respondents were quite sceptical that their support would be valued in Egypt.

However, the study highlights as well that diaspora communities are not uniform but composed of subgroups with different needs and levels of engagement with the homeland. A dichotomy appears between Muslim and Coptic Egyptians. The findings show that Copts abroad do not feel as part of a united Egypt, but rather as members of a mistreated minority. Coptic respondents show resentment towards their homeland due to the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to the political scene. Another dichotomy is evident between long-term and recent migrants in terms of awareness of their role in the homeland’s growth and their relationship with diaspora organisations. Furthermore, elderly migrants have problems in being actively involved in Egypt’s affairs in terms of brain circulation while women are less engaged with Austrian society than men, which can prevent them having the possibility to acquire new knowledge, skills and information from their experience abroad.

The findings confirm the transnational theory’s hypothesis that migrants’ engagement with their homeland does not decrease over time. Both long-term and recent migrants show a similar engagement in terms of intensity. In particular, the length of stay in the destination country does not influence the remittances transfer. Instead, this is mostly proportional to the level of settlement in the destination country.

Concerning migrants’ contribution to the origin country’s development, findings confirm that the experience abroad of highly-skilled migrants’ in the OECD countries is enriching and therefore beneficial to the country of origin. A part from a few cases of brain waste, respondents have increased their professional skills and these can be applied in Egypt. Additionally, they detect and appreciate the methods, ideas and values encountered in the receiving country.

As regards remittances transfer, the study findings do not support the hypothesis that highly-skilled migrants use the formal banking channels for sending money home (Jureidini et
al., 2010). Instead, respondents prefer to send money through personal contacts. The high cost of transfer is influencing their choice. Moreover, the findings show that remittances are mostly used for consumptive investment, which goes against the hypothesis that highly-skilled migrants would invest in productive activities thanks to their high salary that allows savings (Fargues, 2010). Although this may be true, other factors play a role such as migrants’ mind-set (i.e. entrepreneurial spirit) and tailored financial products channelling their remittances towards productive investments. In the case of highly-skilled Egyptian migrants in Austria neither element is strong: no tailored saving product has been found through this study while respondents did not show an inclination towards business, and investing in Austria was not considered more attractive than in Egypt.

This study was of an exploratory nature and therefore its findings can serve as a basis for future research. In particular, it would be useful to explore further the different subgroups of Egyptian highly-skilled migration in Austria with the help of a larger sample. The following dichotomies detected through this study would deserve further investigation: the difference between Egyptian Muslims and Copts in their sense of belonging towards Egypt; the different relationship with migrant associations between recent and long-term Egyptian migrants and their different engagement towards their homeland. Finally, the relationship between highly-skilled Egyptian women in Austria and Egypt’s development should be further explored since unfortunately they were unrepresented in this study.
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# APPENDIX I

## QUALITATIVE STUDY INTERVIEWS

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</tbody>
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APPENDIX II

QUALITATIVE STUDY INTERVIEW GUIDE

Respondent’s code:
Date:

Biographical Data:

1. Year of birth:
2. City of birth:
3. Gender:
4. City of current residence in Austria:
5. Highest level of education:
6. In which country did you get your university diploma?
7. Field of study:
8. Since when do you live in Austria?
9. Why did you move to Austria?

Questions on Brain Circulation:

10. What is your occupation in Austria?
11. What was your occupation in Egypt?
12. Do you feel you are helping your country while in Austria?
13. In case how?
14. What are the obstacles?
15. Have your skills improved in Austria?
16. Can these skills be applied in Egypt?
17. In case, how?
18. Is there any obstacle to apply your skills in Egypt?
19. Do you think you can teach something in Egypt (e.g. through workshops)?
20. Is there anything (management system/working conditions/technology/Human Resources structure/etc.) in your current working environment in Austria that would be worth introducing in Egypt? Please describe.

21. Is there anything (at social/economical/legal level) in Austria that would be worth introducing in Egypt? Please describe.

22. Do you know any secondment / temporary return programme?

23. Would you like to participate to secondment/temporary return programmes?

24. Would you like to participate to virtual workshop/seminar to transfer your skill in Egypt?

**Questions on Remittances Transfer and Productivity:**

25. Do you send money to Egypt?

26. In case, how?

27. Do you invest in Egypt or would you like to? Please describe.

28. What are the obstacles?

29. Are you aware of any programme for investment/Business start-up/Loans/micro-credit in Egypt?

30. Would you be interested in these programmes?

31. Do you invest in Austria? Please describe.

**Questions on Sense of Belonging towards Egypt and Other Forms of Engagement with their Homeland:**

32. Are you informed about current affairs in Egypt?

33. In case, how do you get informed?

34. How often do you come back to Egypt?

35. Do you still have contacts in Egypt?

36. In case, what kind?

37. Does the Internet facilitate your contacts with Egypt?

38. Are you connected with Muslim/Arab/Egyptian organisations in Austria?

39. Are you connected with Muslim/Arab/Egyptian organisations in Egypt?

40. In case, what is your role?

41. In case, what does your organisation do?
42. How do you feel when you come back to Egypt?
43. What do you feel towards Egypt?
44. What do you feel towards Austria?
45. Do you feel well integrated in Austria?
46. Do you plan to come back to Egypt definitely one day? Please explain the reason.
47. Under which conditions would you come back?
48. Do you feel supported by the Egyptian Embassy? Is it useful to you?
49. Do you think that the end of Mubarak’s regime would help you to support more Egypt?
50. In your opinion, can the current political situation in Egypt support its development? If so, in which way?
51. Do you have any suggestion to the government to improve the connections with Egyptian migrants?
52. Do you have any suggestion to the government to involve more Egyptian migrants in supporting Egypt’s development?